

VI. "God-Inspired Scripture"¹

The phrase, "Given by inspiration of God," or "Inspired of God," occurs, as is well-known, but once in the New Testament - in the classical passage, to wit, II Tim. iii. 16, which is rendered in the Authorized Version, "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God," and by the Revised Version, "Every Scripture inspired of God is, etc." The Greek word represented by it, and standing in this passage as an epithet or predicate of "Scripture" - *qeo,pneustoj* - though occurring here only in the New Testament and found nowhere earlier in all Greek literature, has nevertheless not hitherto seemed of doubtful interpretation. Its form, its subsequent usage, the implications of parallel terms and of the analogy of faith, have combined with the suggestions of the context to assign to it a meaning which has been constantly attributed to it from the first records of Christian interpretation until yesterday.

This unvarying understanding of the word is thus reported by the leading lexicographers: Schleusner "New Test. Lexicon." Glasgow reprint of fourth Leipzig edition, 1824: "

qeo,pneustoj, ou, o`, h`, afflatu divino actus, divino quodam spiritu afflatus, et partim de hominibus usurpatur, quorum sensus et sermones ad vim divinam referendi sunt, v. c. poëtis, faticidis, prophetis, auguribus, qui etiam qeodi,daktoi vocantur, partim de ipsis rebus, notionibus, sermonibus, et scriptis, a Deo suggestis, et divino instructu natis, ex qeo.j et pne,w spiro, quod, ut Latinum afflo, de diis speciatim usurpatur, quorum vi homines interdum ita

agi existimabantur, ut notiones rerum, antea ignotarum, insolito quodam modo conciperent atque mente vehementius concitata in sermones sublimiores et elegantiores erumperent. Conf. *Cic. pro Archia* c. 14; *Virgil. Aen.* iii, 358, vi, 50. In N. T. semel legitur II Tim. iii. 16, pa/sa graph. qeo,pneustoj omnis Scriptura divinitus inspirata, seu, quæ est originis divinæ. coll. II Pet i. 21. Syrus . . . scriptura, quæ per spiritum scripta est. Conjunxit nempe actionem scribendi cum actione inspirandi. Apud *Plutarchum* T. ix. p. 583. ed. *Reiske*. qeo,pneustoi o;neiroy sunt somnia a diis immissa."

Robinson "Greek and English Lexicon of the New Testament," new ed., New York, 1872:

"qeo,pneustoj(-ou, o` h`, adj. (qeo,j(pne,w), *God-inspired, inbreathed of God*, II Tim. iii. 16 pa/sa graph. qeo,pneustoj. - Plut. de Placit. Philosoph. 5. 2, tou.j onvei,rouj tou.j qeopneu,stou.j Phocylid. 121 th/j de. qeopneu,stou sofi,hj lo,goj evsti.n a;ristoj. Comp. Jos. c. Ap. 1. 7 [ai` grafai. tw/n profhtw/n kata. th.n evpi,pnoian th.n avpo. tou/ qeou/ maqo,ntwn. Cic. pro Arch. 8, 'poetam . . . quasi divino quodam spiritu inflari."

Thayer-Grimm "Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament," New York, 1887:

"qeo,pneustoj(-on, (qeo,j and pne,w), *inspired by God*: graph., i. e. the contents of Scripture, II Tim. iii. 16 [see pa/j I. 1 c.]; sofi,h, [pseudo-] Phocyl. 121; o;neiroy, Plut. de plac. phil. 5, 2, 3 p. 904f.; [Orac. Sibyll. 5, 406

(cf. 308); Nonn. paraphr. ev. Ioan. 1, 99]. (e;mpneustoj also is used passively, but a;pneustoj(eu;pneustoj(puri,pneustoj([dusdia,pneustoj], actively [and dusana,pneustoj appar. either act. or pass.; cf. W. 96 (92) note].)"

Cremer "Biblico-Theological Lexicon of New Testament Greek" ed. 2, E. T., Edinburgh, 1878:

"qeo,pnewstoj, *prompted by God, divinely inspired*. II Tim. iii. 16, pa/sa graph. q. In profane Greek it occurs only in Plut. *de placit. philos.* v. 2, o;neiroi qeo,pneustoi (kat v avna,gkhn gi,nontai), opposed to fusikoi,. The formation of the word cannot be traced to the use of pne,w, but only of evmpne,w. Cf. Xen. *Hell.* vii. 4, 32, th.n avreth.n qeo.j me.n evmpneu,saj; Plat. *Conv.* 179 B, me,noj evmpneu/sai evni,oij tw/n h`rw,wn to.n qeo,n; Hom. *Il.* XX. 110; *Od.* xix. 138. The simple verb is never used of divine action. How much the word corresponds with the Scriptural view is evident from II Pet. i. 21."

And the commentators generally will be found to speak no otherwise.

The completeness of this lexical consent has recently, however, been broken, and that by no less an authority than Prof. Hermann Cremer himself, the second edition of whose great "Biblico-theological Lexicon" we have just adduced as in entire agreement with the current view. The date of issue of this edition, in its original German form, was 1872. The third edition was delayed until 1883. In the interval Dr. Cremer was called upon to write the article on "Inspiration" in the second edition of Herzog's "Realencyklopaedie" (Vol. vi, *sub voc.*, pp. 746 *seq.*), which saw

the light in 1880. In preparing this article he was led to take an entirely new view² of the meaning of *qeo,pnewstoj*, according to which it defines Scripture, in II Tim. iii. 16, not according to its origin, but according to its effect - not as "inspired of God," but as "inspiring its readers." The statement of his new view was transferred to the third edition of his "Lexicon" (1883; E. T. as "Supplement," 1886) very much in the form in which it appears in Herzog; and it has retained its place in the "Lexicon," with practically no alteration, ever since.³ As its expression in Herzog was the earliest, and therefore is historically the most important, and as the article in the "Lexicon" is easily accessible in both German and English, and moreover does not essentially differ from what is said in Herzog, we shall quote here Dr. Cremer's statement of the case in preference from Herzog. He says:

"In theological usage, Inspiration denotes especially the influence of the Holy Spirit in the origination of the sacred Scriptures, by means of which they become the expression to us of the will of God, or the Word of God. The term comes from the Vulgate, which renders II Tim. iii. 16 *pa/sa graph. qeo,pneustoj*, by *omnis Scriptura divinitus inspirata*. Whether the meaning of the Greek term is conveyed by this is at least questionable. It clearly belongs only to Hellenistic and Christian Greek. The notion that it was used also in classical Greek of poets and seers (Huther in his Commentary) and to express what Cicero says in his *pro Archia*, p. 8, *nemo vir magnus sine aliquo afflatu divino unquam fuit*, is certainly wrong. For *qeo,pneustoj* does not occur at all in classical Greek or in profane Greek as a whole. In the unique passage, Plutarch, *de placit. phil.*, 5, 2 (Mor.

904, 2): tou.j ovnei,rouj tou.j qeopneu,stouj kat v avna,gkhn gi,nesqai\ tou.j de. fusikou.j avneidwlopoioume,nhj yuch/j to. sumfe,ron auvth/| ktl), it is very probably to be ascribed to the copyist, and stands, as Wyttenbach conjectures, in the place of qeope,mptouj. Besides this it occurs in Pseudo-Phocylides, v. 121: th/j de. qeopneu,stou sofi,hj lo,goj evstin a;ristoj - unless the whole line is, with Bernays, to be deleted as disturbing to the sense - as well as in the fifth book of the "Sibyllines," v. 308: Ku,mh d v h` mwra. su.n na,masi toi/j qeopneu,stoi,j, and V. 406, vAlla. me,gan geneth/ra qeo.n pa,ntwn qeopneu,stwn vEn qusi,aij evge,rairon kai. a`gi,aj evkato,mbaj. The Pseudo-Phocylides was, however, a Hellenist, and the author of the fifth book of the "Sibyllines" was, most probably, an Egyptian Jew living in the time of Hadrian. On Christian ground we find it in II Tim. iii. 16, which is possibly the earliest written employment of it to which we can point. Wetstein, on this passage, adduces the sentence from the *Vita Sabae* 16 (in *Cotelerii Monum.*) : e;fqase th/| tou/ Cu ca,rity h` pa,ntwn qeopneu,stwn(pa,ntwn cristofo,rwn auvtou/ sunodi,a me,cri o` ovnomatwn, as well as the designation of Marcus Eremita as o` qeo,pneustoj avnh,r. That the term has a passive meaning = 'gifted with God's Spirit,' 'divinely spirited,' (not 'inspired' as Ewald rightly distinguishes⁴) may be taken as indubitable from 'Sibyll.', v. 406 and the two passages last adduced. Nevertheless graph. qeo,pneustoj does not seem easily capable of meaning 'inspired by God's Spirit' in the sense of the Vulgate; when connected with such

conceptions as *graph*, here, *na/ma*, 'fountain,' 'Sibyll.' v. 308, it would rather signify 'breathing a divine spirit,' in keeping with that ready transition of the passive into the active sense which we see in *a;pneustoj(eu;pneustoj*, 'ill- or well-breathed' = 'breathing ill or well.' Compare Nonnus, *paraphr. ev Jo.*, i, 102: *ou- podo.j a;krou avndrome,nhn pala,mhn ouv k a;xioj eivmi. pela,ssaj(lu/sai mou/non i`ma,nta qeopneu,stoio pedi,lou*, with v. 129: *bapti,zein avpu,roisi kai. ajpneu,stoisi loe,troj*. In harmony with this, it might be understood also in Phocyl. 121; the explanation, 'Wisdom gifted with the Divine Spirit,' at all events has in its favor the fact that *qeo,pneustoj* is given the same sense as when it is connected with *avnh,r(a;nqrwpoj*. Certainly a transition to the sense, 'breathed by God' = 'inspired by God' seems difficult to account for, and it would fit, without forcing, only Phocyl. 121, while in II Tim. iii. 16, on the assumption of this sense, there would be required a not altogether easy metonymy. The sense 'breathing God's Spirit' is moreover in keeping with the context, especially with the *wvfe,limoj pro.j didaskali,an ktl)* and the *ta. duna,mena, se sofi,sai*, v. 15, as well as with the language employed elsewhere, e. g., in the Epistle to the Hebrews, where what the Scripture says is, as is well known, spoken of as the saying, the word of the Holy Ghost. Cf. also Acts xxviii. 25. Origen also, in *Hom. 21 in Jerem.*, seems so to understand it: *sacra volumina Spiritus plenitudinem spirant*. Let it be added that the expression 'breathed by God, inspired by God,' though an outgrowth of the Biblical idea,

certainly, so far as it is referred to the prophecy which does not arise out of the human will (II Pet. i. 21), yet can scarcely be applied to the whole of the rest of the sacred Scriptures - unless we are to find in II Tim. iii. 16 the expression of a conception of sacred Scripture similar to the Philonian. There is no doubt, however, that the Peshito understood it simply = 'inspired by God' - yet not differently than as in Matt. xxii. 43 we find: *Dauid evn pneu,mati lalei/*. It translates *ax'Wrb.K ryGe bt'K. luK bteK.t.a,*, 'for every Scripture which is written *evn pneu,mai v* - certainly keeping prominently in the foreground the inspiration of the writer. Similarly the Æthiopic renders: 'And every Scripture is in the (by the) Spirit of the Lord and profits'; while the Arabic (deriving from the original text) reads: 'And every Scripture which is divinely of *spiratio, divinam sapiens auram.*' The rendering of the Peshito and the explanations of the Greek exegetes would certainly lend great weight to the *divinitus inspirata*, were not they explicable from the dominant idea of the time - for which, it was thought, a suitable term was found in II Tim. iii. 16, nowhere else used indeed and coined for the purpose - but which was itself more or less taken over from the Alexandrian Judaism, that is to say, from heathenism."

Here, we will perceive, is a carefully reasoned attempt to reverse the previous lexical consensus as to the meaning of this important word. We have not observed many traces of the influence of this new determination of its import. The present writer, after going over the ground under Prof.

Cremer's guidance, too hastily adopted his conclusion in a paper on "Paul's Doctrine of the Old Testament" published in *The Presbyterian Quarterly* for July, 1899; and an adverse criticism of Dr. Cremer's reasoning, from the pen of Prof. Dr. L. Schulze, of Rostock, appeared in the *Theologisches Literaturblatt* for May 22, 1896 (xvii, 21, pp. 253, 254), in the course of a review of the eighth edition of the "Lexicon." But there has not met our eye as yet any really thorough reëxamination of the whole matter, such as a restatement of it like Dr. Cremer's might have been expected to provoke. The case surely warrants and indeed demands it. Dr. Cremer's statement is more than a statement - it is an argument; and his conclusion is revolutionary, not indeed as to doctrine - for that rests on a broader basis than a single text or an isolated word - but as to the meaning borne by an outstanding New Testament term. It would seem that there is, then, no apology needed for undertaking a somewhat minute examination of the facts in the case under the guidance of Dr. Cremer's very full and well-reasoned statement.

It may conduce, in the end, to clearness of presentation if we begin somewhat *in medias res* by raising the question of the width of the usage of the word. Is it broadly a Greek word, or distinctively a Hellenistic word, or even a purely Christian word?

So far as appears from the usage as ascertained,⁵ it would seem to be post-Christian. Whether we should also call it Christian, coined possibly by Paul and used only in Christian circles, depends, in the present state of our knowledge, on the determination of two rather nice questions. One of these concerns the genuineness of the reading *qeo^une^ustouj* in the tract on "The Opinions of Philosophers" (v, 2, 3), which has come down to us among the works of Plutarch, as well as in its dependent document, the "History of Philosophy" (106), transmitted among the works of Galen.

The other concerns the character, whether Jewish or Jewish-Christian, of certain portions of the fifth book of the "Sibylline Oracles" and of the "Poem of Admonition," once attributed to Phocylides but now long recognized to be the work of a late Alexandrian Jew,⁶ - in both of which the word occurs. Dr. Cremer considers the reading to be false in the Plutarchian tract, and thinks the fifth book of the "Sybillines" and the Pseudo-Phocylidian poem Jewish in origin. He therefore pronounces the word a Hellenistic one. These decisions, however, can scarcely be looked upon as certain; and they will bear scrutiny, especially as they are accompanied with some incidental errors of statement.

It would certainly require considerable boldness to decide with confidence upon the authorship of any given portion of the fifth book of the "Sibyllines." Friedlieb (whom Dr. Cremer follows) and Badt ascribe the whole book to a Jewish, but Alexandre, Reuss and Dechent to a Christian author; while others parcel it out variously between the two classes of sources - the most assigning the sections containing the word in question, however, to a Jewish author (Bleck, Lücke, Gfrörrer; Ewald, Hilgenfeld; Schürer). Schürer practically gives up in despair the problem of distributing the book to its several authors, and contents himself with saying that Jewish pieces preponderate and run in date from the first Christian century to Hadrian.⁷ In these circumstances surely a certain amount of doubt may fairly be thought to rest on the Jewish or Christian origin of our word in the Sibylline text. On the other hand, there seems to be pretty good positive reason for supposing the Pseudo-Phocylidian poem to be in its entirety a Christian production. Its Jewish origin was still strenuously maintained by Bernays,⁸ but its relation to the "Teaching of the Apostles" has caused the subject to be reopened, and we think has brought it to at least a probable settlement in favor of Scaliger's opinion that it is the work "avnwnu,mou Christiani."⁹ In the face of this probability

the brilliant and attractive, but not always entirely convincing conjectures by which Bernays removed some of the Christian traits from the text may now be neglected: and among them that by which he discarded the line containing our word. So far then as its occurrence in the fifth book of the "Sibyllines" and in Pseudo-Phocylides is concerned, no compelling reason appears why the word may not be considered a distinctively Christian one: though it must at the same time be recognized that the sections in the fifth "Sibyl" in which it occurs are more probably Jewish than Christian.

With reference to the Plutarchian passage something more needs to be said. "In the unique passage, Plutarch *de plac. phil.* 5, 2 (904 F.): *tw/n ovnei,rwn tou.j me.n qeopneu,stouj kat v(avna,gkhn gi,nesqai\ tou.j de. fusikou,j avneidwlopoioume,nhj yuch/j to. sumfe,ron auvth/| ktl)*" says Dr. Cremer, "it is with the greatest probability to be ascribed to the transcriber, in whose mind *qeo,pneustoj* lay in the sense of the Vulgate rendering, *divinitus inspirata*, and it stands, as Wytttenbach conjectures, for *qeope,mptouj*." The remark concerning Wytttenbach is erroneous - only one of a series of odd misstatements which have dogged the textual notes on this passage. Wytttenbach prints *qeo,pneustoj* in his text and accompanies it with this textual note:¹⁰ "*qeope,mptouj reposuit editor Lips. ut ex Gal. et Mosc. At in neutro haec reperio. Sane non est quare compilatori elegantias obtrudamus.*" *Qeope,mptouj* is therefore not Wytttenbach's conjecture: Wytttenbach does not even accept it, and this has of late been made a reproach to him:¹¹ he ascribes it to "the Leipzig editor," that is to Christian Daniel Beck, whose edition of this tract was published at Leipzig, in 1787. But Wytttenbach even more gravely misquotes Beck than he has himself been misquoted by Dr. Cremer. For Beck, who prints in his text: *tw/n ovnei,rwn tou.j me.n qeopneu,stouj*, annotates as follows: "Olim: *tou/j ovnei,rouj tou.j qeopneu,stouj - Reddidi textis elegantiore[m] lectionem,*

quae in M. et G. est. qeopneu, stouj sapere Christianum librarium videtur pro qeope, mptouj."¹² That is to say, Wyttenbach has transferred Beck's note on *tw/n ovnei, rwn tou.j me.n* to *qeope, mptouj*. It is this clause and not *qeope, mptouj* that Beck professes to have got out of the Moscow MS. and Galen: *qeope, mptouj* he presents merely as a pure conjecture founded on the one consideration that *qeopneu, stouj* has a flavor of Christian scribe about it; and he does not venture to put *qeope, mptouj* into the text. The odd thing is that Hutten follows Wyttenbach in his misrepresentation of Beck, writing in his note: "Beck. dedit *qeope, mptouj* ut elegantiore lectionem e Mosq. et Gal. sumptam. In neutro se hoc reperisse W. notat, addens, non esse quare compilatori elegantias obtrudamus. Cors. e Gal. notat *tw/n ovnei, rwn tou.j me.n qeopneu, stouj.*"¹³ Corsini does indeed so report, his note running: "Paullo aliter" (i. e., from the ordinary text which he reprints from Stephens) "Galenus, *tw/n ovnei, rwn tou.j me.n qeopneu, stouj, somniorum ea quidem quae divinitus inspirata sint, etc.*"¹⁴ But this is exactly what Beck says, and nothing other, except that he adds that this form is also found in the Moscow MS. We must conclude that Hutten in looking at Beck's note was preoccupied with Wyttenbach's misreport of it. The upshot of the whole matter is that the reading *qeope, mptouj* was merely a conjecture of Beck's, founded solely on his notion that *qeopneu, stouj* was a purely Christian term, and possessing no diplomatic basis whatsoever. Accordingly it has not found its way into the printed text of Plutarch: all editions, with one exception, down to and including those of Dübner-Döhner (Didot's "Bibliotheca") of 1856 and Bernardakis (Teubner's series) of 1893 read *qeopneu, stouj*.

A new face has been put on the matter, however, by the publication in 1879 of Diels' "Doxographi Graeci," in which the whole class of ancient literature to which Plutarch's "De plac. philos." belongs is subjected to a searching study, with a view to tracing the mutual relations of the several

pieces and the sources from which they are constructed.¹⁵ With this excursion into "higher criticism," into which there enters a highly speculative element, that, despite the scientific thoroughness and admirable acuteness which give the whole an unusually attractive aspect, leaves some doubts in the mind of the sober reader,¹⁶ we have now happily little to do. Suffice it to say that Diels looks upon the Plutarchian tract as an epitome of a hypothetical Aëtios, made about 150 A.D. and already used by Athenagoras (c. 177 A.D.):¹⁷ and on the Galenic tract as in its later portion an excerpt from the Plutarchian tract, made about A.D. 500.¹⁸ In the course of his work, he has framed and printed a careful recension of the text of both tracts,¹⁹ and in both of them he reads at the place of interest to us, *qeope,mptouj*.²⁰ Here for the first (and as yet only²¹) time *qeope,mptouj* makes its appearance in the text of what we may, in deference to Diels' findings and after the example of Gerke,²² call, at least, the "[Pseudo?-] Plutarch."²³ The key to the situation, with Diels, lies in the reading of the PseudoGalen : for as an excerpt from the [Pseudo?-] Plutarch the Pseudo-Galen becomes a valuable witness to its text, and is treated in this case indeed as a determinative witness, inasmuch as the whole MS. transmission of [Pseudo?-] Plutarch, so far as known, reads here *qeopneu,stouj*. Editing *qeope,mptouj* in Pseudo-Galen, Diels edits it also, on that sole documentary ground, in [Pseudo?-] Plutarch, That we may form some estimate of the likelihood of the new reading, we must, therefore, form some estimate of its likelihood in the text of the Pseudo-Galen, as well as of the principles on which the text of the [Pseudo?-] Plutarch is to be framed.

The editions of Pseudo-Galen - including that of Kühn²⁴ - have hitherto read *qeopneu,stouj* at our place, and from this we may possibly infer, that this is the reading of the common run of the MSS.²⁵ Diels constructs his text for this portion of the treatise from two kindred MSS.

only, and records the readings of no others: as no variation is given upon our word, we may infer that these two MSS. at least agree in reading *qeope,mptouj*. The former of them (Codex Laurentianus lxxiv, 3), of the twelfth or early thirteenth century, is described as transcribed "with incredible corruptness"; the latter (Codex Laurentianus lviii, 2), of the fifteenth century, as written more carefully: both represent a common very corrupt archetype.²⁶ This archetype is reconstructed from the consent of the two, and where they differ the preference is given to the former. The text thus framed is confessedly corrupt: "but though it must therefore be cautiously used, Diels considers it nevertheless a treasure house of the best readings for the [Pseudo?-] Plutarch."²⁸ Especially in the latter part of the [Pseudo?-] Plutarch, where the help of Eusebius and the other *eclogæ* fails, he thinks the case would often be desperate if we did not have the Pseudo-Galen. Three examples of the preservation of the right reading by it alone he gives us, one of them being our present passage, in which he follows, therefore, the reading of the Pseudo-Galen against the entire MS. transmission.

Diels considers the whole MS. transmission of the [Pseudo?-] Plutarch to take us back to an archetype of about A.D. 1000, and selects from it three codices as nearest to the archetype,²⁹ viz., A = Codex Mosquensis 339 (nunc 352) of saec. xi. or xii. (the same as the Mosq. quoted by Beck), collated by Matthaei and in places reëxamined for Diels by Voelkelius; B = Codex Marcianus 521 [xcii, 7], of saec. xiv, very closely related to A, collated by Diels himself; and C = Codex Parisinus 1672 of saec. xiii. ex. vel. xiv. in which is a copy of a corpus of Plutarch put together by Planudes or a contemporary. Through these three codices he reaches the original apograph which stands at the root of all the extant MSS., and from it, by the aid of the excerpts from the tract - in our passage the Pseudo-Galen's only - he attains his text.

His note on our reading runs thus: "qeope,mptouj G cf. Arist. de divinat. 2 p. 463b 13: qeopneu,stouj (A) B C, cf. Prol. p. 15.". The parenthesis in which A is enclosed means that A is here cited from the silence of Matthaei's collation.³⁰ The reference to the Prolegomena is to the passage already alluded to, in which the Galenic reading qeope,mptouj is cited as one of three chosen instances of excellent readings preserved by Galen alone. The note there runs thus: "alteri loco christiani librarii pius fraus nocuit. V. 2, 3, `Hro,filoj tw/n ovnei,rwn tou.j me.n qeopneu,stouj kat v avna,gkhn gi,neqai. fuit scilicet qeope,mptouj, quod sero intellectum est a Wytttenbachio in indice Plutarcho. si Galenum inspexisset, ipsum illud qeope,mptouj inventurus erat. simili fraude versus 121 Phocylideis a Byzantinis insertus est, ubi vox illa sacra [II Tim. iii. 16] I. Bernaysio interpolationis originem manifesto aperuit." That is to say, the reading of the Pseudo-Galen is preferred to that of the MSS., because the reading qeopneu,stouj explains itself as a pious fraud of a Christian scribe, giving a place in the text of Plutarch to "this sacred word" - another example of which procedure is to be found in Pseudo-Phoc. 121, extruded by Bernays from the text on this very ground. On this remark, as on a hinge, turns, it would seem, the decision of the whole question. The problem of the reading, indeed, may be set forth at this point in the form of this alternative: - Which is most likely, - that qeopneu,stouj in the [Pseudo?-] Plutarch originated in the pious fraud of a Christian scribe? - or that qeope,mptouj in the text of Pseudo-Galen edited by Diels originated in the error of a careless scribe?

When we posit the problem in this definite form we cannot feel at all certain that Diels' solution is the right one. There is an *a priori* unlikelihood in its way: deliberate corruption of texts is relatively rare and not to be assumed without good reason. The parallel from the Pseudo-Phocylides fails, now that it seems probable that the whole poem

is of Christian origin. There seems no motive for such a pious fraud as is charged: what gain could be had from intruding *qeopneu, stouj* into the Plutarchian text? and what special sanctity attached to this word? And if a sacrosanct character be attributed to the word, could it not be equally plausibly argued that it was therefore offensive to the Christian consciousness in this heathen connection, and was accordingly replaced by the less sacred *qeope, mptouj*, a word of heathen associations and indeed with a secondary sense not far from "extraordinary."³¹ Or if it be now said that it is not intended to charge conscious fraud, it is pertinent to ask what special associations Christians had with the word *qeopneu, stouj* in connection with dreams which would cause it to obtrude itself unconsciously in such a connection. One is almost equally at a loss to account for the intrusion of the word in the place of the simpler *qeope, mptouj*, whether the intrusion be looked upon as deliberate or unconscious. On the other hand, the substitution of *qeope, mptouj* for *qeopneu, stouj* in the text of Pseudo-Galen seems quite readily accountable, and that whether it be attributed to the original excerpter or to some later copyist of the tract. The term was associated with dreams in the minds of all acquainted with the literature of the subject. Diels himself refers us to a passage in Aristotle where the collocation occurs,³² and familiar passages from Philo³³ and the "Clementina"³⁴ will suggest themselves to others. "Godsent dreams" must have almost had the rank of a "*terminus technicus*."³⁵ Moreover the scribe had just written the word in the immediate context, and that not without close contiguity with the word *ovnei, rouj*,³⁶ and may be readily supposed to have had it still lingering in his memory when he came to write the succeeding section. In fine, the intrusion into the text of *qeopneu, stouj*, a rare word and one suggested to a dull or inattentive scribe by nothing, seems far less easy to account for than the intrusion of *qeope, mptouj*, a common word, an ordinary term in this connection, and a term suggested to the scribe by

the immediate context. On transcriptional grounds certainly the former appears far more likely to be original - "proclivi scriptioni praestat ardua."

The decisive consideration against *qeopneu, stouj* in the mind of Diels - as it had been before him in the mind of Beck - seems to have been, indeed, nothing but the assumption that *qeopneu, stouj*, as a distinctively Christian word, must argue a Christian hand, wherever it is found. That, however, in our present study is precisely the matter under investigation; and we must specially guard against permitting to intrude decisively into our premises what we propose to arrive at only by way of conclusion. Whether the word be genuine in the [Pseudo?-] Plutarch or not, is just one of the most important factors in deciding whether it be a peculiarly Christian word or not. An instructive parallel may be found in the treatment accorded by some great authorities to the cognate word *qeo, pnooj* when it turned up in an inscription which seems obviously heathen.³⁷ This inscription, inscribed (about the third century) on the face of a man-headed sphinx at Memphis, sings the praises of the sphinx's beauty - among the items mentioned being that *evfu, per[q]e pro, swpon evcei to. q[e]o[pn]oun*, while, below, the body is that of the lion, king of beasts. Boeckh comments on this: "Vs. 4, 5, recte legit Letronnius, qui *qeo, pnoon* monet Christianum quidam sonare." But why should Letronnius infer Christianity from the word *qeo, pnoon*, or Boeckh think it worth while to record the fact? Fortunately the heathen use of *qeo, pnooj* is beyond question.³⁸ It provides an excellent illustration, therefore, of the rashness of pronouncing words of this kind to be of Christian origin; and suggests the hesitancy with which we should extrude such a word from the text of [Pseudo?-] Plutarch on the sole ground that it "tastes of a Christian scribe." Surely if a heathen could invent and use the one word, he might equally well invent and use the other. And certainly it is a great

mistake to look upon compounds with *qe,oj* of this kind as in any sense exclusively Christian. The long list of heathen terms of this character given by Dr. Cremer, indeed, is itself enough to indicate the heathen facility for their coinage. Many such words, we may well believe, were found by Christians ready made to their hand, and had only to be adapted to their richer usage. What is more distinctively Christian is the parallel list of words compounded with *pneu/ma*³⁹ or even *cristo,j*⁴⁰ which were placed by their side, such as [*pneumatiko,j*], *pneumatoki,nhtoj*, *pneumatofo,roj*, *pneumate,mforoj*; *cristo,grafoj*, *cristodi,dktoj*, *cristoki,nhtoj*, *cristo,lhptoj*, *cristofo,roj*.

As the reasons which have been determining with Diels in framing his text do not appear to us able to bear the weight laid on them, we naturally cannot adopt his text with any confidence. We doubt whether *qeope,mptouj* was the original reading in the Pseudo-Galen; we doubt whether, if that were the case, we should on that ground edit it in the [Pseudo?-] Plutarch. Our feeling is decided that the intrusion of *qeope,mptouj* into a text which originally read *qeopneu,stouj* would be far more easily accounted for than the reverse. One should be slow, of course, in rejecting a reading commended by such a scholarly tact as Diels'. But we may take courage from the fact that Bernardakis, with Diels' text before him, continues to read *qeopneu,stouj* even though recognizing *qeope,mptouj* as the reading of Galen. We think we must be permitted to hold the matter still at least *sub judice* and to profess our inability in the circumstances to look upon the word as a purely Christian term.⁴¹ It would be interesting to know what phraseology was used by Herophilus himself (born c. B.C. 300) in the passage which the [Pseudo?-] Plutarch excerpts. But this excerpt seems to be the only source of information we have in the matter,⁴² and it would perhaps be overbold to suppose that the compiler had preserved the very words of the great

physician. Were such a presumption deemed plausible we should be forced to carry back the first known use of the word *qeopneustoj* to the third century before Christ, but not to a *provenance* other than that Alexandria where its earliest use is otherwise traceable. Perhaps if we cannot call it a purely Christian term nor yet, with Dr. Cremer, an exclusively Hellenistic one, we may venture to think of it, provisionally at least, as belonging to Alexandrian Greek. Whether we should also say to late Alexandrian usage will possibly depend on the degree of likelihood we ascribe to its representing in the text of the [Pseudo?] Plutarch an actual usage of Herophilus.

Our interest in determining the reading in the [Pseudo?] Plutarch culminates, of course, in its bearing on the meaning of *qeopneustoj*. Prof. Schulze's remark⁴³ that no copyist would have substituted *qeopneustoj* here for *qeopemptoj* if linguistic usage had attached an active sense to the former, is no doubt quite just. This is admitted, indeed, by Dr. Cremer, who considers that the scribe to whom the substitution is thought to be due "had *qeopneustoj* in his mind in the sense of the Vulgate rendering, *divinitus inspirata*"; and only seeks to break the force of this admission by urging that the constant exegetical tradition which assigned this meaning to *qeopneustoj*, rests on a misunderstanding of the word and reads into it a sense derived from Alexandrian-Jewish conceptions of inspiration. This appeal from a fixed later to an assumed original sense of the word possesses force, no doubt, only in case that traces of such an assumed original sense can be adduced; and meanwhile the presence of *qeopneustoj* as a synonym of *qeopemptoj*, even in the vocabulary of somewhat late scribes, must rank as one item in the evidence by which its meaning is to be ascertained. The whole face of the matter is changed, however, if *qeopneustoj* be allowed to be probably or even possibly genuine in the [Pseudo?] Plutarch. In that case it could scarcely be

thought to reflect the later Christian conception of inspiration, imposed on Paul's term by thinkers affected by Philo's doctrine of Scripture, but would stand as an independent bit of evidence as to the original meaning of the term. The clerical substitution of *qeo,pemptoj* for it under the influence of literary associations would indeed, in this case too, only witness to a synonymy in the mind of the later scribes, who may well be supposed Christians and sharers in the common conception that Christians read into *qeo,pneustoj*. But the implications of the passage itself would be valid testimony to the original import of the term here used. And it would seem quite clear that the implications of the passage itself assign to it a passive sense, and that a sense not very remote from *qeo,pemptoj*. "Herophilus says," we read, "that theopneustic dreams" ("dreams divinely inspired," Holland; "the dreams that are caused by divine instinct," Goodwin), "come by necessity; but natural ones" ("natural dreams," Holland; "dreams which have their origin from a natural cause," Goodwin), "from the soul's imagery of what is fitting to it and its consequences," etc.⁴⁴ The contrast here between dreams that are *qeo,pneustoi* and those that are *fusikoi*, the former of which are imposed on the soul while the latter are its own production, would seem certainly to imply that *qeo,pneustoj* here imports something nearly akin to "God-given," though naturally with implications of its own as to the mode of the giving. It might be possible to read it as designating dreams that are breathed into by God, filled with His inspiration and thus made the vehicles of His message, if we otherwise knew that such is the implication of the term. But nothing so subtle as this is suggested by the language as it stands, which appears to convey merely the simple notion that theopneustic dreams differ from all natural ones, whether the latter belong to the higher or lower elements of our nature, in that they come from God and are therefore not necessarily agreeable to the soul's own image-making faculties or the product of its immanent desires, but take

form and bear a meaning imposed on them from without.

There are few other instances of the occurrence of the word which have much chance of lying entirely outside the sphere of influence of its use in II Tim. iii. 16. In the first rank of these will certainly be placed the two instances in the fifth book of the "Sibyllines." The former of these occurs in a description of the city of Cyme, which is called the "foolish one," and described as cast down by wicked hands, "along with her theopneustic streams (na,masi qeopneu,stoij)" no longer to shout her boasts into the air but henceforth to remain "dead amid the Cymeian streams."⁴⁵ The description skillfully brings together all that we know of Cyme - adverts to her former greatness ("the largest and noblest of all the Æolian cities," Strabo tells us,⁴⁶ and with Lesbos, "the metropolis" of all the rest), her reputation for folly (also adverted to and quaintly explained by Strabo), her present decadence, and her situation by running waters (a trait indicated also by her coins which show that there was a stream near by called Xanthus). It has been customary to understand by "the theopneustic streams" mentioned, some streams or fountains in the neighborhood known for the presumptively oracular powers of their waters." But there does not seem to have been preserved any notice of the existence of such oracular waters belonging to Cyme, and it makes against this assumption that the Cymeans, like the rest of the Ionians and Æolians, were accustomed to resort for their oracles to the somewhat distant Branchidæ, in the south.⁴⁸ It appears much more likely, then, that the streams adverted to are natural streams and stand here only as part of the rather full and very exact description of the town - the reference being primarily to the Xanthus and to it as an element merely in the excellence of the situation. In that case "theopneustic," here too, would seem to mean something akin to "God-given," or perhaps more broadly still "divine," in the sense of specially excellent and desirable.

The second Sibylline passage is a portion of a lament over the destruction of the Temple at Jerusalem, wherein (we are told) gold, "deceiver of the world and souls," was not worshiped, but men "adored in sacrifices, with pure and noble hecatombs, the great Father-God of all theopneustic things."⁴⁹ Here Alexandre translates, "Qui cælestis vitam pater omnibus afflat"; and Terry, "The God and mighty maker of all breathing things."⁵⁰ And they seem supported in their general conception by the fact that we appear to have before us here only a slightly varied form of a formula met with elsewhere in the Sibyllines. Thus, as Rzach points out, we have at iii, 278⁵¹ a condemnation of those who "neither fear nor desire to honor the deathless Father-God of all men,"⁵² and at iii, 604, essentially the same phrase is repeated. We seem, in a word, to meet here only with the Sibylline equivalent of the Homeric "path.r avndrw/n te qew/n te." Accordingly qeopneu,stwn would seem to stand here in the stead of avnqrw,pwn in the parallel passages, and merely to designate men, doubtless with a reminiscence of Gen. ii. 7 - or perhaps, more widely, creatures, with a reminiscence of such a passage as Ps. civ. 30. In either event it is the creative power of God that is prominently in the mind of the writer as he writes down the word qeopneu,stwn, which is to him obviously the proper term for "creatures" in correlation with the gene,thj qeo,j.

By the side of these Sibylline passages it is perhaps natural to place the line from the Pseudo-Phocylides, which marks the culmination of his praise of "speech" as the greatest gift of God - a weapon, he says, sharper than steel and more to be desired than the swiftness of birds, or the speed of horses, or the strength of lions, or the horns of bulls or the stings of bees - "for best [of all] is the speech of theopneustic wisdom," so that the wise man is better than the strong one, and it is wisdom that rules alike in the field, the city and the sea. It is certainly simplest to understand

"theopneustic wisdom" here shortly as "God-given wisdom." Undoubtedly it is itself the inspirer of the speech that manifests it, and we might manage to interpret the *qeopneu, stou* as so designating it - "God-inspiring, God-breathing wisdom." But this can scarcely be considered natural; and it equally undoubtedly lies more closely at hand to interpret it as designating the source of the wisdom itself as lying in God. Wisdom is conceived as theopneustic, in a word, because wisdom itself is thought of as coming from God, as being the product of the divine activity - here designated, as so frequently in the Old Testament, as operating as a breathing.

A passage that has come to light since Dr. Cremer's investigation for this word-study was made, is of not dissimilar implication. It is found in the recently published "Testament of Abraham,"⁵³ a piece which in its original form, its editor, Prof. James, assigns to a second-century Egyptian Jewish-Christian, though it has suffered much mediævalization in the ninth or tenth century. It runs as follows: "And Michael the archangel came immediately with a multitude of angels, and they took his precious soul (*th.n timi, an auvtou/ yuch, n*) in their hands in a God-woven cloth (*sindo, ni qeou?fantw/*); and they prepared (*evkh, deusan*) the body of righteous Abraham unto the third day of his death with theopneustic ointments and herbs (*muri, smasi qeopneu, stoj kai. avrw, masin*), and they buried him in the land of promise." Here *qeopneustoj* can hardly mean "God-breathing," and "God-imbued" is not much better; and though we might be tempted to make it mean "divinely sweet" (a kind of derivative sense of "God-redolent ointment"; for *pne, w* means also "to smell," "to breathe of a thing"), it is doubtless better to take it simply, as the parallel with *qeou?fantw/* suggests, as importing something not far from "God-given." The cloth in which the soul was carried up to God and the unguents with which the body was prepared for burial were alike from

God - were "God-provided"; the words to designate this being chosen in each case with nice reference to their specific application, but covering to their writer little more specific meaning than the simple adjective "divine" would have done.

It is surely in this same category also that we are to place the verse of Nonnus which Dr. Cremer adduces as showing distinctly that the word *geo,pneustoj* "is not to be taken as equivalent to *inspiratus*, inspired by God, but as rather meaning filled with God's spirit and therefore radiating it." Nonnus is paraphrasing John i. 27 and makes the Baptist say: "And he that cometh after me stands to-day in your midst, the tip of whose foot I am not worthy to approach with human hand though only to loose the thongs of the theopneustic sandal."⁵⁴ Here surely the meaning is not directly that our Lord's sandal "radiated divinity," though certainly that may be one of the implications of the epithet, but more simply that it partook of the divinity of the divine Person whose property it was and in contact with whom it had been. All about Christ was divine. We should not go far wrong, therefore, if we interpreted *geo,pneustoj* here simply as "divine." What is "divine" is no doubt "redolent of Divinity," but it is so called not because of what it does, but because of what it is, and Nonnus' mind when he called the sandal theopneustic was occupied rather with the divine influence that made the sandal what it was, viz., something more than a mere sandal, because it had touched those divine feet, than with any influence which the sandal was now calculated to exert. The later line which Dr. Cremer asks us to compare is not well calculated to modify this decision. In it John i. 33 is being paraphrased and the Baptist is contrasting his mission with that of Christ who was to baptize with fire and the Holy Spirit (*evn puri. bapti,zwn kai. pneu,mati*). He, John, was sent, on the contrary, he says, to baptize the body of already regenerate men, and to do it in lavers that are destitute of both fire and the spirit - fireless

and spiritless (avpu,roisi kai. avpneu,stoisi loetroi/j).⁵⁵ It may indeed be possible to interpret, "unburning and unspiritualizing"; but this does not seem the exact shade of thought the words are meant to express; though in any case the bearing of the phrase on the meaning of qeo,pneustoj in the former line is of the slightest.

Of the passages cited by Dr. Cremer there remain only the two he derives from Wetstein, in which qeo,pneustoj appears as an epithet of certain men. To these should be added an inscription found at Bostra, in which a certain ecclesiastic is designated an avrciereu.j qeo,pneustoj.⁵⁶ Dr. Cremer himself thinks it clear that in such passages we have a passive sense, but interprets it as divinely spirited, "endued with the divine spirit," rather than as "divinely inspired," - in accordance with a distinction drawn by Ewald. Certainly it is difficult to understand the word in this connection as expressing simple origination by God; it was something more than the mere fact that God made them that was intended to be affirmed by calling Marcus and Antipater theopneustic men. Nor does it seem very natural to suppose that the intention was to designate them as precisely what we ordinarily mean by God-inspired men. It lies very near to suppose, therefore, that what it was intended to say about them, is that they were God-pervaded men, men in whom God dwelt in an especial manner; and this supposition may be thought to be supported by the parallel, in the passage from the "Vita Sabae," with cristofo,roj. Of whom this "caravan of all theopneustics, of all his christophers," was composed, we have no means of determining, as Cotelerius' "Monumenta," from which Wetstein quoted the passage, is not accessible to us as we write. But the general sense of the word does not seem to be doubtful. Ignatius, ("ad Ephes." ix.) tells us that all Christians constitute such a caravan, of "God-bearers and shrine-bearers, Christ-bearers, holy-thing-bearers, completely clothed in the

commandments of Christ"; and Zahn rightly comments that thus the Christians appear as the real "evnigeoi or evnqousia,zontej, since they carry Christ and God in themselves." Particularly distinguished Christians might therefore very properly be conceived in a supereminent sense as filled with God and bearers of Christ; and this might very appropriately be expressed by the double attribution of qeo,pneustoj and cristofo,roj. Only it would seem to be necessary to understand that thus a secondary and derived sense would be attributed to qeo,pneustoj, about which there should still cling a flavor of the idea of origination. The qeo,pneustoj avnh,r is God-filled by the act of God Himself, that is to say, he is a God-endowed man, one made what he is by God's own efficiency. No doubt in usage the sense might suffer still more attrition and come to suggest little more than "divine" - which is the epithet given to Marcus of Scetis⁵⁷ by Nicephorus Callistus, ("H. E.," xi, 35) - o` qei/oj Ma,rkoj - that is to say "Saint Mark," of which o` qeo,pneustoj Ma,rkoj is doubtless a very good synonym. The conception conveyed by qeo,pneustoj in this usage is thus something very distinct from that expressed by the Vulgate rendering, *a Deo inspiratus*, when taken strictly; that would seem to require, as Ewald suggests, some such form as qee,mpneustoj; the theopneustic man is not the man "breathed into by God." But it is equally distinct from that expressed by the phrase, "pervaded by God," used as an expression of the character of the man so described, without implication of the origin of this characteristic. What it would seem specifically to indicate is that he has been framed by God into something other than what he would have been without the divine action. The Christian as such is as much God-made as the man as such; and the distinguished Christian as such as much as the Christian at large; and the use of qeo,pneustoj to describe the one or the other would appear to rest ultimately on this conception. He is, in what he has become, the product of the divine energy - of the divine breath.

We cannot think it speaking too strongly, therefore, to say that there is discoverable in none of these passages the slightest trace of an active sense of *qeo,pneustoj*, by which it should express the idea, for example, of "breathing the divine spirit," or even such a quasi-active idea as that of "redolent of God." Everywhere the word appears as purely passive and expresses production by God. And if we proceed from these passages to those much more numerous ones, in which it is, as in II Tim. iii. 16, an epithet or predicate of Scripture, and where therefore its signification may have been affected by the way in which Christian antiquity understood that passage, the impression of the passive sense of the word grows, of course, ever stronger. Though these passages may not be placed in the first rank of material for the determination of the meaning of II Tim. iii. 16, by which they may have themselves been affected; it is manifestly improper to exclude them from consideration altogether. Even as part bearers of the exegetical tradition they are worthy of adduction: and it is scarcely conceivable that the term should have been entirely voided of its current sense, had it a different current sense, by the influence of a single employment of it by Paul - especially if we are to believe that its natural meaning as used by him differed from that assigned it by subsequent writers. The patristic use of the term in connection with Scripture has therefore its own weight, as evidence to the natural employment of the term by Greek-speaking Christian writers.

This use of it does not seem to occur in the very earliest patristic literature: but from the time of Clement of Alexandria the term *qeo,pneustoj* appears as one of the most common technical designations of Scripture. The following scattered instances, gathered at random, will serve to illustrate this use of it sufficiently for our purpose. Clement of Alexandria: "Strom.," vii. 16, §101 (Klotz, iii. 286; Potter,

894), "Accordingly those fall from their eminence who follow not God whither He leads; and He leads us in the inspired Scriptures (kata. ta,j qeopneu,stouj grafaj)"; "Strom.," vii. 16, §103 (Klotz, iii. 287; Potter, 896), "But they crave glory, as many as willfully sophisticate the things wedded to inspired words (toi,j qeopneu,stoi,j lo,goij) handed down by the blessed apostles and teachers, by diverse arguments, opposing human teaching to the divine tradition for the sake of establishing the heresy"; "Protrept." 9, §87 (Klotz., i. 73, 74; Potter 71), "This teaching the apostle knows as truly divine (qei,an): 'Thou, O Timothy,' he says, 'from a child hast known the holy letters which are able to make thee wise unto salvation, through faith that is in Jesus Christ'; for truly holy are those letters that sanctify and deify; and the writings or volumes that consist of these holy letters or syllables, the same apostle consequently calls 'inspired by God, seeing that they are profitable for doctrine,' etc." Origen: "De Principiis," iv, 8 (cf. also title to Book iv), "Having thus spoken briefly on the subject of the Divine inspiration of the Holy Scriptures (peri. tou/ qeopneu,stou th/j qei,aj grafh/j)"; Migne, (11, 1276), "The Jews and Christians agree as to the inspiration of the Holy Scripture (qei,w| gegra,fqai pneumatij), but differ as to its interpretation"; (12, 1084), "Therefore the inspired books (qeo,pneusta bibli,a) are twenty-two"; (14, 1309), "The inspired Scripture"; (13, 664-5), "For we must seek the nourishment of the whole inspired Scripture (pa,shj th/j qeopneu,stou grafh/j); "Hom. xx. in Joshuam," 2 (Robinson's "Origen's Philocalia," p. 63), "Let us not then be stupefied by listening to Scriptures which we do not understand, but let it be to us according to our faith by which we believe that 'every Scripture, seeing that it is inspired (qeo,pneustoj), is profitable': for you must needs admit one of two things regarding these Scriptures, either that they are not inspired (qeo,pneustoi) because they are not profitable, as the unbeliever takes it, or, as a believer, you must admit that since they are inspired (qeo,pneustoi) they are profitable"; "Selecta in Psalmos," Ps. i, 3 (Migne

XII, ii. 1080; De la Rue, 527), "Being about to begin the interpretation of the Psalms, we prefix a very excellent tradition handed down by the Hebrew⁵⁸ to us generally concerning the whole divine Scripture (kaqolikw/j peri. pa,shj qei,aj grafh/j); for he affirmed that the whole inspired Scripture (th.n o[lhn qeo,pneuston grafh,n). . . . But if 'the words of the Lord are pure words, fined silver, tried as the earth, purified seven times' (Ps. ii. 7) and the Holy Spirit has with all care dictated them accurately through the ministers of the word (meta. pa,shj avkribei,aj evxhtasme,nwj to. a[giou pneu/ma u`pobe,blhken auta. dia. tw/n u`phretw/n tou/ lo,gou), let the proportion never escape us, according to which the wisdom of God is first with respect to the whole theopneustic Scripture unto the last letter (kaq v h]n evpi. pa/san e;fqase grafh.n h`sofi,a tou/ qeou/ qeo,pneu,ston me,cri tou/ tuco,ntoj gra,mmatoj); and haply it was on this account that the Saviour said, 'One iota or one letter shall not pass from the law till all be fulfilled': and it is just so that the divine art in the creation of the world, not only appeared in the heaven and sun and moon and stars, interpenetrating their whole bodies, but also on earth did the same in paltry matter, so that not even the bodies of the least animals are disdained by the artificer. . . . So we understand concerning all the things written by the inspiration (evx evpipnoi,aj) of the Holy Spirit" Athanasius (Migne, 27, 214): pa/sa grafh. h`mw/n tw/n cristianw/n qeo,pneusto,j evstin; (Migne, 25, 152): qeo,pneustoj ka,lei/tai; (Bened. Par., 1777, i. 767) : "Saying also myself, 'Since many have taken in hand to set forth to themselves the so-called apocrypha and to sing them with th/| qeopneu,stw| grafh/|" Cyrilus Hier., "Catechet.," iv. 33: "This is taught us by ai` qeo,pneustoi grafai, of both the Old and New Covenant." Basil, "On the Spirit," xxi (ad fin.): "How can he who calls Scripture 'God-inspired' because it was written through the inspiration of the Spirit (o` qeo,pneuston th.n grafh.n ovnomazwn(dia. th/j evpipnoi,aj tou/ a`gi,ou pneu,matoj sugrafei/san), use the language of one who insults and belittles

Him?" "Letters," xvii. 3: "All bread is nutritious, but it may be injurious to the sick; just so, all Scripture is God-inspired (pa/sa grafh. qeo,pneustoj) and profitable"; (Migne, xxx. 81): "The words of God-inspired Scripture (oi` th/j qeopneu,stou grafh/j lo,goi) shall stand on the tribune of Christ"; (Migne, 31, 744): "For every word or deed must be believed by the witness of the qeopneu,stou grafh/j, for the assurance of the good and the shame of the wicked"; (Migne, 31, 1080) : "Apart from the witness of the qeopneu,stwn grafw/n it is not possible, etc."; (Migne, 31, 1500): "From what sort of Scripture are we to dispute at this time? Pa,nta o`mo,tima(kai. pa,nta pneumatika,\ pa,nta qeo,pneusta(kai. pa,nta wvfe,lima"; (Migne, 31, 1536): "On the interpretation and remarking of the names and terms th/j qeopneu,stou grafh/j"; (Migne, 32, 228): megi,sth de. o`do.j pro.j th/n tou/ kah,kontoj eu;resin kai. h` mele,th tw/n qeopneu,twn grafw/n. Gregory Naz. (Migne, 35, 504): peri. tou/ qeopneu,stou tw/n a`gi,wn grafw/n; (Migne, 36, 472, cf. 37, 589), peri. tw/n ghsi,wn bibli,wn th/j qeopneu,stou grafh/j; (Migne, 36, 1589), toi/j qeopneu,stoij grafai/j. Gregory Nyssen, "Against Eunom.," vii. 1: "What we understand of the matter is as follows: `H qeo,pneustoj grafh,, as the divine apostle calls it, is the Scripture of the Holy Spirit and its intention is the profit of men"; (Migne, 44, 68), mo,nhj th/j qeopneu,stou diaqh,khj. Cyrillus Alex. (Migne, 68, 225), polumerw/j kai. polutro,pwj h` qeo,pneustoj grafh. th/j dia. cristou/ swthri,aj proanafwnei/ tou.j tu,pouj. Neilos Abbas (Migne, 79, 141, cf. 529): grafh. h` qeo,pneustoj ouvde.n le,gei avkai,rwj ktl) Theodoret of Cyrrhus ("H. E.", i. 6; Migne, iii. 920). John of Damascus (Migne, 85, 1041), etc.

If, then, we are to make an induction from the use of the word, we shall find it bearing a uniformly passive significance, rooted in the idea of the creative breath of God. All that is, is God-breathed ("Sibyll." v. 406) ; and accordingly the rivers that water the Cymeian plain are God-breathed ("Sibyll." v. 308), the spices God provides for the dead body of His friend

("Testament of Abraham," A. xx), and above all the wisdom He implants in the heart of man (Ps.-Phocyl. 121), the dreams He sends with a message from Him (Ps.-Plut., v. 2, 3) and the Scriptures He gives His people (II Tim. iii. 16). By an extension of meaning by no means extreme, those whom He has greatly honored as His followers, whom He has created into His saints, are called God-breathed men ("Vita Sabae" 16. Inscription in Kaibel) ; and even the sandals that have touched the feet of the Son of God are called God-breathed sandals (Nonnus), i. e., sandals that have been made by this divine contact something other than what they were: in both these cases, the word approaching more or less the broader meaning of "divine." Nowhere is there a trace of such an active significance as "God-breathing"; and though in the application of the word to individual men and to our Lord's sandals there may be an approach to the sense of "God-imbued," this sense is attained by a pathway of development from the simple idea of God-given, God-determined, and the like.

It is carefully to be observed, of course, that, although Dr. Cremer wishes to reach an active signification for the word in II Tim. iii. 16, he does not venture to assign an active sense to it immediately and directly, but approaches this goal through the medium of another signification. It is fully recognized by him that the word is originally passive in its meaning; it is merely contended that this original passive sense is not "God-inspired," but rather "God-filled" - a sense which, it is pleaded, will readily pass into the active sense of "God-breathing," after the analogy of such words as $\alpha\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma$ ($\epsilon\upsilon\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma$), which from "ill- or well-breathed" came to mean "breathing ill or well." What is filled with God will certainly be redolent of God, and what is redolent of God will certainly breathe out God. His reasons for preferring the sense of "gifted or filled with God's Spirit, divinely spirited," to "God-inspired" for the original passive

connotation of the word are drawn especially from what he thinks the unsuitableness of the latter idea to some of the connections in which the word is found. It is thought that, as an epithet of an individual man, as an epithet of Scripture or a fountain, and (in the later editions of the "Lexicon" at least) especially, as an epithet of a sandal, "God-inspired" is incongruous, and something like "filled with God's Spirit and therefore radiating it" is suggested. There is obviously some confusion here arising from the very natural contemplation of the Vulgate translation "*a Deo inspiratus*" as the alternative rendering to what is proposed. There is, we may well admit, nothing in the word *qeo,pneustoj* to warrant the *in-* of the Vulgate rendering: this word speaks not of an "inspiration" by God, but of a "spiration" by God. The alternatives brought before us by Dr. Cremer's presentation are not to be confined, therefore, to the two, "Divinely spirited" and "Divinely inspired," but must be made to include the three, "Divinely spirited," "Divinely inspired," and "Divinely spired." The failure of Dr. Cremer to note this introduces, as we say, some confusion into his statement. We need only thus incidentally refer to it at this point, however. It is of more immediate importance to observe that what we are naturally led to by Dr. Cremer's remarks, is to an investigation of the natural meaning of the word *qeo,pneustoj* under the laws of word-formation. In these remarks he is leaning rather heavily on the discussion of Ewald to which he refers us, and it will conduce to a better understanding of the matter if we will follow his directions and turn to our Ewald.

Ewald, like Dr. Cremer, is dissatisfied with the current explanation of *qeo,pneustoj* and seeks to obtain for it an active sense, but is as little inclined as Dr. Cremer to assign an active sense directly to it. He rather criticises Winer,⁵⁹ for using language when speaking of *qeo,pneustoj* which would seem to imply that such compounds could really be active - as if "it

were to be taken as a passive, although such words as *eu;pneustoj*(*a;pneustoj* are used actively." He cannot admit that any compound of a word like - *pneustoj* can be really active in primary meaning, and explains that *eu;pneustoj* means not so much "breathing good," i. e., propelling something good by the breath, as "endowed with good breath," and expresses, therefore, just like *a;pneustoj*, "breathless," i. e., "*dead*," a subjective condition, and is therefore to be compared with a half-passive verb, as indeed the word-form suggests. Just so, *qeo;pneustoj*, he says, is not so much our "God-breathing" as our "full of God's Spirit," "permeated and animated by God's Spirit." Thus, he supposes *qeo;pneustoj* to mean "blown through by God" (*Gottdurchwehet*, "God-pervaded"), rather than "blown into by God" (*Gotteingewehet*, "God-inspired ") as the Vulgate (*inspiratus*) and Luther (*eingegeben*) render it - an idea which, as he rightly says, would have required something like *qee,mpneustoj*⁶⁰ (or we may say *qeei,spneustoj*)⁶¹ to express it.

At first he seems to have thought that by this explanation he had removed all implication as to the origination of Scripture from the epithet: it expresses, he said,⁶² what Scripture is - viz., pervaded by God, full of His Spirit - without the least hint as to how it got to be so. He afterwards came to see this was going too far, and contented himself with saying that though certainly implicating a doctrine of the origin of the Scriptures, the term throws the *emphasis* on its quality.⁶³ He now, therefore, expressed himself thus: "It is certainly undeniable that the new expression *qeo;pneustoj*, II Tim. iii. 16, is intended to say very much what Philo meant, but did not yet know how to express sharply by means of such a compressed and strong term. For *qeo;pneustoj* (like *eu;pneustoj*, accurately, 'well-breathed') must mean 'God-breathed' or 'God-animated' (*Gottbeathmet*, or *Gottbegeistert*), and, in accordance with the genius of the compressed, clear Greek compounds, this includes in itself the

implication that the words are *spoken by the Spirit of God*, or by those who are inspired by God," - a thing which, he adds, is repeatedly asserted in Scripture to have been the case, as, for example, in II Pet. i. 21. On another occasion,⁶⁴ he substantially repeats this, objecting to the translations *inspiratus*, *eingegeben*, as introducing an idea not lying in the word and liable to mislead, affirming a general but not perfect accord of the idea involved in it with Philo's conception of Scripture, and insisting on the incomplete parallelism between the term and our dogmatic idea of "inspiration." "This term," he says, "no doubt expresses only what is everywhere presupposed by Philo as to Scripture and repeatedly said by him in other words; still his usage is not yet so far developed; and it is accordant with this that in the New Testament, also, it is only in one of the latest books that the word is thus used. This author was possibly the first who so applied it." Again, *geo,pneustoj* "means, purely passively, God-spirited (*Gottbegeistet*), or full of God's Spirit, not at all, when taken strictly, what we call discriminatingly God-inspired (*Gottbegeistert*) or filled with God's inspiration (*Begeisterung*), but in itself only, in a quite general sense, God-breathed, God-inspired (*Gottbeathmet*, *Gottbegeistert*), or filled with the divine spirit. In itself, therefore, it permits the most divers applications and we must appeal purely to the context in each instance in order to obtain its exact meaning."

Here we have in full what Dr. Cremer says so much more briefly in his articles. In order to orient ourselves with reference to it, we shall need to consider in turn the two points that are emphasized. These are, first, the passive form and sense of the word; and, secondly, the particular passive sense attributed to it, to wit: *Gottbegeistet* rather than *Gottbegeistert*, "endowed with God's Spirit," rather than "inspired by God."

On the former point there would seem to be little room for difference of opinion. We still read in Schmiedel's Winer: "Verbals in -to; correspond sometimes to Latin participles in -tus, sometimes to adjectives in -bilis"; and then in a note (despite Ewald's long-ago protest), after the adduction of authorities, "qeo,pneustoj, *inspiratus* (II Tim. iii. 16; passive like e;mpneustoj, while eu;pneustoj(a;pneustoj are active)."65 To these Thayer-Grimm adds also puri,pneustoj and dusdia,pneustoj as used actively and dusana,pneustoj as used apparently either actively or passively. Ewald, however, has already taught us to look beneath the "active" usage of eu;pneustoj and a;pneustoj for the "half-passive" background, and it may equally be found in the other cases; in each instance it is a state or condition at least, that is described by the word, and it is often only a matter of point of view whether we catch the passive conception or not. For example, we shall look upon dusdia,pneustoj as active or passive according as we think of the object it describes as a "slowly evaporating" or a "slowly evaporated" object - that is, as an object that only slowly evaporates, or as an object that can be only with difficulty evaporated. We may prefer the former expression; the Greeks preferred the latter: that is all. We fully accord with Prof. Schulze, therefore, when he says that all words compounded with -pneustoj have the passive sense as their original implication, and the active sense, when it occurs, is always a derived one. On this showing it cannot be contended, of course, that qeo,pneustoj may not have, like some of its relatives, developed an active or quasi-active meaning, but a passive sense is certainly implied as its original one, and a certain presumption is thus raised for the originality of the passive sense which is found to attach to it in its most ordinary usage.66

This conclusion finds confirmation in a consideration which has its bearing on the second point also - the consideration that compounds of

verbals in -toj with qeo,j normally express an effect produced by God's activity. This is briefly adverted to by Prof. Schulze, who urges that "the closely related qeodi,daktoj, and many, or rather most, of the compounds of qeo- in the Fathers, bear the passive sense," adducing in illustration: qeo,blastoj, qeobou,lhtoj, qeoge,nhtoj, qeo,grptoj, qeo,dmhtoj, qeo,dotoj, qeodw,rhtoj, qeo,qreptoj, qeoki,nhtoj, qeo,klhtoj, qeopoi,htoj, qeoyo,rhtoj, qeo,crhstoj, qeo,cristoj. The statement may be much broadened and made to cover the whole body of such compounds occurring in Greek literature. Let any one run his eye down the list of compounds of qeo,j with verbals in -toj as they occur on the pages of any Greek Lexicon, and he will be quickly convinced that the notion normally expressed is that of a result produced by God. The sixth edition of Liddell and Scott happens to be the one lying at hand as we write; and in it we find entered (if we have counted aright), some eighty-six compounds of this type, of which, at least, seventy-five bear quite simply the sense of a result produced by God. We adjoin the list: qeh,latoj, qeoba,staktoj, qeo,blustoj, qeobou,lhtoj, qeobra,beutoj, qeoge,nhtoj, qeo,gnwstoj, qeo,graptoj, qeodek,toj, qeodi,daktoj, qeo,dmhtoj, qeoo,mhtoj, qeo,dotoj, qeodw,rhtoj, qeo,qetoj, qeokata,ratoj, qeokataskeu,astoj, qeoke,leustoj, qeoki,nhtoj, qeo,klhtoj, qeo,kmhtoj, qeo,krantoj, qeo,kritoj, qeo,kthtoj, qeo,ktistoj, qeo,ktitoj, qeokube,rnhtoj, qeoku,rwtoj, qeo,lektoj, qeo,lhptoj, qeomaka,ristoj, qeomi,shtoj, qeo,mustoj, qeo,paistoj, qeopara,dotoj, qeopa,raktoj, qeo,pemptoj, qeope,ratoj, qeo,plhktoj, qeo,ploutoj, qeopoi,htoj, qeopo,nhtoj, qeopro,sdektoj, qeo,ptustoj, qeo,rghtoj, qeo,rrhtoj, qe,ortoj, qeo,sdotoj, qeo,streptoj, qeosth,riktoj, qeostu,ghtoj, qeosu,llektoj, qeosu,mfutoj, qeosu,naktoj, qeo,sutoj, qeosfra,gistoj, qeo,swstoj, qeote,ratoj, qeo,teuktoj, qeoti,mhtoj, qeo,treptoj, qeotu,pwtoj, qeou?po,statoj, qeou<fantoj, qeo,fantoj, qeo,fqegktoj, qeofi,lhtoj, qeo,foitoj, qeoyo,rhtoj, qeoyrou,rhtoj, qeoyfu,laktoj, qeoyco,lwtoj, qeo,crhstoj, qeo,cristoj. The eleven instances that remain, as in some sort exceptions to the general rule, include cases of different kinds. In some of them the verbal is derived

from a deponent verb and is therefore passive only in form, but naturally bears an active sense: such are *qeodh,lhtoj* (God-injuring), *qeomi,mhtoj* (God-imitating), *qeo,septoj* (feared as God). Others may possibly be really passives, although we prefer an active form in English to express the idea involved: such are, perhaps, *qeo,klutov* ("Godheard," where we should rather say, "calling on the gods"), *qeoko,llhtoj* ("God-joined," where we should rather say, "united with God"), *qeo,preptoj* ("God-distinguished," where we should rather say, "meet for a god"). There remain only these five: *qelai,thtoj* ("obtained from God"), *qeo,qutov* ("offered to the gods"), *qeora,stoj* and the more usual *qeo,rrotoj* ("flowing from the gods"), and *qeo,cw,rhtoj* ("containing God"). In these the relation of *qeo,j* to the verbal idea is clearly not that of producing cause to the expressed result, but some other: perhaps what we need to recognize is that the verbal here involves a relation which we ordinarily express by a preposition, and that the sense would be suggested by some such phrases as "God-asked-of," "God-offered-to," "God-flowedfrom," "God-made-room-for." In any event, these few exceptional cases cannot avail to set aside the normal sense of this compound, as exhibited in the immense majority of the cases of its occurrence. If analogy is to count for anything, its whole weight is thrown thus in favor of the interpretation which sees in *qeo,pneustoj*, quite simply, the sense of "Godbreathed," i.e., produced by God's creative breath.

If we ask, then, what account is to be given of Ewald's and, after him, Prof. Cremer's wish, to take it in the specific sense of "God-spirited," that is, "imbued with the Spirit of God," we may easily feel ourselves somewhat puzzled to return a satisfactory answer. We should doubtless not go far wrong in saying, as already suggested, that their action is proximately due to their not having brought all the alternatives fairly before them. They seem to have worked, as we have said, on the

hypothesis that the only choice lay between the Vulgate rendering, "God-inspired," and their own "God-imbued." Ewald, as we have seen, argues (and as we think rightly) that "God-inspired" is scarcely consonant with the word-form, but would have required something like *qee,mpneustoj*. Similarly we may observe Dr. Cremer in the second edition of his "Lexicon" (when he was arguing for the current conception) saying that "the formation of the word cannot be traced to the use of *pne,w*, but only of *evmpne,w*," and supporting this by the remark that "the simple verb is never used of divine action"; and throughout his later article, operating on the presumption that the rendering "inspired" solely will come into comparison with his own newly proposed one. All this seems to be due, not merely to the traditional rendering of the word itself, but also to the conception of the nature of the divine action commonly expressed by the term, "inspiration," and indeed to the doctrine of Holy Scripture, dominant in the minds of these scholars.⁶⁷ If we will shake ourselves loose from these obscuring prepossessions and consider the term without preoccupation of mind, it would seem that the simple rendering "God-breathed" would commend itself powerfully to us: certainly not, with the Vulgate and Luther, "God-*in*breathed," since the preposition "in" is wholly lacking in the term and is not demanded for the sense in any of its applications; but equally certainly not "God-imbued" or "God-infused" in the sense of imbued or infused *with* (rather than *by*) God, since, according to all analogy, as well as according to the simplest construction of the compound, the relation of "God" to the act expressed is that of "agent." On any other supposition than that this third and assuredly the most natural alternative, "God-breathed," was not before their minds, the whole treatment of Ewald and Dr. Cremer will remain somewhat inexplicable.

*****Why otherwise, for example, should the latter have remarked,

that the "word must be traced to the use of *evmpne,w* and not to the simple verb *pne,w*?" Dr. Cremer, it is true, adds, as we have said, that the simple verb is never used of divine action. In any case, however, this statement is overdrawn. Not only is *pne,w* applied in a physical sense to God in such passages of the LXX. as Ps. cxlvii. 7 (18) (*pneu,sei to. pneu/ma auvtou/*) and Isa. xl. 24, and of Symmachus and Theodotion as Isa. xl. 7; and not only in the earliest Fathers is it used of the greatest gifts of Christ the Divine Lord, in such passages as Ign., "Eph." 17: - "For this cause the Lord received ointment on His head, that He might breathe incorruption upon His Church (*i[na pne,h| th| evkklhsi,a| ajfqarsi,an*)"; but in what may be rightly called the normative passage, Gen. ii. 7, it is practically justified, in its application to God, by the LXX. use of *pnoh*, in the objective clause, and actually employed for the verb itself by both Symmachus and Theodotion. And if we will penetrate beneath the mere matter of the usage of a word to the conception itself, nothing could be more misleading than such a remark as Dr. Cremer's. For surely there was no conception more deeply rooted in the Hebrew mind, at least, than that of the creative "breath of God"; and this conception was assuredly not wholly unknown even in ethnic circles. To a Hebrew, at all events, the "breath of God" would seem self-evidently creative; and no locution would more readily suggest itself to him as expressive of the Divine act of "making" than just that by which it would be affirmed that He breathed things into existence. The "breath of the Almighty" - *pnoh. pantokra,toroj* - was traditionally in his mouth as the fit designation of the creative act (Job xxxii. 8, xxxiii. 4); and not only was he accustomed to think of man owing his existence to the breathing of the breath of God into his nostrils (Gen. ii. 7, especially Symm. Theod.) and of his life as therefore the "breath of God" (*pneu/ma qei/oj*, LXX., Job xxvii. 8), which God needs but to draw back to Himself that all flesh should perish (Job xxxiv. 14): but he conceived also that it was by the breath of God's mouth (*pneu,mati tou/*

stw,matoj, Ps. xxxiii. 6), that all the hosts of the heavens were made, and by the sending forth of His breath, (pneu/ma, Ps. civ. 30) that the multiplicity of animal life was created. By His breath even (pnoh,, Job xxxvii. 10), he had been told, the ice is formed; and by His breath (pneu/ma, Isa. xi. 5, cf. Job iv. 9) all the wicked are consumed. It is indeed the whole conception of the Spirit of God as the executive of the Godhead that is involved here: the conception that it is the Spirit of God that is the active agent in the production of all that is. To the Hebrew consciousness, creation itself would thus naturally appear as, not indeed an "inspiration," and much less an "infusion of the Divine essence," but certainly a "spiration"; and all that exists would appeal to it as, therefore, in the proper sense theopneustic, i. e., simply, "breathed by God," produced by the creative breath of the Almighty, the pnoh. pantokra,toroj.

This would not, it needs to be remembered, necessarily imply an "immediate creation," as we call it. When Elihu declares that it is the breath of the Almighty that has given him life or understanding (Job xxxii. 8, xxxiii. 4), he need not be read as excluding the second causes by which he was brought into existence; nor need the Psalmist (civ. 30) be understood to teach an "immediate creation" of the whole existing animal mass. But each certainly means to say that it is God who has made all these things, and that by His breath: He breathed them into being - they are all qeo,pneustoi. So far from the word presenting a difficulty therefore from the point of view of its conception, it is just, after the nature of Greek compounds, the appropriate crystallization into one concise term of a conception that was a ruling idea in every Jewish mind. Particularly, then, if we are to suppose (with both Ewald and Cremer) that the word is a coinage of Paul's, or even of Hellenistic origin, nothing could be more natural than that it should have enshrined in it the Hebraic conviction that God produces all that He would bring into being by a mere breath.

From this point of view, therefore, there seems no occasion to seek beyond the bare form of the word itself for a sense to attribute to it. If we cannot naturally give it the meaning of "God-inspired," we certainly do not need to go so far afield as to attribute to it the sense of "filled with God": the natural sense which belongs to it by virtue of its formation, and which is commended to us by the analogy of like compounds, is also most consonant with the thought-forms of the circles in which it perhaps arose and certainly was almost exclusively used. What the word naturally means from this point of view also, is "God-spirated," "God-breathed," "produced by the creative breath of the Almighty."

Thus it appears that such a conception as "God-breathed" lies well within the general circle of ideas of the Hellenistic writers, who certainly most prevalently use the word. An application of this conception to Scripture, such as is made in II Tim. iii. 16, was no less consonant with the ideas concerning the origin and nature of Scripture which prevailed in the circles out of which that epistle proceeded. This may indeed be fairly held to be generally conceded.

The main object of Ewald's earlier treatment of this passage, to be sure, was to void the word *qeo,pneustoj* of all implication as to the origination of Scripture. By assigning to it the sense of "God-pervaded," "full of God's Spirit," he supposed he had made it a description of what Scripture is, without the least suggestion of how it came to be such; and he did not hesitate accordingly, to affirm that it had nothing whatever to say as to the origin of Scripture." But he afterwards, as we have already pointed out, saw the error of this position, and so far corrected it as to explain that, of course, the term *qeo,pneustoj* includes in itself the implication that the words so designated are spoken by the Spirit of God or by men inspired by God - in accordance with what is repeatedly said

elsewhere in Scripture, as, for example, in II Pet. i. 21 - yet still to insist that it throws its *chief emphasis* rather on the nature than the origin of these words.⁶⁹ And he never thought of denying that in the circles in which the word was used in application to Scripture, the idea of the origination of Scripture by the act of God was current and indeed dominant. Philo's complete identification of Scripture with the spoken word of God was indeed the subject under treatment by him, when he penned the note from which we have last quoted; and he did not fail explicitly to allow that the conceptions of the writer of the passage in II Timothy were very closely related to those of Philo. "It is certainly undeniable," he writes, "that the new term *qeo,pneustoj*, II Tim. iii. 16, is intended to express very much what Philo meant, and did not yet know how to say sharply by means of so compressed and direct a term"; and again, in another place, "this term, no doubt, embodies only what is everywhere presupposed by Philo as to the Scriptures, and is repeatedly expressed by him in other words; yet his usage is not yet so far developed; and it is in accordance with this that in the New Testament, too, it is only one of the latest writings which uses the term in this way."⁷⁰

It would seem, to be sure, that it is precisely this affinity with Philo's conception of Scripture which Dr. Cremer wishes to exclude in his treatment of the term. "Let it be added," he writes, near the close of the extract from his Herzog article which we have given above, "that the expression 'breathed by God, inspired by God,' though an outgrowth of the Biblical idea, certainly, so far as it is referred to the prophecy which does not arise out of the human will (II Pet. i. 20), yet can scarcely be applied to the whole of the rest of Scripture - unless we are to find in II Tim. iii. 16 the expression of a conception of sacred Scripture similar to the Philonian." And a little later he urges against the testimony of the exegetical tradition to the meaning of the word, that it was affected by the

conceptions of Alexandrian Judaism - that is, he suggests, practically of heathenism. There obviously lies beneath this mode of representation an attempt to represent the idea of the nature and origin of Scripture exhibited in the New Testament, as standing in some fundamental disaccord with that of the Philonian tracts; and the assimilation of the conception expressed in II Tim. iii. 16 to the latter as therefore its separation from the former. Something like this is affirmed also by Holtzmann when he writes :⁷¹ "It is accordingly clear that the author shares the Jewish conception of the purely supernatural origin of the Scriptures in its strictest acceptation, according to which, therefore, the theopneusty is ascribed immediately to the Scriptures themselves, and not merely, as in II Pet. i. 21, to their writers; and so far as the thing itself is concerned there is nothing incorrect implied in the translation, *tota Scriptura*." The notion that the Biblical and the Philonian ideas of Scripture somewhat markedly differ is apparently common to the two writers: only Holtzmann identifies the idea expressed in II Tim. iii. 16 with the Philonian, and therefore pronounces it to be a mark of late origin for that epistle; while Cremer wishes to detach it from the Philonian, that he may not be forced to recognize the Philonian conception as possessing New Testament authorization.

No such fundamental difference between the Philonian and New Testament conceptions as is here erected, however, can possibly be made out; though whatever minor differences may be traceable between the general New Testament conception and treatment of Scripture and that of Philo, it remains a plain matter of fact that no other general view of Scripture than the so-called Philonian is discernible in the New Testament, all of whose writers - as is true of Jesus Himself also, according to His reported words, - consistently look upon the written words of Scripture as the express utterances of God, owing their origin to

His direct spiration and their character to this their divine origin. It is peculiarly absurd to contrast II Pet. i. 21 with II Tim. iii. 16 (as Holtzmann does explicitly and the others implicitly), on the ground of a difference of conception as to "inspiration," shown in the ascription of inspiration in the former passage to the writers, in the latter immediately to the words of Scripture. It is, on the face of it, the "*word* of prophecy" to which Peter ascribes divine surety; it is *written* prophecy which he declares to be of no "private interpretation"; and if he proceeds to exhibit *how* God produced this sure written word of prophecy - viz., through men of God carried onward, apart from their own will, by the determining power of the Holy Ghost⁷² - surely this exposition of the mode of the divine action in producing the Scriptures can only by the utmost confusion of ideas be pleaded as a denial of the fact that the Scriptures were produced by the Divine action. To Peter as truly as to Paul, and to the Paul of the earlier epistles as truly as to the Paul of II Timothy, or as to Philo himself, the Scriptures are the product of the Divine Spirit, and would be most appropriately described by the epithet of "God-breathed," i. e., produced by the breath, the inspiration, of God.

The entire distinction which it is sought to erect between the New Testament and the Philonic conceptions of Scripture, as if to the New Testament writers the Scriptures were less the oracles of God than to Philo, and owed their origin less directly to God's action, and might therefore be treated as less divine in character or operation, hangs in the mere air. There may be fairly recognized certain differences between the New Testament and the Philonic conceptions of Scripture; but they certainly do not move in this fundamental region. The epithet "God-breathed," "produced by the creative breath of the Almighty," commends itself, therefore, as one which would lie near at hand and would readily express the fundamental view as to the origination of Scripture current

among the whole body of New Testament writers, as well as among the whole mass of their Jewish contemporaries, amid whom they were bred. The distinction between the inspiration of the writers and that of the record, is a subtlety of later times of which they were guiltless: as is also the distinction between the origination of Scripture by the action of the Holy Ghost and the infusing of the Holy Spirit into Scriptures originating by human activity. To the writers of this age of simpler faith, the Scriptures are penetrated by God because they were given by God: and the question of their effects, or even of their nature, was not consciously separated from the question of their origin. The one sufficient and decisive fact concerning them to these writers, inclusive of all else and determinative of all else that was true of them as the Word of God, was that they were "God-given," or, more precisely, the product of God's creative "breath."

In these circumstances it can hardly be needful to pause to point out in detail how completely this conception accords with the whole New Testament doctrine of Scripture, and with the entire body of phraseology currently used in it to express its divine origination. We need only recall the declarations that the Holy Spirit is the author of Scripture (Heb. iii. 7, x. 15), "in whom" it is, therefore, that its human authors speak (Matt. xxii. 43; Mark xii. 36), because it is He that speaks what they speak "through them" (Acts i. 16, iv. 25), they being but the media of the prophetic word (Matt. i. 22, ii. 15, iii. 3, iv. 14, viii. 17, xii. 17, xiii. 35, xxi. 4, xxiv. 15, xxvii. 9, Luke xviii. 31, Acts ii. 16, xxvii. 25, Rom. i. 2, Luke i. 76, Acts i. 16, iii. 18, 21). The whole underlying conception of such modes of expression is in principle set forth in the command of Jesus to His disciples that, in their times of need, they should depend wholly on the Divine Spirit speaking in them (Matt. x. 20; Mark xiii. 11; cf. Luke i. 41, 67, xii. 12; Acts iv. 8) : and perhaps even more decidedly still in Peter's description of the

prophets of Scripture as "borne by the Holy Ghost," as pneumato,foroi, whose words are, therefore, of no "private interpretation," and of the highest surety (II Pet. i. 21). In all such expressions the main affirmation is that Scripture, as the product of the activity of the Spirit, is just the "breath of God"; and the highest possible emphasis is laid on their origination by the divine agency of the Spirit. The primary characteristic of Scripture in the minds of the New Testament writers is thus revealed as, in a word, its Divine origin.

That this was the sole dominating conception attached from the beginning to the term *qeo,pneustoj* as an epithet of Scripture, is further witnessed by the unbroken exegetical tradition of its meaning in the sole passage of the New Testament in which it occurs. Dr. Cremer admits that such is the exegetical tradition, though he seeks to break the weight of this fact by pleading that the unanimity of the patristic interpretation of the passage is due rather to preconceived opinions on the part of the Fathers as to the nature of Scripture, derived from Alexandrian Judaism, than to the natural effect on their minds of the passage itself. Here we are pointed to the universal consent of Jewish and Christian students of the Word as to the divine origin of the Scriptures they held in common - a fact impressive enough of itself - as a reason for discrediting the testimony of the latter as to the meaning of a fundamental passage bearing on the doctrine of Holy Scripture. One is tempted to ask whether it can be really proved that the theology of Alexandrian Judaism exercised so universal and absolute a dominion over the thinking of the Church, that it is likely to be due to its influence alone that the Christian doctrine of inspiration took shape, in despite (as we are told) of the natural implications of the Christian documents themselves. And one is very likely to insist that, whatever may be its origin, this conception of the divine origination of Scripture was certainly shared by the New

Testament writers themselves, and may very well therefore have found expression in II Tim. iii. 16 - which would therefore need no adjustment to current ideas to make it teach it. At all events, it is admitted that this view of the teaching of II Tim. iii. 16 is supported by the unbroken exegetical tradition; and this fact certainly requires to be taken into consideration in determining the meaning of the word.

It is quite true that Dr. Cremer in one sentence does not seem to keep in mind the unbrokenness of the exegetical tradition. We read: "Origen also, in 'Hom. 21 in Jerem.', seems so [i. e., as Dr. Cremer does] to understand it [that is, *qeo,pneustoj*]: - *sacra volumina spiritus plenitudinem spirant.*" The unwary reader may infer from this that these words of Origen are explanatory of II Tim. iii. 16, and that they therefore break the exegetical tradition and show that Origen assigned to that passage the meaning that "the Holy Scriptures breathe out the plenitude of the Spirit." Such is, however, not the case. Origen is not here commenting on II Tim. iii. 16, but only freely expressing his own notion as to the nature of Scripture. His words here do not, therefore, break the constancy of the exegetical tradition, but at the worst only the universality of that Philonian conception of Scripture, to the universality of which among the Fathers, Dr. Cremer attributes the unbrokenness of the exegetical tradition. What results from their adduction is, then, not a weakening of the patristic testimony to the meaning of *qeo,pneustoj* in II Tim. iii. 16, but (at the worst) a possible hint that Dr. Cremer's explanation of the unanimity of that testimony may not, after all, be applicable. When commenting on II Tim. iii. 16, Origen uniformly takes the word *qeo,pneustoj* as indicative of the origin of Scripture; though when himself speaking of what Scripture is, he may sometimes speak as Dr. Cremer would have him speak. It looks as if his interpretation of II Tim. iii. 16 were expository of its meaning to him rather than impository

of his views on it. Let us, by way of illustration, place a fuller citation of Origen's words, in the passage adduced by Dr. Cremer, side by side with a passage directly dealing with II Tim. iii. 16, and note the result.

Secundum istiusmodi expositiones decet sacras litteras credere nee unum quidem apicem habere vacuum sapientia Dei. Qui enim mihi homini præcipit dicens: *Non apparebis ante conspectum meum vacuus*, multo plus hoc ipse agit, ne aliquid vacuum loquatur. Ex plenitudine ejus accipientes prophetæ, ea, quæ erant de plenitudine sumpta, cecinerunt: et idcirco sacra volumina spiritus plenitudinem spirant, nihilque est sive in prophetia, sive in lege, sive in evangelio, sive in apostolo, quod non a plenitudine divinæ majestatis descendat. Quamobrem spirant in scripturis sanctis hodieque plenitudinis verba. Spirant autem his, qui habent et oculos ad videnda coelestia et aures ad audienda divina, et nares ad ea, quæ sunt plenitudinis, sentienda (Origen, "in Jeremiam Homilia," xxi, 2. Wirceburg ed., 1785, ix, 733).

Here Origen is writing quite freely: and his theme is the divine fullness of Scripture. There is nothing in Scripture which is vain or empty and all its fullness is derived from Him from whom it is dipped by the prophets. Contrast his manner, now, when he is expounding II Tim. iii. 16.

"Let us not be stupefied by hearing Scriptures which we do not understand; but let it be to us according to our faith, by which also we believe that every Scripture because it is theopneustic (pa/sa graph. qeo,pneustoj ou=sa) is profitable. For you must needs admit one of

two things regarding these Scriptures: either that they are not theopneustic since they are not profitable, as the unbeliever takes it; or, as a believer, you must admit that since they are theopneustic, they are profitable. It is to be admitted, of course, that the profit is often received by us unconsciously, just as often we are assigned certain food for the benefit of the eyes, and only after two or three days does the digestion of the food that was to benefit the eyes give us assurance by trial that the eyes are benefited So, then, believe also concerning the divine Scriptures, that thy soul is profited, even if thy understanding does not perceive the fruit of the profit that comes from the letters, from the mere bare reading" [Origen, "Hom. XX in Josuam" 2, in J. A. Robinson's Origen's "Philocalia," p. 63).

It is obvious that here Origen does not understand II Tim. iii. 16, to teach that Scripture is inspired only because it is profitable, and that we are to determine its profitableness first and its inspiration therefrom; what he draws from the passage is that Scripture is profitable because it is inspired, and that though we may not see in any particular case how, or even that, it is profitable, we must still believe it to be profitable because it is inspired, i. e., obviously because it is given of God for that end.

It seemed to be necessary to adduce at some length these passages from Origen, inasmuch as the partial adduction of one of them, alone, by Dr. Cremer might prove misleading to the unwary reader. But there appears to be no need of multiplying passages from the other early expositors of II Tim. iii. 16, seeing that it is freely confessed that the exegetical tradition runs all in one groove. We may differ as to the weight

we allow to this fact; but surely as a piece of testimony corroborative of the meaning of the word derived from other considerations, it is worth noting that it has from the beginning been understood only in one way - even by those, such as Origen and we may add Clement, who may not themselves be absolutely consistent in preserving the point of view taught them in this passage.⁷³

The final test of the sense assigned to any word is, of course, derived from its fitness to the context in which it is found. And Dr. Cremer does not fail to urge with reference to *qeo,pneustoj* in II Tim. iii. 16, that the meaning he assigns to it corresponds well with the context, especially with the succeeding clauses; as well as, he adds, with the language elsewhere in the New Testament, as, for example, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, where what Scripture says is spoken of as the utterance, the saying of the Holy Ghost, with which he would further compare even Acts xxviii. 25.

That the words of Scripture are conceived, not only in Hebrews but throughout the New Testament, as the utterances of the Holy Ghost is obvious enough and not to be denied. But it is equally obvious that the ground of this conception is everywhere the ascription of these words to the Holy Ghost as their responsible author: *littera scripta manet* and remains what it was when written, viz., the words of the writer. The fact that all Scripture is conceived as a body of Oracles and approached with awe as the utterances of God certainly does not in the least suggest that these utterances may not be described as God-given words or throw a preference for an interpretation of *qeo,pneustoj* which would transmute it into an assertion that they are rather God-giving words.

And the same may be said of the contextual argument. Naturally, if *qeo,pneustoj* means "God-giving," it would as an epithet or predicate of

Scripture serve very well to lay a foundation for declaring this "God-giving Scripture" also profitable, etc. But an equal foundation for this declaration is laid by the description of it as "God-given." The passage just quoted from Origen will alone teach us this. All that can be said on this score for the new interpretation, therefore, is that it also could be made accordant with the context; and as much, and much more, can be said for the old. We leave the matter in this form, since obviously a detailed interpretation of the whole passage cannot be entered into here, but must be reserved for a later occasion. It may well suffice to say now that obviously no advantage can be claimed for the new interpretation from this point of view. The question is, after all, not what can the word be made to mean, but what does it mean; and the witness of its usage elsewhere, its form and mode of composition, and the sense given it by its readers from the first, supply here the primary evidence. Only if the sense thus commended to us were unsuitable to the context would we be justified in seeking further for a new interpretation - thus demanded by the context. This can by no means be claimed in the present instance, and nothing can be demanded of us beyond showing that the more natural current sense of the word is accordant with the context.

The result of our investigation would seem thus, certainly, to discredit the new interpretation of *qeo,pneustoj* offered by Ewald and Cremer. From all points of approach alike we appear to be conducted to the conclusion that it is primarily expressive of the origination of Scripture, not of its nature and much less of its effects. What is *qeo,pneustoj* is "God-breathed," produced by the creative breath of the Almighty. And Scripture is called *qeo,pneustoj* in order to designate it as "God-breathed," the product of Divine spiration, the creation of that Spirit who is in all spheres of the Divine activity the executive of the Godhead. The traditional translation of the word by the Latin *inspiratus*

a Deo is no doubt also discredited, if we are to take it at the foot of the letter. It does not express a breathing into the Scriptures by God. But the ordinary conception attached to it, whether among the Fathers or the Dogmaticians, is in general vindicated. What it affirms is that the Scriptures owe their origin to an activity of God the Holy Ghost and are in the highest and truest sense His creation. It is on this foundation of Divine origin that all the high attributes of Scripture are built.



Endnotes:

1. From *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, v. XT, pp. 89-130.
2. The novelty of the view in question must not be pressed beyond measure. It was a new view in the sense of the text, but, as we shall subsequently see, it was no invention of Prof. Cremer's, but was derived by him from Ewald.
3. That is at least to the eighth edition (1895), which is the last we have seen. The chief differences between the Herzog and "Lexicon" articles are found at the beginning and end - the latter being fuller at the beginning and the former at the end. The "Lexicon" article opens thus: "qeo,pneustoj, -on, *gifted with God's Spirit, breathing the Divine Spirit* (but not, as Weiss still maintains = *inspired by God*). The term belongs only to Hellenistic and Ecclesiastical Greek, and as peculiar thereto is connected with expressions belonging to the sphere of heathen prophecy and mysteries, qeoforoj, qeoforhtoj, qeoforou,menoj, qeh,latoj, qeoki,nhtoj, qeode,gmwn, qeode,ktwr, qeopro,poj, qeo,mantij, qeo,frwn, qeofra,dmwn, qeofradh,j, e;nqeo,j, evnqousiasth,j, et al., to which Hellenistic Greek adds two new words, qeo,pneustoj and qeodi,daktoj, without, however, denoting what the others do - an ecstatic state." The central core of the article then runs parallel in both forms. Nothing is added in the "Lexicon," except (in the later editions) immediately after the quotations from Nonnus this single sentence: "This usage in Nonnus shows just that it is not to be taken as = *inspiratus*, inspired by God but as = filled with God's Spirit and therefore radiating it." Then follows immediately the next

sentence, precisely as in Herzog, with which the "Lexicon" article then runs parallel to the quotation from Origen, immediately after which it breaks off.

4. The contrast is between "*gottlich begeistert*" and "*gottlich begeistert.*" The reference to Ewald is given in the "Lexicon": *Jahrb. f. bibl. Wissenschaft*, vii. 68. *seq.*; ix. 91 *seq.*
5. Of which the facts given by Cremer may for the present be taken as a fair conspectus, only adding that the word occurs not only in the editions of Plutarch, "De plac. phil.," v. 2, 3, but also in the printed text of the dependent document printed among Galen's works under the title of "De hist. phil.," 106.
6. Cf. Mahaffy, "History of Greek Literature" (American ed.), i. 188, note 1.
7. "The Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ," E. T., II, iii. 286, whence the account given in the text is derived.
8. See his "Gesammelte Abhandlungen," edited by Usener in 1885. Usener's Preface should be also consulted.
9. So Harnack, "Theologische Literaturzeitung," 1885, No. 7, p. 160: also, J. R. Harris, "The Teaching of the Apostles and the Sibylline Books" (Cambridge, 1888): both give internal evidences of the Christian origin of the book. Cf. what we have said in *The Andover Review* for August, 1886, p. 219.
10. Oxford 8vo edition, 1795-1830, Vol. iv, ii. 650.
11. As by Diels in his "Doxographi Graci," p. 15: "*fuit scilicet qeope,mptouj, quod sero intellectum est a Wyttenbachio in indice Plutarcho. si Galenum inspexissit, ipsum illud qeope,mptouj inventurus erat.*" But Diels' presentation of Galen was scarcely open to Wyttenbach's inspection: and the editions then extant read qeopneu,stouj as Corsini rightly tells us.
12. "Plutarchi de Physicis Philosophorum Decretis," ed. Chr. Dan. Beckius, Leipzig, 1787.
13. Tübingen, 1791-1804, Vol. XII (1800), p. 467.
14. "Plutarchi de Placitis Philosophorum Libb. v." (Florentiæ, 1750).
15. A very clear account of Diels' main conclusions is given by Franz Susemihl in his "Geschichte der Griechischen Literatur in der Alexandrinerzeit" (Leipzig, 1891-1892), ii. pp. 250, 251, as well as in Bursian's *Jahresbericht* for 1881 (VII, i. 289 *seq.*). A somewhat less

- flattering notice by Max Heinze appears in Bursian for 1880, p. 3 *seq.* Cf. Gerke, *sub voc.* "Aëtios," in the new edition of Pauly's "Real-Encyclopaedie" (Wissowa's ed., 1894), I, i. 705 *a.*
16. Cf. the remarks of Max Heinze as above.
 17. It would be possible to hold, of course, that Athenagoras used not the [Pseudo?-] Plutarch, but the hypothetical Aëtios, of which Diels considers the former an excerpt: but Diels does not himself so judge: "anceps est quæstio utrum excerptserit Athenagoras Plutarchi Placita an maius illud opus, cuius illa est epitome. illud mihi probatur, hoc R. Volkmanno 'Leben Plut.,' i. 169. . . ." (p. 51).
 18. The relation of the Pseudo-Galen to the [Pseudo?-] Plutarch Diels expresses thus: "Alter liber quo duce ex generali physicorum tanquam promulside ad largiorem dapam Galenus traducit est 'Plutarchus de Placidis philosophorum physicis.' Unde cum in prioribus pauca suspensa manu ut condimentum adpersa sint (c. 5, 20, 21), jam a c. 25 ad finem Plutarchus ita regnat, nihil aliud ut præterea adscitum esse appareat . . . ergo foedioribus Byzantium soloecismis amputatis hanc partem ad codicum fidem descripsimus, non nullis Plutarcheæ emendationis auxilium, pluribus fortasse humanæ perversitatis insigne testimonium" (pp. 252, 253).
 19. Plutarch's, pp. 267 *seq.*; Galen's, pp. 595 *seq.*
 20. Plutarch's "Ep.," v. 2, 3 (p. 416); Galen's "Hist. Phil.," 106 (p. 640).
 21. For Bernardakis reads *qeopneu,stouj* in his text (Teubner series, Plutarch's "Moralia," v. 351), recognizing at the same time in a note that the reading of Galen is *qeope,mptouj*.
 22. In Pauly's "Real-Encyclopædie," new ed., s. v.
 23. It is not meant, of course, that Diels was the first to deny the tract to Plutarch. It has always been under suspicion. Wyttenbach, for example, rejects its Plutarchian claim with decision, and speaks of the tract in a tone of studied contempt, which is, indeed, reflected in the note already quoted from him, in the remark that we would not be justified in obtruding elegancies on a mere compiler. Cf. i. p. xli: "Porro, si quid hoc est, spurium liber utriusque nomine perperam fertur idem, Plutarchi qui dicitur *De Philosophorum Placitis*, Galeni *Historia philosophiæ.*"
 24. Diels does not think highly of this portion of Kahn's edition: "Kuehnius, qui prioribus sui corporis voluminibus manum subinde

- admovit quamvis parum felicem, postremo urgenti typhothetæ ne inspectas quidem Charterianae plagulas typis describendas tradidisse fertur. neque aliter explicari potest, quod editio ambitiose suscepta tam misere absoluta est" (p. 241, 2).
25. Though Diels informs us that the editors have made very little effort to ascertain the readings of the MSS.
 26. "Ex archetypo haud vetusto eodemque mendosissimo quattuor exempla transcripta esse, ac fidelius quidem Laur. A, peritius sed interpolate Laur. B." (p. 241).
 27. Diels' language is: "dolendum sane est libri condicionem tam esse desperatam ut etiam Plutarcho archetypo comparato haud semel plane incertus hæreas, quid sibi velit compiler" (p. 12).
 28. "Verum quamvis sit summa opus cautione ne ventosi nebulonis commenta pro sincera memoria amplexemur, inest tamen in Galeno optimarum lectionum pæne intactus thesaurus" (p. 13).
 29. "Codices manu scripti quotquot noti sunt ex archetypo circa millesimum annum scripto deducti sunt" (p. 33). "duo autem sunt recensendi Plutarchi instrumenta ... unum recentius ex codicis petendum, inter quos A B C archetypo proximos ex ceterorum turba segregavi ... alterum genus est excerptorum . . ." (p. 42).
 30. The readings of A are drawn from a collation of it with the Frankfort edition of 1620 published by C. F. Matthæi in his "Lectiones Mosquenses." In a number of important readings, the MS. has been reinspected for Diels by Voelkel with the result of throwing some doubt on the completeness of Matthæi's collation. Accordingly the MS. is cited in parenthesis whenever it is cited *e silentio* (see Diels, p. 33).
 31. The general use of *qeo,pemptoj* is illustrated in the Lexicons, by the citation of Arist., "Ethic. Nic.," i. 9, 3, where happiness is spoken of as *qeo,pemptoj* in contrast to the attainment of virtue in effort; Longinus, c. 34, where we read of *qeo,pempta tina dwrh,mata* in contrast with *avnqrw,pina*; Themist, "Or." 13, p. 178 D, where *o` q) neani,oj* is found; Dion. Hal., T. 14. Liddell and Scott quote for the secondary sense of "extraordinary," Longus, 3, 18; Artem., i. 7.
 32. Arist., *de divinat*, 2 p. 4636 13: *o[lwj d v evpei. kai. tw/n a;llwn zw,wn ovneirw,ttei tina.(qeo,pempta me.n ouvka;n ei;h ta. evnu,pni,a(ouvde. ge,gone tou,tou ca,rin(diamo,nia me,noi\ h` ga.r fu,sij daimoni,a(avll v ouv*

- qei,a.
33. Cf. Philo's tract peri. tou/ qeope,mptouj ei;nai tou.j ovnei,rouj (Mangey., 1. 620). Its opening words run (Yonge's translation, ii. 292): "The treatise before this one has contained our opinions as to those of tw/n ovnei,rwn qeope,mptwn classed in the first species . . . which are defined as dreams in which the Deity sends the appearances beheld in dreams according to his own suggestion (to. qei/on kata. th.n ivdi,an u`pobolhj ta.j evn toi/j u[pnoij ejpipe,mpein fantasi,aj)," whereas this later treatise is to discuss the second species of dreams, in which, "our mind being moved along with that of the universe, has seemed to be hurried away from itself and to be God-borne (qeoforei/swqai) so as to be capable of preapprehension and foreknowledge of the future." Cf. also § 22, th/j qeope,mptou fantasi,aj: § 33, qeope,mptouj ovnei,rouj: ii. § 1, tw/n qeope,mptwn ovnei,rwn. The superficial parallelism of Philo with what is cited from Herophilus is close enough fully to account for a scribe harking back to Philo's language - or even for the compiler of the Pseudo-Galen doing so.
34. "Clementine Homilies," xvii. 15: "And Simon said: 'If you maintain that apparitions do not always reveal the truth, yet for all that visions and dreams, being God-sent (ta. o`ra,mata kai. ta. evnu,pnia qeo,pempta o;nta ouv yeu,detai) do not speak falsely in regard to those matters which they wish to tell.' And Peter said: 'You were right in saying that, being God-sent, they do not speak falsely (qeo,pempta ovnta ouv yeu,detai. But it is uncertain if he who sees has seen a God-sent dream (eiv o` ivdw.n qeo,pempton evw,raken o;neiron)." What has come to the "Clementine Homilies" is surely already a Christian commonplace.
35. The immediately preceding paragraph in the Pseudo-Galen (§ 105), corresponding with [Pseudo?-] Plutarch, v. i. 1, 2.3 is edited by Diels thus: Pla,twn kai. oi` Stwikoi. th.n mantikh.n eivsa,gousi\ kai. ga.r qeo,pempton ei=nai(o[per evsti.n evnqeastiko.n kai. kata. to. qeio,taton th/j yuch/j(o[per evsti.n evnqousiastiko,n(kai. to. ovneiropuliko.n kai. to. avstronomiko.n kai. to. ovrneoskopiko,n) Xenofa,nhj kai. vEpi,kouroj avnairou/si th.n mantikh,n) Puqago,raj de, mo,non to. qutiko.n ouvkv evgkri,nei) vAristote,lhj kai. Dikai,arcoj tou.j ovnei,rouj eivsa,gousin(avqa,naton me,n th.n yuch.n ouv nomi,zontevj qei,ou de, tinoj mete,xein) Surely the scribe or compiler who could transmute the section peri.

mantikh/j in the [Pseudo?-] Plutarch into this, with its intruded *geo,pempton* before him and its allusion to Aristotle on dreams, might be credited without much rashness with the intrusion of *geope,mptouj* into the next section.

36. Cf. in general E. Thramer. Hastings *ERE*, VI, p. 542.
37. It is duly recorded in Boeckh, "Corpus Inscript. Grace," 4700 b. (Add. iii). It is also printed by Kaibel, "Epigrammata Græca" (Berlin, 1878), p. 428, but not as a Christian inscription, but under the head of "Epigrammata dedicatoria: V. proscynemata."
38. Porphyry: "Ant. Nymph.," 116: h`gou/nto ga.r prosiza,nein tw|/ u[dati ta.j yuca.j qeopno,w| o;nti(w[j fhsin o` Noumh,nioj\ dia. tou/to le,gwn kai. to.n profh,thn eivrhke,nai(evmfe,resqai evpa,no tou/ u[datoj qeou/ pneu/ma - a passage remarkable for containing an appeal to Moses (Gen. i. 5) by a heathen sage. "God-breathed water" is rendered by Holstenius: "aquæ quæ divino spiritu foveretur"; by Gesnerus: "aquæ divinitus affliatæ"; by Thomas Taylor: "water which is inspired by divinity." Pisid. "Hexaem.," 1489: h` qeo,pnouj avkro,thj (quoted unverified from Hase-Dindorf's Stephens). The Christian usage is illustrated by the following citations, taken from Sophocles: Hermes Tris., "Poem," 17. 14: th/j a;lhqei,aj; Anastasius of Sinai, Migne, 89. 1169 A: Those who do not have flesh, love of God, "these, having a diabolical will and doing the desires of their flesh, paraito/ntai w`j ponhro.n to. qeo,moion, kai. qeo,ktiston(kai. qeo,moion th/j noera/j kai. qeocara,ktou h`mw/n yuch/j o`mologeivn evn Cristw|/(kai. th.n zwopoio.n au`th/j kai. sustatikh.n qeo,pnoun evse,rgeian."
39. *pneumatoforoj* and *pneumatoforei/sqai* are pre-Christian Jewish words, already used in the LXX. (Hos. ix. 7, Zeph, iii. 4, Jer. ii. 24). Compounds of *qeo,j* found in the LXX. are *qeo,ktistoj*, II Mace. vi. 23; *qeomacei/n*, II Macc. vii. 19 [*qeoma,coj* Sm., Job xxvi. 5, *et al.*]; *qeose,beia*, Gen. xx. 11 *et al.*; *qeoseb,h,j* Ex. xviii. 21 *et al.*
40. No derivative of *cristo,j* except *cristiano,j* is found in the New Testament. The compounds are purely Patristic. See Lightfoot's note on Ignatius, Eph. ix; Phil. viii and the note in Migne's "Pat. Gram.," xi. 1861, at Adamantii "Dialogus de recta fide," § 5.
41. In the Hase-Dindorf Stephens, *sub-voc.* *qeo,pneustoj*, the passage, from the [Pseudo?-] Plutarch is given within square brackets in this form: ["Plut. Mor. p. 904F: tou.j ovnei,rouj tou.j qeoplou,touj]." What is

to be made of this new reading, we do not know. One wonders whether it is a new conjecture or a misprint. No earlier reference is given for *qeo,ploutoj* in the "Thesaurus" than Chrysostom: "Ita Jobum appellat Jo. Chrytom, Vol. iv, p. 297, Suicer." Sophocles cites also Anast. Sinai. for the word: *Hexæmeron XII ad fin.* (Migne, 1076 D., Vol. 89): *o[puj tou/to katabalw.n evn tai/j yucaij trapezishw/n sw/n a;rvr`wn se di v auvtw/n th.n qeo,plouton kataplouth,sw.*

42. So it may be confidently inferred from the summary of what we know of Herophilus given in Susemihl's "Geschichte der Griechisch. Literatur in d. Alexandrinerzeit," Vol. i, p. 792, or from Marx's "De Herophili . . . vita scriptis atque in medicina mentis" (Göttingen, 1840), p. 38. In both cases Herophilus' doctrine of dreams is gathered solely from our excerpts - in the case of Susemihl from "Aëtius" and in the case of Marx primarily from Galen with the support of Plutarch.

43. *Loc. cit.*

44. In the common text the passage goes on to tell us of the dreams of mixed nature, i. e., presumably partly divine and partly human in origin. But the idea itself seems incongruous and the description does not very well fit the category. Diels, therefore, conjectures *pneumatikou,v* in its place in which case there are three categories in the enumeration: Theopneustic, physical (i. e., the product of the *yuch*, or lower nature), and pneumatic, or the product of the higher nature. The whole passage in Diels' recension runs as follows: Aët. 'Plac.,' p. 416 (Pseudo-Plut., V. 2, 3): *`Hrofiloj tw/n ovnei,rwn tou.j me.n qeope,mptouj kat v avna,gkhn gi,nesqai(tou.j de. fusikou.j avneidwlopoioume,nhj yuch/j(to. sumfe,ron auvth|/ kai. to. pa,ntwj evso,menon(tou.j de. sugkramatikou.j [pneumatikou.j? Diels, but this is scarcely the right correction, cf. Susemihl, "Gesch. d. Gr. Lit.," etc. i. 792] [evk tou/ au`toma,tou] kat v eivdw,lwn pro,sptwsin, o[tan a[boulo,meqa ble,pwmen(w`j evpi. tw/n ta.j evrwme,naj o`rw,ntwn evn u[puw| gi,netai."*

45. V. 308 *seq.* The full text, in Rzach's edition, runs:

Ku,mh d v h` mwrh. su.n na,masin oi-j qeopneu,stoij
vEn pala,maij avqe,wn avndrw/n kai. avqe,smwn
vRifqei/j j ouvq e;ti ti,sson evj aivqe,ra r`h/ma

prodw,sei\

vAlla. menei/ nekrh. evni, na,masi kumai,oisin.

46. Strabo, "Rerum Geographicarum," liber xiii, iii. 6, pp. 622, 623 (Amsterdam ed., 1707, p. 924). A good summary may be read in Smith's "Dictionary of Greek and Roman Geography," i. 724, 725.
47. Alexandre translates "plenis numine lymphis"; Dr. Terry, "inspired streams."
48. So Herodotus observes (i, 157).
49. p, 408 seq. In Rzach's text the lines run:

Ouv ga.r avkhde,stwj aivnei/ qeo.n evx avfanou/j gh/j
ouvde. pe,trhn poi,hse sofo.j te,ktwn para. tou,toivj
ouv cruso.n ko,smou avpa,thn yucw/n t v evseba,sqh(
avlla. me,gan geneth/ra qeo.n pa,ntwn qeopneu,swn
evn qusi,aij evge,rair v a`gi,aivj kalai/j q v e`kato,mbaij.

50. In this second edition, Dr. Terry has altered this to "The Mighty Father, God of all things God-inspired": but this scarcely seems an improvement.
51. ouvde. fobhqeij avqa,naton geneth/ra qeo.n pa,ntwn avnqrw,pwn ouvke;qelej tima/n. Rzach compares also Xenophon. "Fragm.," i. 1, M., eijj qeo.j e;n te qeoi-si kai. avnqrw,poisi me,gistoj\
52. Terry, Ed. 2: "the immortal Father, God of all mankind."
53. Recension A, chap. xx. p. 103, ed. James.
54. Nonni Panopolitani "Paraphrasis in Joannem" (i. 27), in Migne, xliii. 753:

Kai. ovpi,steroj o[stij i`ka,nei
Sh,meron u`mei,wn me,soj i[statai(ou- podo.j a]krou(
vAndrome,hn pala,mhn ouvke a[xio,j eivmi pela,ssaj(
Lu/sai mou/non i`ma,nta qeopneu,stoio pedi,lou)

55. *Op. cit.*, p. 756.
56. It is given in Kaibel's "Epigrammata Græca," p. 477. Waddington supposes the person meant to be a certain Archbishop of Bostra, of date 457-474, an opponent of Origenism, who is commemorated in the Greek Church on June 13. The inscription runs as follows:

Do,xhj] ovrqoto[n]ou tami,hj kai. u`pe,rmacoj evsqlo,j,
 avrciereu.j qeo,pneustoj evdei,mato ka,lloj a;metron
 vAnti,patr]o[j] kluto,mhtij aveqlofo,rouj met v
 avgw/navj
 ku[d]ai,nwn mega,lwj qeomh,tora parqe,non a`gnh,n
 Mari,an polu,umnon(avkh,ration avglao,dwron\

57. Wetstein cites the expression as applied (where, he does not say) to "Marcus Ægyptus," by which he means, we suppose, Marcus of Scetis, mentioned by Sozomen, H. E., vi. 29, and Nicephorus Callistus, H. E., xi. 35. Dr. Cremer transmutes the designation into Marcus Eremita, who is mentioned by Nicephorus Callistus, H. E., xiv. 30, 54, and whose writings are collected in Migne, lxxv. 905 *seq.* The two are often identified, but are separately entered in Smith and Wace.
58. That is doubtless the Jewish teacher to whom he elsewhere refers, as, e. g., "De Principiis," iv. 20 (Ante-Nicene Library, N. Y. ed., iv. 375), where the same general subject is discussed.
59. "Jahrb. f. bibl. Wissenschaft," vii. 114.
60. In a note on p. 89, Ewald adds as to qee,mpneustoj that it is certainly true that such compounds are not common, and that this particular one does not occur: but that they are possible is shown by the occurrence of such examples as qeosu,naktovj qeokataskeu,astoj, in which the preposition occurs: and *dem Laute nach*, the formation is like qeh,latoj. There seems to be no reason, we may add, why, if it were needed, we should not have had a qee,mpneustoj by the side of qeo,pneustoj, just as by the side of pneumatoforoj we have pneumate,mforoj ("Etymologicum Magnum," 677, 28; John of Damascus, in Migne, 96, 837c.: +Hse profhtw/n pneumate,mforon sto,ma).
61. For not even qeempne,w would properly signify "breathe into" but rather "breathe in," "inhale." It is by a somewhat illogical extension of meaning that the verb and its derivatives (e;mpneusij(e;mpnoia) are used in the theological sense of "inspiration," in which sense they do not occur, however, either in the LXX. or the New Testament. In the LXX. e;mpneusij means a "blast," a "blowing" (Ps. xvii. (xviii.) 15; cf. the participle evmpne,wn, Acts ix. 1); e;mpnouj, "living," "breathing" (II

Mace. vii. 5, xiv. 45); and the participle *pa/n evmpne,on*, "every living, breathing thing" (Deut. xx. 16; Josh. x. 28, 30, 35, 37, 39, 40; xi. 14; Wisd. xv. 11). *vEispne,w* is properly used by the classics in the sense of "breathing into," "inspiring": it is not found in itself or derivatives in LXX. or the New Testament - though it occurs in Aq. at Ex. i. 5. How easily and in what a full sense, however, *evmpne,w* is used by ecclesiastical writers for "inspire" may be noted from such examples as Ign. "ad Mag.," 8: "For the divine (*qeio,tatoi*) prophets lived after Christ; for this cause also they were persecuted, being inspired by His grace (*evmneo,menoi u`po. th/j ca,ritoj auvtou/*) for the full persuasion of those that are disobedient." Theoph. of Antioch, "ad. Autol.," ii. 9: "But the men of God, *pneumatoforo,i* of the Holy Ghost, and becoming prophets *u`p v auvtou/ tou/ qeou/ evmpneusq,ntej kai. sofisq,ntej*, became *qeodi,daktoi* and holy and righteous." The most natural term for "inspired" in classic Greek one would be apt to think, would be *e;nqeoj (e;nqouj)*, with *to. e;nqeon* for "inspiration"; and after it, participial or other derivatives of *evnqousia,zw*: but both *eivspne,w* and *evmpne,w* were used for the "inspiration" that consisted of "breathing into" even in profane Greek.

62. P. 88

63. "Geschichte des Volkes Israel," vi. 245, note.

64. "Jahrb. f. bibl. Wissenschaft," ix. 91.

65. Sec. 16, 2, p. 135. Cf. Thayer's Winer, p. 96; Moulton's, p. 120. Also Thayer's Buttman, p. 190. The best literature of the subject will be found adduced by Winer.

66. Compounds of *-pneustoj* do not appear to be very common. Liddell and Scott (ed. 6) do not record either *avna,-* or *dia,-* or *evpi,-* or even *eu;-*; though the cognates are recorded, and further compounds presupposing them. The rare word *eu;pneustoj* might equally well express "breathing-well" quasi-actively, or "well-aired" passively; just as *a;pneustoj* is actually used in the two senses of "breathless" and "unventilated": and a similar double sense belongs to *dusana,pneustoj*.

;Empneustoj does not seem to occur in a higher sense; its only recorded usage is illustrated by Athenaeus, iv. 174, where it is connected with *o;rgana* in the sense of wind-instruments: its cognates are used of "inspiration." Only *puri,pneustoj = puri,pnooj = "fire-breathing"* is distinctively active in usage: cf. *avna,pneustoj*, poetic for

a;pneustoj = "breathless."

67. Two fundamental ideas, lying at the root of all their thinking of Scripture, seem to have colored somewhat their dealing with this term: the old Lutheran doctrine of the Word of God, and the modern rationalizing doctrine of the nature of the Divine influence exerted in the production of Scripture. On account of the latter point of view they seem determined not to find in Scripture itself any declaration that will shut them up to "a Philonian conception of Scripture" as the Oracles of God - the very utterances of the Most High. By the former they seem predisposed to discover in it declarations of the wonder-working power of the Word. The reader cannot avoid becoming aware of the influence of both these dogmatic conceptions in both Ewald's and Cremer's dealing with qeo,pneustoj. But it is not necessary to lay stress on this.
68. "Jahrb. f. bibl. Wissenschaft," vii. 88, 114.
69. "Geschichte des Volkes Israel," i. 245, note.
70. "Jahrb.," etc., ix. 92.
71. "Die Pastoralbriefe" u. s. w., p. 163.
72. For the implications of the term fero,menoi here (as distinguished from avgo,menoi) consult the fruitful discussion of the words in Schmidt's "Synonymik."
73. Cf. Prof. Schulze, *loc. cit.*: "Further, it should not be lost sight of (and Dr. Cremer does not do so) how the Church in its defenders has understood this word. There can be no doubt that in the conflict with Montanism, the traditional doctrine of theopneusty was grounded in the conception of qeo,pneustoj, but never that of the Scriptures breathing out the Spirit of God. The passage which Cremer adduces from Origen gives no interpretation of this word, but only points to a quality of Scripture consequent on their divine origination by the Holy Spirit: and elsewhere when he adduces the rule of faith, the words run, *quod per spiritum dei sacræ scripturæ conscriptæ sint*, or *a verbo dei et spirita dei dictæ sunt*: just as Clem. Alex. also, when, in *Coh.* 71, he is commenting on the Pauline passage, takes the word in the usual way, and yet, like Origen, makes an inference from the God-likeness (as qeopoiei/n) in Plato's manner, from the whole passage - though not deriving it from the word itself. For the use of the word in Origen, we need to note: *Sel. in Ps.*, ii. 527; *Hom. in Joh.*,

vi. 134, Ed. de la R."

VII. "It Says:" "Scripture Says:" "God Says"¹

IT would be difficult to invent methods of showing profound reverence for the text of Scripture as the very Word of God, which will not be found to be characteristic of the writers of the New Testament in dealing with the Old. Among the rich variety of the indications of their estimate of the written words of the Old Testament as direct utterances of Jehovah, there are in particular two classes of passages, each of which, when taken separately, throws into the clearest light their habitual appeal to the Old Testament text as to God Himself speaking, while, together, they make an irresistible impression of the absolute identification by their writers of the Scriptures in their hands with the living voice of God. In one of these classes of passages the Scriptures are spoken of as if they were God; in the other, God is spoken of as if He were the Scriptures: in the two together, God and the Scriptures are brought into such conjunction as to show that in point of directness of authority no distinction was made between them.

Examples of the first class of passages are such as these: Gal. iii. 8, "The Scripture, foreseeing that God would justify the heathen through faith, preached before the gospel unto Abraham, saying, In thee shall all the nations be blessed" (Gen. xii. 1-3); Rom. ix. 17, "The Scripture saith unto Pharaoh, Even for this same purpose have I raised thee up" (Ex. ix. 16). It was not, however, the Scripture (which did not exist at the time) that, foreseeing God's purposes of grace in the future, spoke these precious words to Abraham, but God Himself in His own person: it was not the not yet existent Scripture that made this announcement to Pharaoh, but God Himself through the mouth of His prophet Moses. These acts could be attributed to "Scripture" only as the result of such a

habitual identification, in the mind of the writer, of the text of Scripture with God as speaking, that it became natural to use the term "Scripture says," when what was really intended was "God, as recorded in Scripture, said."

Examples of the other class of passages are such as these: Matt. xix. 4, 5, "And he answered and said, Have ye not read that he which made them from the beginning made them male and female, and said, For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and the twain shall become one flesh?" (Gen. ii. 24); Heb. iii. 7, "Wherefore, even as the Holy Ghost saith, To-day if ye shall hear his voice," etc. (Ps. xcv. 7); Acts iv. 24, 25, "Thou art God, who by the mouth of thy servant David hast said, Why do the heathen rage and the people imagine vain things" (Ps. ii. 1); Acts xiii. 34, 35, "He that raised him up from the dead, now no more to return to corruption, . . . hath spoken in this wise, I will give you the holy and sure blessings of David" (Isa. lv. 3); "because he saith also in another [Psalm], Thou wilt not give thy holy one to see corruption" (Ps. xvi. 10); Heb. i. 6, "And when he again bringeth in the first born into the world, he saith, And let all the angels of God worship him" (Deut. xxxii. 43); "and of the angels he saith, Who maketh his angels wings, and his ministers a flame of fire" (Ps. civ. 4); "but of the Son, He saith, Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever," etc., (Ps. xlv. 7) and, "Thou, Lord, in the beginning," etc. (Ps. cii. 26). It is not God, however, in whose mouth these sayings are placed in the text of the Old Testament: they are the words of others, recorded in the text of Scripture as spoken to or of God. They could be attributed to God only through such habitual identification, in the minds of the writers, of the text of Scripture with the utterances of God that it had become natural to use the term "God says" when what was really intended was "Scripture, the Word of God, says."

The two sets of passages, together, thus show an absolute identification, in the minds of these writers, of "Scripture" with the speaking God.

In the same line with these passages are commonly ranged certain others, in which Scripture seems to be adduced with a subjectless *le,gei* or *fhsi,*, the authoritative subject - whether the divinely given Word or God Himself - being taken for granted. Among these have been counted such passages, for example, as the following: Rom. ix. 15, "For he saith to Moses, I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I have compassion" (Ex. xxxiii. 19); Rom. xv. 10, "And again he saith, Rejoice, ye Gentiles, with his people" (Deut. xxxii. 43); and again, "Praise the Lord, all ye Gentiles; and let all the people praise him" (Ps. cvii. 1); Gal. iii. 16, "He saith not, And to seeds, as of many; but as of one, And to thy seed (Gen. xiii. 15), which is Christ"; Eph. iv. 8, "Wherefore he saith, When he ascended on high, he led captivity captive, and gave gifts unto men" (Ps. lxviii. 18); Eph. v. 14, "Wherefore he saith, Awake thou that sleepest and arise from the dead and Christ shall shine upon thee" (Isa. ix. 1); I Cor. vi. 16, "For the twain, saith he, shall become one flesh" (Gen. ii. 24); I Cor. xv. 27, "But when he saith, All things are put in subjection" (Ps. viii. 7); II Cor. vi. 2, "For he saith, At an acceptable time, I hearkened unto thee, and in a day of salvation did I succor thee" (Isa. xlix. 8); Heb. viii. 5, "For see, saith he, that thou make all things according to the pattern that was showed thee in the mount" (Ex. xxv. 40); James iv. 6, "Wherefore he saith, God resisteth the proud but giveth grace to the humble" (Prov. iii. 34).

There is room for difference of opinion, of course, whether all these passages are cases in point. And there has certainly always existed some difference of opinion among commentators as to the proper subauditum

in such instances as are allowed. The state of the case would seem to be fairly indicated by Alexander Buttmann, when he says:

"The predicates *le,gei* or *fhsi,n* are often found in the New Testament in quotations, *o` qeo,j* or even merely *h` grafh*, being always to be supplied as subject; as I Cor. vi. 16, II Cor. vi. 2, Gal. iii. 16, Eph. iv. 8, v. 14, Heb. viii. 5, iv. 3 (*ei;rhken*). These subjects are also expressed, as in Gal. iv. 30, I Tim. v. 18, or to be supplied from the preceding context, as in Heb. i. 5 *seq.*"²

Of the alternatives thus offered, Jelf apparently prefers the one:

"In the New Testament we must supply *profhth,j(h` grafh,(pneu/ma*, etc., before *fhsi,(le,gei(marturei/.*"³

Winer and Blass take the other:

"The formulas of citation - *le,gei*, II Cor. vi. 2, Gal. iii. 16, Eph. iv. 8 al., *fhsi,,* I Cor. vi. 16, Heb. viii. 5; *ei;rhke*, Heb. iv. 4 (cf. the Rabbinical *rmwaw*); *marturei/*, Heb. vii. 17 (*ei=pe*, I Cor. xv. 27) - are probably in no instance impersonal in the minds of the New Testament writers. The subject (*o` qeo,j*) is usually contained in the context, either directly or indirectly; in I Cor. vi. 16 and Matt. xix. 5, *fhsi,,* there is an apostolic ellipsis (of *o` qeo,j*); in Heb. vii. 17, the best authorities have *marturei/tai.*"⁴

"In the formulas of citation such as *le,gei*, II Cor. vi. 2, Gal. iii. 16, etc.; *fhsi,n*, I Cor. vi. 16, Heb. viii. 5; *ei;rhke*,

Heb. iv. 4 - οὐ λέγει is to be understood ('He says'); in II Cor. x. 10, φησιν (a DE, etc. [?], 'one says'), appears to be a wrong reading for φασιν (B), unless perhaps a τῆς has dropped out (but cp. Clem. Hom., xi. 9 *ad init.*)."⁵

The commentators commonly range themselves with Winer and Blass. Thus, on Rom. ix. 15, Sanday and Headlam comment: "le,gei without a nominative for qeo,j le,gei is a common idiom in quotations," referring to Rom. xv. 10 as a parallel case. On Gal. iii. 16, Meyer says: "sc. qeo,j, which is derived from the historical reference of the previous evrvr`e,qhsan, so well known to the reader"; and Alford: "viz., He who gave the promises - God"; and Sieffert: "ouv le,gei sc. qeo,j which flows out of the historical relation (known to the reader) of the preceding evrvr`e,qhsan (cf. Eph. iv. 8, v. 14)." On Eph. iv. 8, Meyer's comment runs: "*Who* says it (comp. v. 14) is obvious of itself, namely, God, whose word the Scripture is. See on I Cor. vi. 16; Gal. iii. 16; the supplying h` grafh, or to. pneu/ma must have been suggested by the context (Rom. xv. 10). The manner of citation with the simple le,gei, obviously meant of God, has as its necessary presupposition, in the mind of the writer and readers, the Theopneustia of the Old Testament." Haupt, similarly: "The introduction of a citation with the simple le,gei, with which, of course, 'God' is to be supplied as subject, not 'the Scripture,' is found in Paul again v. 14, II Cor. vi. 2, Rom. xv. 10; similarly φησι, I Cor. vi. 16 (ei=pen with the addition οὐ λέγει, II Cor. vi. 16)." A similar comment is given by Ellicott, who adds at Eph. v. 14: "scil. οὐ λέγει, according to the usual form of St. Paul's quotations; see notes on chap. iv. 8 and on Gal. iii. 16": though on I Cor. vi. 16 he speaks with less decision: "It may be doubted what nominative is to be supplied to this practically impersonal verb, whether h` grafh, (comp. John vii. 38, Rom. iv. 3, ix. 17, al.) or οὐ λέγει (comp. Matt. xix. 5, II Cor. vi. 2, where this nominative is distinctly suggested by the context):

the latter is perhaps the more natural: comp. Winer, *Gr.*, § 58, 9, and notes on Eph. iv. 8." On I Cor. vi. 16, Edwards comments: "sc. o` qeo,j, as in Rom. ix. 15. Cf. Matt. xix. 4, 5, where o` poi,hsaj supplies a nom. to ei=pen. Similarly in Philo and Barnabas fhsi, introduces citations from Scripture." On II Cor. vi. 2, Waite says: "A statement of God Himself is adduced"; and De Wette: "sc. qeo,j, who Himself speaks." On Heb. viii. 5, Bleek comments: "That there is to be understood as the subject of fhsi,, not, as Bohme thinks, h` grafh,, but o` qeo,j, can least of all be doubtful here, where actual words of God are adduced"; and Weiss: "This statement is now established (ga,r) by appeal to Ex. xxv. 40, which passage is characterized only by the interpolated fhsi,n (cf. Acts xxv. 22) as a divine oracle.... The subject of (fhsi,n is, of course, God, neither o` crhmatismo,j (Lün.) nor h` grafh, (Bhm.)." On James iv. 6, Mayor comments: "The subject understood is probably God, as above, i. 12, evphggei,lato, and Eph. iv. 8, v. 14, where the same phrase occurs; others take it as h` grafh,. Cf. above, v. 5."⁶

Most of these passages have, on the other hand, been explained by some commentators on the supposition that it is h` grafh, that is to be supplied, as has sufficiently appeared indeed from the controversial remarks in the notes quoted above. This circumstance may be taken as precluding the necessity of adducing examples here.⁷ Suffice it to say that those so filling in the *subauditum* are entirely at one with the commentators already quoted in looking upon the citations as treated by the New Testament writers as of divine authority, it being, in their apprehension, all one in this regard whether the *subauditum* is conceived as h` grafh, or as o` qeo,j.

In the meantime, however, there has occasionally showed itself a tendency to treat these subjectless verbs more or less as true impersonals.

Thus we read in Delitzsch's note on Heb. viii. 5: "For 'see,' *saith* He, i. e., $\text{o}^{\text{e}} \text{qeo}, \text{j}$, or taking fhsi , impersonally (that is, without a definite subject), 'it is said' (i. e., in Scripture), (Bernhardy, 'Synt.,' 419)." So Kern on James iv. 6 comments: " le, gei here *impersonaliter*, instead of the foregoing $\text{le}, \text{gei} \text{h}^{\text{e}} \text{grafh}$,"; and accordingly Beyschlag, in his recent commentary says: "to $\text{le}, \text{gei}(\text{h}^{\text{e}} \text{grafh})$, is to be supplied, or it is to be taken with Kern impersonally." Similarly Godet on I Cor. vi. 16 says: "The subject of the verb fhsi, n , *says he*, may be either Adam or Moses, or Scripture, or God Himself, or finally, as is shown by Heinrici, the verb may be a simple formula of quotation like our '*It is said.*' This form is frequently found in Philo."⁸ Some such usage as is here supposed may seem actually to occur in the common text of Wisdom xv. 12⁹ and II Cor. x. 10.¹⁰ But in both passages the true reading is probably fasi, n ; in neither instance is it clear that, if fhsi, n be read, it has no subject implied in the context; if fhsi, n be read and taken as equivalent to fasi, n it still is not purely indefinite; and in any case the instances are not parallel, inasmuch as in neither of these passages is it Scripture, or indeed any document, that is adduced.

The fact that a few very able commentators have taken this unlikely line of exposition would call for nothing more than this incidental remark, were not our attention attracted somewhat violently to it by the dogmatic tone and extremity of contention of a recent commentator who has adopted this opinion. We refer to Dr. T. K. Abbott's comment on Eph. iv. 8, in his contribution to "The International Critical Commentary." It runs to a considerable length, but as on this very account it opens out somewhat more fully than usual this rather unwonted view of the construction, we shall venture to quote it *in extenso*. Dr. Abbott says:

"Dio. le, gei . 'Wherefore it saith' = 'it is said.' If any substantive is to be supplied, it is $\text{h}^{\text{e}} \text{grafh}$;; but the verb

may well be taken impersonally, just as in colloquial English one may often hear: 'it says' or the like. Many expositors supply, however, o` qeo,j. Meyer even says, 'Who says it is obvious of itself, namely, God, whose word the Scripture is.¹¹ Similarly Alford¹² and Ellicott.¹³ If it were St. Paul's habit to introduce quotations from the Old Testament, by whomsoever spoken in the original text, with the formula o` Qeo.j le,gei, then this supplement here might be defended. But it is not. In quoting he sometimes says le,gei, frequently h` grafh. le,gei, at other times Dabi.d le,gei, `Hsai<aj le,gei. There is not a single instance in which o` Qeo,j is either expressed or implied as the subject, except where in the original context God is the speaker, as in Rom. ix. 15. Even when that is the case he does not hesitate to use a different subject, as in Rom. x. 19, 20: 'Moses saith,' 'Isaiah is very bold, and saith'; Rom. ix. 17, 'The Scripture saith to Pharaoh.'

"This being the case, we are certainly not justified in forcing upon the apostle here and in chap. v. 14 a form of expression consistent only with the extreme view of verbal inspiration. When Meyer (followed by Alford and Ellicott) says that h` grafh, must not be supplied unless it is given by the context, the reply is obvious, namely, that, as above stated, h` grafh. le,gei does, in fact, often occur, and therefore the apostle might have used it here, whereas o` Qeo.j le,gei does not occur (except in cases unlike this), and we have reason to believe could not be used by St. Paul here. It is some

additional confirmation of this that both here and in chap. v. 14 (if that is a Biblical quotation) he does not hesitate to make important alterations. This is the view taken by Braune, Macpherson, Moule; the latter, however, adding that for St. Paul 'the word of the Scripture and the word of its Author are convertible terms.'

"It is objected that although *fhsi*, is used impersonally, *le,gei* is not. The present passage and chap. v. 14¹⁴ are enough to prove the usage for St. Paul, and there are other passages in his Epistles where this sense is at least applicable; cf. Rom. xv. 10, where *le,gei* is parallel to *ge,graptai* in ver. 9; Gal. iii. 16, where it corresponds to *evrvr`h,qhsan*. But, in fact, the impersonal use of *fhsi*, in Greek authors is quite different, namely = *fasi*, 'they say' (so II Cor. x. 10). Classical authors had no opportunity of using *le,gei* as it is used here, as they did not possess any collection of writings which could be referred to as *h` grafh,*, or by any like word. They could say: *o` no,moj le,gei* and *to. lego,menon*."

It is not, it will be observed, the fact that Dr. Abbott decides against the *subauditum*, *o` qeo,j*, in these passages, which calls for remark. As he himself points out, many others have been before him in this. It is the extremity of his opinion that first of all attracts attention. For it is to be noticed that, though he sometimes speaks as if he understood an implied *h` grafh,*, or some like term, as the subject of *le,gei*, that is not his real contention. What he proposes is to take the verb wholly indefinitely - as equivalent to "it is said," as if the source of the quotation were

unimportant and its authority insignificant. This interpretation of his proposal is placed beyond doubt by his remarks on chap. v. 14. There we read:

"Dio. le,gei. 'Wherefore it is said.' It is generally held that this formula introduces a quotation from canonical Scripture. . . . The difficulties disappear when we recognize that le,gei need not be taken to mean o` Qeo.j le,gei - an assertion which has been shown in iv. 8 to be untenable. It means, 'it says,' or 'it is said,' and the quotation may probably be from some liturgical formula or hymn - a supposition with which its rhythmical character agrees very well. . . . Theodoret mentions this opinion. . . . Stier adopts a similar view, but endeavors to save the supposed limitation of the use of le,gei by saying that in the Church the Spirit speaks. As there are in the Church prophets and prophetic speakers and poets, so there are liturgical expressions and hymns which are holy words. Comparing vv. 18, 19, Col. iii. 16, it may be said that the apostle is here giving us an example of this self-admonition by new spiritual songs."

So extreme an opinion, as we have already hinted, naturally finds, however, little support in the commentators, even in those quoted to buttress it, - of course, in its fundamental point. Braune says: "We must naturally supply h` grafh,, the Scripture, with le,gei, 'saith,' (James iv. 6, Rom. xv. 10, Gal. iii. 16, I Cor. vi. 16: fhsi,n), and not o` qeo,j (Meyer, Schenkel¹⁵), or o` le,gwn (Bleek: the writer)": to which Dr. M. T. Riddle, his translator, however, adds: "The fact that Paul frequently supplies h`

graph, (Rom. iv. 3, ix. 17, x. 11, Gal. iv. 30, I Tim. v. 18) is against Braune's view; for in some of these passages there is a reason for its insertion (see "Romans," p. 314), and as the Scriptures are God's Word (Meyer), the natural aim and obvious subject is οὐ θεός. So Alford, Ellicott and most." Moule's comment runs: "*Wherefore* he saith] Or *it*, i. e., the Scripture, saith. St. Paul's usage in quotation leaves the subject of the verb undetermined here and in similar cases (see, e. g., chap. v. 14¹⁶). For him the word of the Scripture and the word of its author are convertible terms." Macpherson alone, of those appealed to by Dr. Abbott, supports, in a somewhat carelessly written note, the indefinite interpretation put forward by Dr. Abbott, - being misled apparently by remarks of Lightfoot's and Westcott's. His comment runs:

"A very simple quotation formula is here employed, the single word λεγει. It is also similarly used (chap. v. 14; II Cor. vi. 2; Gal. iii. 16; Rom. xv. 10).¹⁷ This word is frequently employed in the fuller formula, *The Scripture saith*, λεγει ἡ γραφή, (Rom. iv. 3, x. 11, xi. 2; Jas. ii. 23, etc.); or the name of the writer of the particular scripture, Esaias, David, the Holy Spirit, the law (Rom. xv. 12; Acts xiii. 35; Heb. iii. 7; I Cor. xiii. 34, etc.).¹⁸ Of λεγει, φησι,, ειρηκε, and similar words thus used, Winer ("Grammar," p. 656, 1882) says that probably in no instance are they impersonal in the minds of the New Testament writers, but that the subject, οὐ θεός, is somewhere in the context, and is to be supplied.¹⁹ On the contrary, Lightfoot, in his note on Gal. iii. 16, remarks that λεγει, like the Attic φησι,, seems to be used impersonally, the nominative being lost sight of. In our passage we have no nominative in the

context which we can supply, and it seems better to render the phrase impersonally, *It is said*. The same word is used very frequently in the Epistle to the Hebrews, but always with God or Christ understood from the immediate context. Westcott very correctly remarks (p. 457) that the use of the formula in Eph. iv. 8, v. 14, seems to be of a different kind."²⁰

Outside of these commentators quoted by himself, however, Prof. Abbott's extreme view has (as has, indeed, already incidentally appeared) the powerful support of Lightfoot and Heinrici. The former expresses his opinion not only in his note on Gal. iii. 16, to which Macpherson refers, but more fully and argumentatively in his note on I Cor. vi. 16 printed in his posthumous "Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul." In the former of these places he says:

"ouv le,gei seems to be used impersonally, like the Attic fhsi, in quoting legal documents, the nominative being lost sight of. If so, we need not inquire whether o` qeo,j or h` grafh, is to be understood. Comp. le,gei, Rom. xv. 10, Eph. iv. 8, v. 14; and fhsi,n, I Cor. vi. 16, II Cor. x. 10 (v. l)."

In the latter, speaking more at large "as to the authority assigned to the passage" quoted by St. Paul, he says:

"What are we to understand by fhsi,n? Is o` qeo,j to be supplied or h` grafh,? To this question it is safest to reply that we cannot decide. The fact is that, like le,gei, fhsi,n when introducing a quotation seems to be used impersonally. This usage is common in Biblical

Greek (le,gei, Rom. xv. 10, Gal. iii. 16, Eph. iv. 8, v. 14; fhsi,n, Heb. viii. 5, II Cor. x. 10 (v. l.), more common in classical Greek. Alford, after Meyer, objects to rendering fhsi,n impersonally here, as contrary to St. Paul's usage. But the only other occurrence of the phrase in St. Paul is II Cor. x. 10, where he is not introducing Scripture, but the objections of human critics and of more than one critic. If then fhsi,n be read there at all, it must be impersonal. The apostle's analogous use of le,gei points to the same conclusion. In Eph. v. 14 it introduces a quotation which is certainly not in Scripture, and apparently belonged to an early Christian hymn. We gather therefore that St. Paul's usage does not suggest any restriction here to ο` γεο,j or η` γραφ,. But we cannot doubt from the context that the quotation is meant to be authoritative."

In his own commentary on I Corinthians (1880), Heinrici writes as follows:

"To fhsi,, just as to le,gei (II Cor. vi. 2, Gal. iii. 16) nothing at all is to be supplied, but like *inquit* it stands, sometimes as the introduction to an objection (II Cor. x. 10, where Holsten refers to Bentley on Horat., Serm., i, 4, 78), sometimes as a general formula of citation. It is especially often used in the latter sense by Philo, in the quotation of Scripture passages, and by Arrian-Epictetus, who supplies many most interesting parallels to the Pauline forms of speech. Schweighauser, in his Index, under fhsi,, remarks of it:

nec enim semper in proferenda objectione locum habet illa formula, verum etiam in citando exemplo ad id quod agitur pertinente. J. G. Muffler (*Philo the Jew's Book on the Creation*, Berlin, 1841, p. 44) says that *fhsi*, after the example of Plato (?), became gradually among the Hellenistic Jews the standing formula of citation."

In his edition of Meyer's " Commentary on I Corinthians " (eighth edition, 1896), this note reappears in this form:

"*fhsi*,n). Who? According to the usual view, God, whose words the sayings of the Scripture are, even when they, like Gen. ii. 24 through Adam, are spoken through another. Winer, 7 § 58, 9, 486; Buttmann, 117. But the impersonal sense '*es heisst*,' '*inquit*,' lies nearer the Pauline usage; he coincides in this with Arrian-Epictetus and Philo, with whom *fhsi*, sometimes introduces an objection, sometimes is the customary formula of citation. Cf. II Cor. x. 10, vi. 2, I Cor. xv. 27, Eph. iv. 8; Winer, as above; Muller, in Philo, *De op. mund.*, 44; Heinrici, i. 181. In accordance with this, are the other supplements of subject - *h` graph*, or *to pneu/ma* (Ruckert) - to be estimated."

Even in the extremity of his contention, therefore, Dr. Abbott, it seems, is not without support - on the philological side, at least - in previous commentators of the highest rank.

He himself does not seem, however, quite clear in his own mind: and his confusion of both considerations and commentators which make for

the fundamentally diverse positions that there is to be supplied with *le,gei* some such subject as *h` grafh,,* and that there is nothing at all to be supplied but the word is to be taken with entire indefiniteness, is indicative of the main thing that calls for remark in Dr. Abbott's note. For, why should this confusion take place? It is quite evident that in interpreting the phrase the fundamental distinction lies between the view which supposes that a subject to *le,gei* is so implied as to be suggested either by the context or by the mind of the reader from the nature of the case, and that which takes *le,gei* as a case of true impersonal usage, of entirely indefinite subject. It is a minor difference among the advocates of the first of these views, which separates them into two parties - those which would supply as subject *o` qeo,j,* and those which would supply *h` grafh,.* That one of these subdivisions of the first class of views should be violently torn from its true comradeship and confused with the second view, betrays a preoccupation on Dr. Abbott's part, when dealing with this passage, with considerations not of purely exegetical origin. He is for the moment less concerned with ascertaining the meaning of the apostle than with refuting a special interpretation of his words: and therefore everything which stands opposed in any measure to the obnoxious interpretation appears to him to be "on his side." Put somewhat brusquely, this is as much as to say that Dr. Abbott is in this note dominated by dogmatic prejudice.

There do not lack other indications of this fact. The most obtrusive of them is naturally the language - scarcely to be called perfectly calm - with which the second paragraph of the note opens: "We are certainly not justified in forcing upon the apostle here and in chap. v. 14 a form of expression consistent only with the extreme view of verbal inspiration." Certainly not. But because we chance not to like "the extreme view of verbal inspiration," are we justified in forbidding the apostle to use a

form of expression consistent only with it, and forcing upon him some other form of expression which we may consider consistent with a view of inspiration which we like better? Would it not be better to permit the apostle to choose his own form of expression and confine ourselves, as expositors, to ascertaining from his form of expression what view of inspiration lay in his mind, rather than seek to force his hand into consistency with our preconceived ideas? The whole structure of the note evinces, however, that it was not written in this purely expository spirit. Thus only can be explained a certain exaggerated dogmatism in its language, as if doubt were to be silenced by decision of manner if not by decisiveness of evidence. So also probably is to be explained a certain narrowness in the appeal to usage - that rock on which much factitious exegesis splits. Only, it is intimated, in case "it were St. Paul's habit to introduce quotations from the Old Testament, by whomsoever spoken in the original text, with the formula οὐ θεοῦ λεγέται," "could this supplement here be defended." One asks in astonishment whether St. Paul really could make known his estimate of Scripture as the very voice of God which might naturally be quoted with the formula "God says," and so render the occurrence of that formula occasionally in his writings no matter of surprise, only by a habitual use of this exact formula in quoting Scripture. And one notes without surprise that the narrowness of Dr. Abbott's rule for the adduction of usage supplies no bar to his practice when he is arguing "on the other side." At the opening of the very next paragraph we read, "It is objected that although *θεοῦ*, is used impersonally, *λεγέται* is not": and to this the answer is returned, "The present passage and chap. v. 14 are sufficient to prove the usage for St. Paul"; with the supplement, "And there are other passages in his epistles where this sense is at least applicable"; and further, "But in fact, the impersonal use of *θεοῦ*, in Greek authors is quite different." One fancies Dr. Abbott must have had a grim controversial smile upon his features

when he wrote that last clause, which pleads that the meaning assigned to *le,gei* here is absolutely unexampled in Greek literature, not only for *le,gei* but even for *fhsi,,* as a reason for accepting it for *le,gei* here! But apart from this remarkable instance of skill in marshaling adverse facts - a skill not unexampled elsewhere in the course of this note, as any one who will take the trouble to examine the proof-texts adduced in it will quickly learn - might not the advocates of the supplement, *o` qeo,j,* say equally that "the present passage and chap. v. 14 are sufficient to prove the usage for St. Paul, and there are other passages in his epistles where this sense is at least applicable." And might they not support this statement with better proof-texts than those adduced by Dr. Abbott, or indeed with the same with better right; as well as with a more applicable supplementary remark than the one with which he really subverts his whole reasoning - such as this, for example, that elsewhere, in the New Testament, as for instance in the Epistle to the Hebrews, the usage contended for undoubtedly occurs, and a satisfactory basis is laid for it in the whole attitude of the entire body of New Testament writers, inclusive of Paul, toward the Old Testament? Certainly, reasoning so one-sided and dominated by preconceived opinions so blinding is thoroughly inconclusive. The note is, indeed, an eminent example of that form of argumentation which, to invert a phrase of Omar Khayyam's, "goes out at the same door at which it came in": and even though its contention should prove sound, can itself add nothing to the grounds on which we embrace it. At best it may serve as the starting-point of a fresh investigation into the proper interpretation of the phrase with which it deals.

For such a fresh investigation we should need to give our attention particularly to two questions. The first would inquire into the light thrown by Paul's method of introducing quotations from the Old

Testament, upon his estimate of the text of the Old Testament, - with a view to determining whether it need cause surprise to find him adducing it with such a formula as "God says." Subsidiary to this it might be inquired whether it is accurate to say that "there is not a single instance in which ο` qeo,j is either expressed or implied as the subject, except where in the original context God is the speaker," and further, if Paul's usage elsewhere can be accurately so described, whether that fact will warrant us in denying such an instance to exist in Eph. iv. 8. The second question would inquire into the general usage of the subjectless le,gei or fhsi, in and out of the New Testament, with a view to discovering what light may be thrown by it upon the interpretation of the passages in question. It might be incidentally asked in this connection whether it is a complete account to give of fhsi in profane Greek to say that the "impersonal use of fhsi, in Greek authors is quite different from that of the New Testament, inasmuch as with them fhsi, = fasi,, 'they say.'"

It is really somewhat discouraging at this late date to find it treated as still an open question, how Paul esteemed the written words of the Old Testament. And it brings us, as the French say, something akin to stupefaction, when Dr. Abbott goes further and uses language concerning Paul's attitude toward the Old Testament text which implies that Paul habitually distinguished, in point of authority, between those passages "where in the original context God is the speaker" and the rest of the volume, so that "we have reason to believe" that the formula ο` qeo,j le,gei "could not be used by Paul" in introducing Scriptural language not recorded as spoken by God in the original context. He even suggests, indeed, that Paul shows an underlying doubt as to the Divine source of even the words attributed to God in the Old Testament text - "not hesitating to use a different subject" when quoting them, "as in Rom. x. 19, 20, 'Moses saith,' 'Isaiah is very bold and saith' ; Rom. ix. 17, 'The

Scripture saith to Pharaoh" - and deals with the text of other portions with a freedom which exhibits his little respect for them - "not hesitating to make important alterations" in them. It would seem to require a dogmatic prejudice of the very first order to blind one to a fact so obvious as that with Paul "Scripture," as such, is conceived everywhere as the authoritative declaration of the truth and will of God - of which fact, indeed, no better evidence can be needed than the very texts quoted by Dr. Abbott in a contrary sense.

For, when Paul, in Rom. ix. 15, supports his abhorrent rejection of the supposition that there may be unrighteousness with God, with the divine declaration taken from Ex. xxxiii. 19, introduced with the formula, "For he" - that is, as Dr. Abbott recognizes, God - "saith to Moses," and then immediately, in Rom. ix. 17, supports the teaching of this declaration with the further word of God taken from Ex. ix. 16, introduced with the formula, "For the Scripture saith unto Pharaoh" - the one thing which is thrown into a relief above all others is that, with Paul, "God saith" and "Scripture saith" are synonymous terms, so synonymous in his habitual thought that he could not only range the two together in consecutive clauses, but use the second in a manner in which, taken literally, it is meaningless and can convey an appropriate sense only when translated back into its equivalent of "God saith." The present tense in both formulas, moreover, advises us that, despite the fact that in both instances they are words spoken by God which are cited, it is rather as part of that Scripture which to Paul's thinking is the ever-present and ever-speaking word of God that they are adduced. It is not as words which God once spoke (ei=pen, LXX.) to Moses that the former passage is here adduced, but as living words still speaking to us - it is not as words Moses was once commanded to speak to Pharaoh that the second is here adduced, but as words recorded in the ever-living Scripture for our

admonition upon whom the ends of the world have come. They are thus not assigned to Scripture in order to lower their authority: but rather as a mark of their abiding authority. And similarly when in that catena of quotations in Rom. x. 16-21, we read at ver. 19, "first Moses saith," and then at ver. 20, "and Isaiah is very bold and saith," both adducing words of God - the implication is not that Paul looks upon them as something less than the words of God and so cites them by the names of these human authors; but that it is all one to him to say, "God says," and "Moses says," or "Isaiah says": and therefore in this catena of quotations - in which are included four, not two, quotations - all the citations are treated as alike authoritative, though some are in the original context words of God and others (ver. 16) words of the prophet - and though some are adduced by the name of the prophet and some without assignment to any definitely named human source. The same implication, again, underlies the fact that in the catena of quotations on Rom. xv. 9 seq., the first is introduced by kaqw.j ge,graptai, the next two by kai. pa,lin le,gei and kai. pa,lin, and the last by kai. pa,lin `Hsai<aj le,gei - the first being from Ps. lxxviii. 50, the second from Deut. xxxii. 43, the third from Ps. cxvii. 1, and only the last from Isaiah - Isa. xi. 10: clearly it is all one to the mind of Paul how Scripture is adduced - it is the fact that it is Scripture that is important. So also it is no more true that in Gal. iii. 16, the le,gei "corresponds to evrvr`h,qhsan" of the immediately preceding context, than that it stands in line with the "and the Scripture foreseeing that God would justify the Gentiles by faith, preached the Gospel beforehand unto Abraham" of iii. 8 - a thing which the Scripture as such certainly did not do; and with the "for it is written" of iii. 10 and iii. 13, and the unheralded quotations of the Scriptures as unquestioned authority of iii. 11 and iii. 12; and with the general appeal in iii. 22 to the teaching of Scripture as a whole as the sole testimony needed: the effect of the whole being to evince in the clearest manner that to Paul the whole

text of Scripture, inclusive of Gen. xii. 3, Deut. xxvii. 26, Hab. ii. 4, Lev. xviii. 5, and Gen. xxii. 18, was as such the living word of the living God profitable to all ages alike for divine instruction.

We need not go, indeed, beyond the first sentence of this Epistle to the Romans from which all but one of Dr. Abbott's citations are drawn, to learn Paul's conception of Scripture as the crystallized voice of God. There he declares himself to have been "separated unto the gospel of God which he promised afore by his prophets in the Holy Scriptures" (Rom. i. 2). Dr. George T. Purves, in a singularly well-considered and impressive paper on "St. Paul and Inspiration," printed in *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review* for January, 1893,²¹ justly draws out the meaning of this compressed statement thus:

"Not only did Moses and the prophets speak from God, but the sacred Scriptures themselves were in some way composed under divine control. He not only affirms with Peter that 'moved by the Holy Ghost, men spake from God,' but that '*the Scriptures themselves* are inspired by God.' Paul plainly recognizes the human authorship of the books, and quotes Moses and David and Isaiah as speaking therein. But not only *through them*, but *in these books* of theirs did God also speak. Many readers notice the first part of Paul's statement, but not the second. God spake 'through the prophets *in the Holy Scriptures*.'"

This emphasis on the *written* Scriptures as themselves the product of a divine activity, making them as such the divine voice to us, is characteristic of the whole treatment of Scripture by Paul (I Cor. x. 11, Rom. xv. 4, iv. 23, I Cor. ix. 10, iv. 6): and it is thoroughly accordant with

the point of view so exhibited, that he explicitly declares, not of the writers of Scripture, but of the sacred writings themselves, that they are theopneustic - breathed out, or breathed into by God (II Tim. iii. 16). For he applies this epithet not to "every prophet," but to "every *Scripture*" - that is, says Dr. Purves, to "the whole collection to which he had just referred as the 'sacred writings,' and all their parts": these *writings* are theopneustic. "By their inspiration, he evidently meant," continues Dr. Purves justly, "that, as writings, they were so composed under God's particular direction that both in substance and in form they were the special utterances of His mind and will."

It could be nothing more than an accident if Paul, under the dominance of such a conception of Scripture, has nowhere happened to adduce from it a passage, taken out of a context in which God is not expressly made in the Old Testament narrative itself the speaker, with the formula, ο` θεος λεγει, expressed or implied. If no instance of such an adduction occurs, it is worth while to note that fact, to be sure, as one of the curious accidents of literary usage; but as there is no reason to doubt that such a formula would be entirely natural on the lips of Paul, so there is no propriety in calling it impossible in Paul, or even in erecting a distinction between him and other New Testament writers on the ground that they do and he does not quote Scripture by such a formula. As a matter of fact, the distinction suggested between passages in Scripture "where in the original context God is the speaker" and passages where He is not the speaker - as if the one could be cited with a "God says," and the other not, - is foreign to Paul's conception and usage, as has abundantly appeared already: so that whatever passages of the former kind occur - "as in Rom. ix. 15," says Dr. Abbott - are really passages in which Scripture is quoted with a "God says." It cannot be held to be certain, moreover, that passages do not occur in which the "God says" introduces

words not ascribed to God in the original context - so long, at least, as it is not obvious that "God" is not the *subauditum* in passages like Acts xiii. 35, Rom. xv. 10, Gal. iii. 16. It is no doubt, however, also worth observing that it is equally matter of fact, that it is rather to the Epistle to the Hebrews than to those that bear the name of Paul that we shall need to go to find a body of explicit instances of the usage in question. This is, as we have said, an interesting fact of literary usage, but it is not to be pressed into an indication of a divergent point of view toward "Scripture" between the Epistle to the Hebrews and the epistles that bear Paul's name.

Even Dr. Westcott seems, to be sure, so to press it. In the interesting dissertation "On the Use of the Old Testament in the Epistle," which he has appended to his "Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews," he sets out in some detail the facts that bear on the mode in which that epistle cites the Old Testament:

"The quotations," he tells us, "are without exception made anonymously. There is no mention anywhere of the name of the writer (iv. 7 is no exception to the rule). God is presented as the speaker through the person of the prophet, except in the one place where He is directly addressed (ii. 6). . . . In two places the words are attributed to Christ. . . . In two other places the Holy Spirit specially is named as the speaker. . . . But it is worthy of notice that in each of these two cases the words are also quoted as the words of God (iv. 7, viii. 8). This assignment of the written word to God, as the Inspirer of the message, is most remarkable when the words spoken by the prophet in his own person are treated as divine words - as words spoken by Moses: i.

6 (Deut. xxxii. 43); iv. 4, comp. vv. 5, 7, 8 (Gen. ii. 2); x. 30 (Deut. xxxii. 36); and by Isaiah: ii. 13 (Isa. viii. 17 f), comp. also xiii. 5 (Deut. xxxi. 6). Generally it must be observed that no difference is made between the word spoken and the word written. For us and for all ages the record is the voice of God. The record is the voice of God, and as a necessary consequence the record is itself living. . . . The constant use of the present tense in quotations emphasizes this truth: ii. 11, iii. 7, xii. 5. Comp. xii. 26." [22](#)

Every careful student will recognize this at once as a very clear and very true statement of the attitude of the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews toward the Old Testament. But we cannot help thinking that Dr. Westcott overshoots the mark when he throws it into strong contrast with the attitude of the rest of the New Testament writers to the Old Testament. When he says, for example: "There is nothing really parallel to this general mode of quotation in the other books of the New Testament" - meaning apparently to suggest, as the subsequent context indicates, that the author of this Epistle exhibits an identification in his mind of the written text of the Scriptures with the voice of God which is foreign to the other writers of the New Testament - he would seem to have attached far too great significance to what is, after all, so far as it is real, nothing more than one of those surface differences of individual usage which are always observable among writers who share the same fundamental view-point, or even in different treatises from the same hand. Entirely at one in looking upon the Scriptures as nothing less than *ta. lo, gia tou/ qeou/* (Rom. iii. 2, Heb. v. 12 23) - in all their parts and phrases the utterance of God - the epistles that bear the name of Paul and this epistle yet chance to differ in the prevalent mode in which these "oracles" are adduced: the one in its

formulas of citation emphasizing the sole fact that they are "oracles" it is quoting, the others, that these "oracles" lie before them in written form. Let the fact of this difference, of course, be noted: but let it not be overstrained and, as if it were the sole relevant fact in the field of view, made to bear the whole weight of a theory of the relations of the two in their attitude toward Scripture.

Impossible as such a procedure should be in any case, it becomes doubly so when we note the extremely narrow and insecure basis for the conclusion drawn, which is offered by the differences in usage adduced between Hebrews and the rest of the New Testament - which means for us primarily the epistles that bear the name of Paul. Says Dr. Westcott in immediate sequence to what we have quoted from him:

"There is nothing really parallel to this general mode of quotation in the other books of the New Testament. Where the word *le,gei* occurs elsewhere, it is for the most part combined either with the name of the prophet or with 'Scripture': e.g., Rom. x. 16, *`Hsai<aj* ; x. 19, *Mwush/j le,gei*; xi. 9, *Dauei.d le,gei*; iv. 3, *h` grafh. le,gei*; ix. 17, *le,gei h` grafh.,* etc. Where God is the subject, as is rarely the case, the reference is to words directly spoken by God: II Cor. vi. 2, *le,gei ga.r (o` qeo,j)*; Rom. ix. 15, *tw|/ Mwusei/*; ix. 25, *evn tw|/ `Wshe. le,gei .* Comp. Rom. xv. 9-12 (*lge,graptai)) le,gei)) `Hsai<aj le,gei*). The two passages in the Epistle to the Ephesians (iv. 8, v. 14, *dio. le,gei*) appear to be different in kind."

The last remark is apparently intended to exclude Eph. iv. 8 and v. 14 from consideration.²⁴ The immediately preceding one seems intended to

suggest that the subject to be supplied to *le,gei* in Rom. xv. 10, which carries with it also Rom. xv. 11, is *h` grafh,*; if we rather supply with Sanday-Headlam *qeo,j*, this citation would afford an instance to the contrary. Other cases similar to this, e. g., Acts xiii. 35²⁵ and (with the parallel *fhsi*,) I Cor. vi. 16,²⁶ are simply passed by in silence. If such cases were considered, perhaps the induction would be different.

It is possible, on the other hand, that the usage of the Epistle to the Hebrews also is conceived by Dr. Westcott a shade too narrowly. It scarcely seems sufficient to say of ii. 6, for example, that this passage is not an exception to the more general usage of the Epistle inasmuch as it is "the one place where God is directly addressed" - and is therefore not ascribed to Him, but to "some one somewhere." According to Dr. Westcott's own exposition,²⁷ we have in i. 10 also words addressed *to* God and yet cited as spoken *by* God, and in a number of passages words spoken of God nevertheless cited as spoken *by* Him; and, in a word, the fundamental principle of the mode of quotation used by this Epistle is that the words of Scripture as such are the living words of God and are cited as such indifferently - whether in the original context spoken by Him or by another of Him, to Him, or apart from Him. In any event, therefore, the citation in the present passage by the formula "someone hath somewhere borne witness" is an exception to the general usage of the Epistle, and evidences that the author of it, though conceiving Scripture as such as a body of divine oracles, did not really lose sight of the fact that these oracles were delivered through men, and might therefore be cited on occasion as the deliverances of these men. In other words, here is a mode of citation of the order affirmed to be characteristic of the letters bearing the name of Paul. It is at least not beyond the limits of possibility that another such instance occurs in iv. 7: "saying in David." No doubt, "in David," may be taken here, as Dr. Westcott takes it, as

meaning "in the person of David," i. e., through his prophetic utterances; but it seems, on the whole, much more natural to take it as parallel to *evn th/ bi,blw| Mwuse,wj* (Mark xii. 26), *evn tw| `Wshe*, (Rom. ix. 25), and as meaning "in the book of David"²⁸ - exhibiting the consciousness of the author that he is quoting not merely "God," but God in the *written Scripture* - written by the hand of men. This is the more worth insisting on that it is really not absolutely certain that the subject of the *le,gwn* here is immediately "God" at all. There is no subject expressed either for it or the *o`ri,zei* on which it depends; and when we go back in the context for an express subject it eludes us, and we shall not find it until we arrive at the "even as the Holy Ghost saith" of iii. 7. From that point on, we have a series of quotations, introduced, quite in the manner of Philo, with formulæ which puzzle us as to their reference - whether to God, who is the general subject of the whole context, or to Scripture, conceived as the voice of God (e. g., iii. 15, *evn tw| le,gesqai* - by whom? God? or "the Scripture" already quoted? iv. 4, *ei,rhken* - who? God? or Scripture? iv. 5, *kai. evn tou,tw| pa,lin*). Something of the same kind meets us in the eighth chapter, where quite in the manner of Philo, we begin at ver. 5: "Even as Moses was oracularly warned when about to make the tabernacle, for 'see,' *fhsi,n*, etc." and proceed at ver. 8, with a subjectless *le,gei*, to close with ver. 13 with an equally subjectless *evn tw| le,gein*. It certainly is not obvious that the subject to be supplied to these three verbs is "God" rather than "oracular Scripture."

One can but feel that with a due regard to these two classes of neglected facts, a somewhat broader comparison of the usage of the Epistle to the Hebrews and that of those letters that bear the name of Paul would not leave an impression of such sharp and indubitable divergence in point of view as Dr. Westcott's statement is apt to suggest. In the Epistle to the Hebrews, the verb *le,gw* is used to introduce

citations, (1) with *expressed* subject: ii. 6, "But someone somewhere hath borne witness, saying" ; iii. 7, "Even as the Holy Ghost saith" ; vi. 14, "God sware by himself, saying": (2) with subject to be *supplied from the preceding context*: i. 6, "And when he (God) again bringeth in the firstborn into the world, he saith" ; i. 7, "And of the angels he (God) saith" ; ii. 12, "He (Christ) is not ashamed to call them brethren, saying" ; v. 6, "As he (God) saith also in another place": (3) with subject to be *supplied from the general knowledge of the reader*: x. 5, "Wherefore when he (Christ) cometh into the world, he saith" ; x. 8, "Saying (Christ) above" ; xii. 26, "But now hath he (God) promised, saying": (4) *without obvious subject*: iii. 15, "While it is said, To day, etc." (by whom? God? or the Scripture quoted, iii. 7 *seq.*?); iv. 7, "He [or it?] again defineth a certain time, saying in David" ; viii. 8, "For finding fault with them, he [or it?] saith" (cf. viii. 13, "in that he [or it?] saith").

On the other hand, in the epistles that bear the name of Paul we may distinguish some four cases of the adduction of Scripture by the formula *le,gei*. (1) Sometimes, quoting Scripture *as a divine whole*, the formula runs *h` grafh. le,gei* or *le,gei h` grafh.*: Rom. iv. 3, ix. 17 (*le,gei h` grafh, tw|/ Faraw|<*), xi. 2 (*h` grafh. evn `Hlei,a*), Gal. iv. 30, I Tim. v. 18. (2) Sometimes it is adduced *by the name of the author*: *Dauei.d le,gei*, Rom. iv. 6, xi. 9; *`Hsai,aj le,gei*, Rom. x. 16, 20, xv. 12. (3) Sometimes it is quoted *by its contents*: *o` no,moj le,gei*, Rom. iii. 19, vii. 7, I Cor. ix. 8, 10, xiv. 34; the righteousness that is of faith *le,gei*, Rom. x. 6 (cf. ver. 10); *o` crhmatismo,j le,gei*, Rom. xi. 4. (4) Sometimes it is adduced by the verb *le,gei* *without expressed subject*. (A) In some of these cases *the subject is plainly indicated* in the preceding context: Rom. ix. 25 = "God," from ver. 22; x. 10 = "the righteousness of faith," (?) from ver. 6; x. 21 = "Isaiah," from ver. 20. (B) In others it is less clearly indicated and is *not altogether obvious*: [Acts xiii. 34 = "God," from *ei;rhken?*]; Rom. ix. 15 = "God," from ver. 14?; Rom. xv. 10 = "Scripture," from *ge,graptai?*; II Cor. vi. 2 = "God,"

from preceding context; Gal. iii. 16 = "God," from the promises?; Eph. iv. 8 and v. 12. It should be added that parallel to the use of the subjectless fhsi, in Heb. viii. 5 we have the similar use of it in I Cor. vi. 16.

When we glance over these two lists of phenomena we shall certainly recognize a difference between them: but the difference is not suggestive of such an extreme distinction as Dr. Westcott appears to indicate. The fact is that for its proper estimation we must rise to a higher viewpoint and look upon the two lists in the light of a much larger fact. For we cannot safely study this difference of usage as an isolated phenomenon: and we shall get the key to its interpretation into our hands only when we correlate it with a more general view of the estimate of Scripture and mode of adducing Scripture prevalent at the time and in the circles which are represented by these epistles. Dr. Westcott already points the way to this wider outlook, when at the end of his discussion he adds these words:

"The method of citation on which we have dwelt is peculiar to the Epistle [to the Hebrews] among the writings of the New Testament; but it is interesting to notice that there is in the Epistle of Clement a partial correspondence with it. Clement generally quotes the LXX. anonymously. He attributes the prophetic words to God (15, 21, 46), to Christ (16, 22), to the Holy Word (13, 56), to the Holy Spirit (13, 16). But he also, though rarely, refers to the writers (26, Job; 52, David), and to Books (57, Proverbs, 'the all virtuous Wisdom'), and not unfrequently uses the familiar form *ge,graptai* (14, 39, etc.). The quotations in the Epistle of Barnabas are also commonly anonymous, but Barnabas mentions several names of the sacred writers, and gives passages

from the Law, the Prophets and the Psalms with the formula, 'the Prophet saith' (vi. 8; 2; 4, 6)."

And, he should have added, Barnabas also repeatedly adduces what he held to be the Word of God with the formulas *ge,graptai* (iv. 3, 14, v. 2, xi. 1, xiv. 6, xv. 1, xvi. 6) and *le,gei h` graph*, (iv. 7, 11, v. 4, vi. 12, xiii. 2, xv. 5) : and indeed passes from the one mode of citation to the other without the least jar, as, for example, in chap. v.: "For *it is written* concerning him, some things indeed with respect to Israel, and some with respect to us. For *it saith* this (Isa. liii. 5, 7). . . . And the *Scripture saith* (Prov. i. 17). . . . And *still also this* (Jer. i. 25). . . . For *God saith* (Zech. xiii. 6). . . . For the *prophesier saith* (Ps. xxii. 21, etc.). . . . And again *it saith* (Isa. 1. 6)." Though adverting thus to these facts, however, Dr. Westcott quite misses their significance. What they mean is shortly this: that the two modes of citing Scripture thought to distinguish Hebrews and the letters that bear the name of Paul, do not imply well-marked distinctive modes of conceiving Scripture; but coexist readily within the limits of one brief letter, like the letter of Clement or that of Barnabas. No wonder, when laid side by side, we found the usages of the two to present no sharply marked division line, but to crumble into one another along the edges. And when we look beyond Clement and Barnabas and take a general glance over the literature of the time, it is easily seen that we are looking in the two cases only at two fragments of one fact, and are seeing in each only one of the everywhere current methods of citing Scripture as the very Word of God. It seems inconceivable that one could rise from reading, say, twenty pages of Philo, for example, without being fully convinced of this.

Philo's fundamental conception of Scripture is that it is a book of oracles; each passage of it is a *crhsmo,j* or *lo,gion*, and the whole is

therefore oi` crhsmoi, or ta. lo,gia: he currently quotes it, accordingly, as "the living voice" of God, and whole treatises of his may be read without meeting with a single citation introduced by ge,graptai or with the Scriptures once called h` grafh,. Nevertheless, when occasion serves, he adduces Scripture readily enough as h` grafh,, and cites it with ge,graptai, and calls it ta. gra,mmata. We have no more reason for assuming that such modes of citing Scripture would have been foreign to the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews (whose mode of citing Scripture is markedly Philonic) than we have for assuming that the author of the tract *de Mutatione Nominum*, in which they do not occur, but where Scripture is almost exclusively oi` chsmoi,, or the author of the tracts *de Somniis*, where again they do not occur, but where Scripture is almost exclusively o` i`ero.j (or o` qei/oj) lo,goj (i. 14, 22, 33, 35, 37, 39, 42, ii. 4, 9, 37, etc. ; i. 33, ii. 37) - which designations are rare again in *de Mutatione Nominum* (o` q) l), 20; o` i`) l., 38) - held a different conception of Scripture from the author of the tract *de Legatione ad Caium* (§ 29) or the tract *de Abrahamo* (§ 1), in which the Scriptures are spoken of as ta. gra,mmata or ai` grafai,. There is no reason, in a word, why, if the Epistle to the Hebrews had contained even a single other verse, it might not have presented the "exotic," h` grafh, or ge,graptai. Because Philo or the author of this Epistle was especially accustomed to look on Scripture as a body of *oracles* and to cite it accordingly, is no reason why he should forget that it is a body of *written* oracles and be incapable on occasion of citing it from that point of view. Similarly because Paul ordinarily cites Scripture as *written* is no reason why he should not be firmly convinced that what is written in it is *oracles*, or should not occasionally cite it from that point of view. In a word, the two modes of citing Scripture brought into contrast by Bishop Westcott are not two mutually exclusive ways of citing Scripture, but two mutually complementary methods. The use of the one by any writer does not argue that the other is foreign to him; if we have enough written

material from his hand, we are sure rather to find in him traces of the other usage also. This is the meaning of the presence in the Epistle to the Hebrews of suggestive instances of an approach to the citation of Scripture as a document: and of the presence in the epistles bearing the name of Paul of instances of modes of citation which hint of his conception of Scripture as an oracular book. Where and when the sense of the oracular character of the source of the quotation is predominately in mind it tends to be quoted with the simple *ehsi*, or *le,gei*, with the implication that it is God that says it: this is most richly exhibited in Philo, and, within the limits of the New Testament, most prevailing in the Epistle to the Hebrews. Where and when, on the other hand, the consciousness that it is from a written source that the authoritative words are drawn is predominant in the mind, it tends to be quoted with the simple *ge,graptai* or the more formal *h' graph. le,gei*: this is the mode in which it is most commonly cited in the epistles that bear the name of Paul. Both modes of citation rest on the common consciousness of the Divine authority of the matter cited, and have no tendency to exclude one another: they appear side by side in the same writer, and must be held to predominate variously in different writers only according to their prevailing habits of speaking of Scripture, and at different times in the same writer according as the circumstances under which he was writing threw the emphasis in his mind temporarily upon the Scriptures as written *oracles* or as *written* oracles.

From this point of view we may estimate Dr. Westcott's remark: "Nor can it be maintained that the difference of usage is to be explained by the difference of readers, as being [in Hebrews] Jews, for in the Gospels *ge,graptai* is the common formula (nine times in St. Matthew)." This remark, like his whole treatment of the subject, seems conceived in a spirit which is too hard and narrow, too drily statistical. No one,

doubtless, would contend that the difference of readers directly produced the difference of usage, as if the Scriptures must be quoted to Jews as "oracles of God," and to Gentiles as "written documents." But it is far from obvious that the difference of readers may not, after all, have had very much to do with the prevalence of the one mode of citation in the Epistle to the Hebrews and of the other in the epistles that bear the name of Paul. The Jews were certainly accustomed to the current citation of the Scriptures as the living voice of God in oracular deliverances - as the usage of Philo sufficiently indicates: and it may be that this was subtly felt the most impressive method of adducing the words of the Holy Book when addressing Jews. On the other hand, the heathen were accustomed to authoritative documents, cited currently, with an implication of their authority, by the formula *ge,graptai*:²⁹ and it may well be that this subtly suggested itself as the most telling way of adducing Scripture as authoritative law to the Gentiles. We need not ride such a notion too hard: but it at least seems far from inconceivable that the selfsame writer, addressing, on the one hand, a body of devout Jews, and, on the other, a body of law-loving Romans, might find himself using almost unconsciously modes of adducing Scripture suggestive, in the one case, of loving awe in its presence and, in the other, of its binding authority over the conscience. Be this as it may, however, it is quite clear that the fact that Paul ordinarily adduces Scripture with "the forms (*kaqw.j*) *ge,graptai* (sixteen times in the Epistle to the Romans), *h` grafh. le,gei*, and the like, which never occur in the Epistle to the Hebrews," implies no far-reaching difference of conception on his part from that exhibited by that Epistle, as to the fundamental character of the Scriptures as an oracular book - which, on the contrary, is just what he calls them (Rom. iii. 2) - and certainly raises no presumption against his occasionally quoting them as an oracular book with the formula so characteristic of the Epistle to the Hebrews, *o` qeo.j le,gei*, or its equivalents. And the fact that "Paul not

unfrequently quotes the words of God as 'Scripture' simply (e. g., Rom, ix. 17)" so far from raising a presumption that he would not quote "Scripture" as "words of God," actually demonstrates the contrary, as it only in another way indicates the identification on his part of the written word with the voice of the speaking God.

If we approach the study of such texts as Eph. iv. 8, v. 14, therefore, from the point of view of the Pauline conception of Scripture, there is no reason why they should not be understood as adducing Scripture with a high "God says." To say that "we have reason to believe" that such a formula "could not be used by Paul," is as wide of the mark as could well be. To say that it is a formula more in accordance with the point of view of the Epistle to the Hebrews, is to confound mere occasional differences in usage with fundamental differences in conception. To Paul, too, the Scriptures are a book of oracles, and though he cites them ordinarily as *written* oracles there is no reason why he should not occasionally cite them merely as *oracles*. And in any case, whether we take the *subauditum* in such passages as "God," or "Scripture," or prefer to render simply by "it," from Paul's point of view the meaning is all one: in any case, Scripture is to him the authoritative dictum of God and what it says is adduced as the authoritative word that ends all strife.

In seeking to estimate the likelihoods as to the meaning of such a locution as the *διο. λεγει* of Eph. iv. 8, v. 14, we should not lose from sight, on the other hand, the fact that the Greek language was not partial to true "impersonals," that is, absolutely indefinite uses of its verbs. Says Jelf :

"Of impersonal verbs (in English, verbs with the indefinite it) the Greek language has but few."[30](#)

Says Kühner:

"Impersonal verbs, by which we understand a verb agreeing with the indefinite pronoun *it*, are not known to the Greek language: for expressions like *dei/(crh, . . . le,getai, etc. . . .* the Greek always conceived as personal, in that the infinitive or subjoined sentence was considered the subject of these verbs."³¹

No doubt, the subject often suffers ellipsis - especially when it may be counted upon readily to suggest itself, either out of the predicate itself, or out of the context, or out of the knowledge of the reader: and no doubt this implied subject is sometimes the indefinite *tij*. But it remains true that as yet there has turned up no single instance in all Greek literature of *le,gei* in the purely indefinite sense of "someone says," equivalent to "it is said" in the meaning of general rumor, or of a common proverb, or a current saying; and though there have been pointed out instances of something like this in the case of the kindred word *fhsi,*, it still remains somewhat doubtful precisely how they are to be interpreted. The forms commonly used to express this idea are either the expressed *tiv*, or the third person plural, as *le,gousi/(fasi,(ovnoma,zousin*, or the third person singular passive, as *le,getai*, or the second person singular optative or indicative of the historical tenses, as *fai,hvj a;n, = dicas*, or the like.³²

We find it, indeed, occasionally asserted that (*fhsi*, is used sometimes or frequently as a pure impersonal, in the sense of "it is said." The passage from Bernhardt, to be sure, to which reference has been made in support of this assertion, by more than one of the commentators adduced above, has its primary interest not in this point, but in the different one of the use of the singular *fhsi*, for the plural - like the Latin *inquit*, and the English "says" in that vulgar colloquial locution in which it is made to do duty not only in the form "he says," but also in such forms as "I says" and

"you says," and even "they says" and "we says." What Bernhardt remarks is:³³

*"The rhetorical employment of the singular for the plural rests on the Greek peculiarity (K. 3, 5; 6, 13c.) of clearly conceiving and representing the multitude by means of the individual. A ready instance of this is supplied by the formula fhsi,, like the Latin *inquit* an expression for all persons and numbers for designating an indefinite speaker (den beliebigen Redner) - 'heisst es'; and by the more classic eivpe, moi in appeal to the multitude in Attic life, Arist. (as *Pac.*, 385, eivpe, moi ti, pa,scet v w;ndrej; coll. *Eccl.*, 741), Plat. (clearly in a turn like eivpe, moi, w= Sw,krate,j te kai. u`mei/j oi` a;lloi), Demosth., *Phil.* i, p. 45; *Chers.*, p. 108; *Timocr.*, p. 718."³⁴*

The usage of fhsi, here more particularly adverted to - for all numbers and persons - seems a not uncommon one. Instances may possibly be found in the "Discourses" of Epictetus i. 29, 34 (Schenkl, p. 95). "Even athletes are dissatisfied with slight young men: 'He cannot lift me,' fhsi,," where fhsi, might perhaps be rendered by our vernacular, "says they," referring to "the athletes." Again, iv. 9, 15 (Schenkl, p. 383): "But learn from what the trainers of boys do. The boy has fallen: 'Rise,' fhsi,, 'wrestle again, till you become strong!'" where we may possibly have another 'says they,' viz., the trainers. Possibly again ii. 10, 20 (Schenkl, p. 133), "But consider, if you refer everything to a small coin, not even he who loses his nose is in your opinion damaged. 'Yes,' fhsi,, 'for he is mutilated in his body,'" where possibly fhsi, is "says you," referring to the collocutor, addressed in the preceding context in the second person - though, no

doubt, another explanation is here possible. Indeed, in no one of the instances cited is it impossible to conceive a singular subject derived from the contextual plural as specially in mind. If *fhsi*, were genuine in Wisdom xv. 12,³⁵ II Cor. x. 10,³⁶ these might well supply other instances - the "says they" in each case continuing the contextual or implicated plural. But in none of these instances, it is to be observed, would the subject be conceived as in the strict sense "indefinite." It is a perfectly definite subject that is present to the mind of the writer, given either in the immediate context or in the thorough understanding that exists between the writer and reader. There is in them nothing whatever of the vagueness that attaches to the French "on dit," or the German "man sagt," or the English "it is said." The Greeks had other locutions for expressing this idea, and if it was ever expressed by the simple *fhsi*, only the slightest traces of it remain in their extant literature.

In the seventh edition of the Greek Lexicon of Liddell & Scott,³⁷ nevertheless, this usage is expressly assigned to *fhsi*,. We read:

"*fhsi*, parenthetically, *they say, it is said*, Il. 5, 638, Od. 6, 42 and Att.; but in prose also *fhsi*,, like French *on dit*, Dem. 650, 13, Plut. 2, 112 C., etc. (so Lat. *inquit, ait*, Gronov, Liv. 34, 3, Bent. Hor. 1 Sat. 4, 79; - especially in urging an objection or counterargument, v. Interpp. Pers. Sat. 1, 40); - so also *e;fh, c. acc. et inf.*, Xen. An. i, 6, 6."

It is far from obvious, however, that the passages here adduced will justify precisely the usage which they are cited to illustrate. In the passage from Demosthenes - *e;stw, fhsi.n(u`pe.r auvtou/ h` auvth. timwri,a , etc.* - it seems to be quite clear, as the previous sentence suggests and the editors recognize,³⁸ that the subject of the (*fhsi*, is *e;kastoj tw/n gegrafo,twn*, and is

far from a purely indefinite *tij*. The passage from Plutarch ("Consolatio ad Apollonium," xxi) is more specious. It runs: *avll v ouv ga.r h;lpizon(fhsi,(tau/ta pei,sesqai(ouvde. prosedo,kwn*; and is translated in the Latin version, "At, inquit, *præter spem mihi hic casus et expectationem evenit*"; and in Holland's old English version, "But haply you will say, I never thought that this would have befallen unto me, neither did I so much as doubt any such thing." A glance at the context, however, is enough to show that there is no purely indefinite *fhsi*, here, though it may be that we have here another instance of its usage without regard to number and person. In any case, the subject is the quite definitely conceived interlocutor of the passage. That the *e;fh* adduced at the end of the note as in some degree of the same sort is not an indefinite *e;fh*, but has the Clearchus of the immediately preceding context as its subject, is too obvious for remark. Clearchus was present by the request of Cyrus at the trial of Orontes, and when he came out he reported to his friends the manner in which the trial was conducted: "He said (*e;fh*) that Cyrus began to speak as follows." It is not by such instances as these that the occurrence of a purely indefinite *fhsi*, can be established.³⁹

The subjectless *fhsi*,, to be sure, does occur very thickly scattered over the face of Greek literature, introducing or emphasizing quotations, or adducing objections, or the like: but the "it" that is to be supplied to it is, ordinarily at least, a quite definite one with its own definite reference perfectly clear. A characteristic instance, often referred to, is that in Demosth., "Leptin," § 56:⁴⁰ *kai. ga,r toi mo,nw| tw/n pa,ntwn auvtw|/ tou/t v evn th|/ sth,lh| ge,graptai(evpeidh. Ko,nwn(fhsi,n(hvleuqe,rwse tou.j vAqhnaï,wn summa,couj. - ;Esti de. tou/to to. gra,mma. . . .*" Here F. A. Wolf comments: "Absolute *ibi* interjectum est *fhsi,n*, aut, si mavis, subaudi *o` gra,yaj*"; and Schaefer adds: "Subaudi *h` sth,lh*."⁴¹ It does not appear why we should not render simply "it says": but this "it" is so far from an

"indefinite' it" that it has its clear reference to the inscription just mentioned. Perhaps even more instructive is a passage in the third Philippic⁴² of Demosthenes, which runs as follows:

"That such is our present state, you yourselves are witnesses, and need not any testimony from me. That our state in former times was quite opposite to this, I shall now convince you, not by any arguments of mine, but by a decree of your ancestors (gra,mmata tw/n progo,nwn), which they inscribed upon a brazen column (sth,lhn) erected in the citadel. . . . What, then, says the decree (ti, ou=n le,gei ta. gra,mmata)? 'Let Arithmius,' it says (fhsi,n), 'of Zelia, the son of Pythonax, be accounted infamous and an enemy to the Athenians and their allies, both he and all his race.' . . . The sentence imported somewhat more, for, in the laws importing capital cases, it is enacted (ge,graptai) that 'when the legal punishment of a man's crime cannot be inflicted he may be put to death,' and it was accounted meritorious to kill him. 'Let not the infamous man,' saith the law, 'be permitted to live' (kai. a;timoj(fhsi,, teqna,tw), intimating that he is free from guilt who executes this sentence (tou/to dh.(le,gei(kaqaro.n to.n tou,twn tina. avpoktei,nanta ei;nai)."

In both cases it is doubtless enough to render fhsi,, "it says," its function being in each case to call pointed attention to the words quoted: but the "it" is by no means "indefinite" in the sense that its reference was not very definitely conceived. On the second instance of its occurrence Wolf comments: "s. o` foniko.j no,moj,"⁴³ while Schaefer says: "

"Pleonastice positum cum ge,graptai praecesserit. Verumtamen h. l. sensum paulo magis juvat quam ubi post ei=pon, ei=te, continuo sequitur e;fhn(e;fh. Ad fhsi, subaudi o` nomoqe,thj."

These instances will supply us with typical examples of the "absolute" fhsi,; and, in this sense, "subjectless fhsi," is of very common occurrence indeed in Greek literature.

But really "subjectless fhsi,," i. e., fhsi, without any implied subject in context or common knowledge, which therefore we must take quite indefinitely, is very rare indeed, if not non-existent. Perhaps one of the most likely instances of such a usage is offered us by a passage in Plutarch's "Consolatio ad Apollonium," 34.⁴⁵ Holland's old version of it runs thus:⁴⁶

"And verily in regard of him who is now in a blessed estate, it has not been naturall for him to remaine in this life longer than the terme prefixed and limited unto him; but after he had honestly performed the course of his time, it was needfull and requisit for him to take the way for to returne unto his destinie that called for him to come unto her."

From this we may at least learn that fhsi,n here presented some difficulty, as Holland passes it by unrendered. The common Latin version restores it, reading the last clause thus: "Sed ita postulabit natura ut hoc expleto fatale quod aiunt *iter* conficeret, revocante eum jam ad se natura"; the Greek running thus: "avll v euvta,ktwj tou/ton evkplh,santi pro.j th.n ei`marme,nhn evpana,gein porei,an(kalou,shj auvth/j(fhsi,n, h;dh pro.j e`auth,n." The theory of the Latin version obviously is that fhsi,n here is to

be taken indefinitely, that is as an index hand pointing to a current designation of death as an entering upon the "fated journey" - h` ei` marme,nh porei,a. This is explained to us by Wyttenbach's note:[47](#)

"fhsi,n] non debebat offendere viros doctos. Est *ut ait poeta ille unde hoc sumptum est*. Videt hoc et Reiskius. Correxì versionem. De Tragici dicto in Animadversibus dicitur."

Accordingly, in the Animadversions,[48](#) he addresses himself first to showing that the expression here signaled was a current poetical saying - appealing to Plato,[49](#) Julian, Philo; and then adds:

"Cæterum fhsi,n ita elliptice usitatum est: v. c. Plutarcho, p. 135 B.,[50](#) 817 D., Dion. Chrys., p. 493 D., 532 A., 562 B. Notavit et Uptonus ad Epict. in Indice. In annotatoribus ad Lambertum Bosium de Ellipsis unus Schoettgenius, idque ex uno Paulo Apostolo hunc usum annotavit, p. 74. Et. Latine ita dicitur *inquit*, quod monuerunt J. F. Gronovius et A. Drakenborch. ad Livium xxxiv. 3, J. A. Ernestus in Clav. Cic. voce *Inquit*."

It does not seem, however, that Wyttenbach would have us read the fhsi, here quite indefinitely, as adducing for example a current saying: judging from his own paraphrase this might appear to him as a certain exaggeration of its implication. Its office would seem rather to be to call attention to the words, to which it is adjoined, as quoted, and thus, in the good understanding implied to exist between the writer and his readers, to point definitely to its source: so that it might be a proper note to it to say, "subaudi o` tragiko,j, vel o` poihtj,j" - and this might be done with a

considerable emphasis on the *o*`; nay, the actual name of the poet, well known to both writer and reader, though now lost to us, might equally well be the *subauditum*, and such, indeed, may be the implication of the *subauditum* suggested by Wyttenbaeh: *ut ait poeta ille unde hoc scriptum est*. Surely, an instance like this is far from a clear case of the absolutely indefinite or even generally undefining use of *h*si,.

Among the references with which Wyttenbach supports his note, the most promising sends us to Epictetus, whose "Discourses" abound in the most varied use of *orlvi*, and offer us at the same time one of our most valuable sources of knowledge of the Greek in common use near the times of the apostles.⁵¹ We meet with many instances here which it has been customary to explain as cases of *h*si, in a wholly indefinite reference. But the matter is somewhat complicated by the facts that we are not reading here Epictetus' "Discourses" pure and simple, but Arrian's report of them; and that Arrian may exercise his undoubted right to slip in a *h*si, of his own whenever he specially wishes to keep his readers' attention fixed upon the fact that they are his master's words he is setting down, or perhaps even merely out of the abiding sense, on his own part, that he is reporting Epictetus and not writing out of his own mind. When such a *h*si, occurs at the beginning of a section it gives no trouble: every reader recognizes it at once as Arrian's. But when it occurs unexpectedly in the midst of a vivacious discussion, the reader who is not carrying with him the sense of Arrian's personality, standing behind the Epictetus he is attending to, is very apt to be stumbled by it, and to resort to some explanation of it on the theory that it is Epictetus' own and is to find its interpretation in the context. An attempt has been made by Schenkl in the index to his edition of Epictetus⁵² to distinguish between the instances in which *h*si, occurs "inter Epicteti verba ab Arriano servata," and those in which it occurs "inter Arriani verba." It will be found that

most of the instances where it has been thought markedly indefinite in its reference are classed by him in the second group and are thus made very definite indeed - the standing *subauditum* being "Epictetus." Opinions will, no doubt, differ as to the proper classification of a number of these: and in any case many instances remain which cannot naturally be so explained - occurring as they do in the midst of vividly conceived dramatic passages. In this very vividness of dramatic action, however, is doubtless to be found the explanation of these instances. So far are the verbs here from being impersonal, that the speakers in these little dialogues stood out before Epictetus' mind's eye as actual persons; and it is therefore that he so freely refers to them with his vivid *fhsi*,.

The following are some of the most striking examples of his usage of the word. "But now we admit that virtue produces one thing, and we declare that approaching near to it is another thing, namely progress or improvement. Such a person, *fhsi,n*, is already able to read Chrysippus by himself. Indeed, sir, you are making great progress" (i, 4, 9).⁵³ Here Schenkl suggests that the *fhsi,n* is Arrian's, and this would seem to be a good suggestion, as it illuminates the passage in more ways than one. If not, the *subauditum* would seem to be the collocutor of the paragraph: a "some one," no doubt, but rather the "some one" most prominent in the mind of writer and reader in this discussion. "But a man may say, Whence shall I get bread to eat, when I have nothing (*kai. po,qen fa,gw(fhsi,(mhde.n e;xwn;)*)?" (i. 9, 8). Here again the *fhsi*, seems best explained as Arrian's (Schenkl): if not, the *subauditum* is again the collocutor prominent through the context, and only, in that sense, indefinite. "Who made these things and devised them? 'No one,' you say (*fhsi,n*). O amazing shamelessness and stupidity" (i. 16, 8). The reference is to the collocutor. "They are thieves and robbers you may say (*kle,ptai(fhsi,n(eijsi)))*" (i. 18, 3). Either Arrian's (Schenkl), or with the collocutor as the

subauditum. " How can you conquer the opinion of another man? By applying terror to it, he replies (fhsi,n), I will conquer it" (i, 29, 12). *Subaudi* the collocutor. "For why, a man says (fhsi,), do I not know the beautiful and the ugly?" (ii, 11, ?). Either Arrian's (Schenkl), or *subaudi* the collocutor. "How, he replies (fhsi,n), am I not good?" (ii, 13, 17). Either Arrian's (Schenkl), or *subaudi* the collocutor. So also similarly in ii, 22, 4; iii, 2, 5; iii, 5, 1, etc. Cf. also ii, 23, 16; iii, 3, 12; 9, 15; 20, 12; 26, 19. Similarly, in the "Fragments" we have this: "They are amusing fellows, said he (e;fh = Epictetus), who are proud of the things which are not in our power. A man says, I (evgw,, fhsi,) am better than you, for I possess much land and you are wasting with hunger. Another says (a;lloj le,gei). . . ." "Frag.," xviii. [Schw.,16]). Here the fhsi, is brought in as the initial member of a series and in contrast with a;lloj le,gei: it would seem to be Epictetus' own, therefore, and to mean "says one," as distinguished from another; and thus it appears to be the most likely instance of the "indefinite fhsi," in the whole mass. But even it seems an essentially different locution from the really indefinite "it is said," "on dit," " man sagt."

A glance over the whole usage of fhsi, in Arrian-Epictetus leaves on the mind a keen sense of the lively way in which the word must have been interjected into Greek conversation, but does not greatly alter the impression of its essential implication which we derive from the general use of the word. Take a single instance of its current use in the "Discourses" in its relation to kindred words:

"So also Diogenes somewhere says (pou le,gei) that there exists but one means of obtaining freedom - to die contentedly, and he writes (gra,fei) to the king of the Persians, 'You cannot enslave the city of the Athenians,

any more,' says he (fhsi,n), 'than fishes.' 'How? Can I not catch them ?' 'If you catch them,' says he (fhsi,n), 'they will immediately leave you and be gone, just like fishes: for whatever one of them you catch dies, and if these men die when they are caught, what good will your preparations do you?'" (iv, 1, 30).

The lively effect given by such unexpected interpositions of fhsi,n is lost in our decorous translation of the New Testament examples: but it exists in them too. Thus: "But she, being urged on by her mother, 'Give me,' says she, 'here upon a charger, the head of John the Baptist'" (Matt. xiv. 8); "But he, 'Master, speak,' says he" (Luke vii. 40); "But Peter to them, 'Repent,' says he, 'and be baptized each one of you'" (Acts ii. 38) ; "'Let those among you,' says he, 'that are able, go down with me'" (Acts xxv. 5); "'To-morrow,' says he, ' thou shalt hear him'" (Acts xxv. 22); "But Paul, 'I am not mad,' says he, 'most noble Festus'" (Acts xxvi. 25).⁵⁴ The main function of fhsi, then would appear to be to keep the consciousness of the speaker reported clearly before the mind of the reader. It is therefore often used to mark the transition from indirect to direct quotation:⁵⁵ and it lent itself readily, therefore, to mark the adduction both of objections and of literary citations. But, one would imagine, it did not very readily lend itself to vague and indefinite references.

If we desire to find cases of "subjectless le,gei" in any way similar to those of fhsi,, we must apparently turn our back on profane Greek altogether.⁵⁶ We have fortunately in Philo, however, an author, the circumstances of whose writing made literary quotation as frequent with him as oral is in the lively pages of Epictetus' "Discourses." And in Philo's treatises le,gei takes its place by the side of its more common kinsman fhsi,, and is used in much the same way, though naturally

somewhat less frequently. In harmony with his fundamental viewpoint - which looked on the Scriptures as a body of oracular sayings - Philo adduces Scripture commonly with verbs of "saying" - fhsi,, le,getai(le,gei(ei=pen (ge,graptai falling into the background). Passages so adduced are often woven into the fabric of his discussion of the contents of Scripture; and where the words adduced are words of a speaker in the Biblical narrative, the subject of the fhsi, or le,gei which introduces them naturally is often this speaker - whether God or some other person. Equally often, however, the subject given immediately or indirectly in the context is something outside of the narrative that is dealt with: in this case it is sometimes Moses, or "the prophet," or "the lawgiver" - at other times, "the Holy Word," or "the sacred Word," or "the Oracle," or "the Oracles" (o` qei/oj lo,goj(o` i`ero.j lo,goj(o` crhsmo,j(to. lo,gion(oi` crhsmoi,(ta. lo,gia) - at other times still it is "God," under various designations. Often, however, the verb - fhsi, or le,gei - stands not only without expressed subject, but equally without indicated subject. The rendering of these cases has given students of Philo some trouble, arising out of the apparent confusion, when the subject is expressed, of the reference of the verb, - now to a speaker in the text of Scripture and now to the author of the particular Scripture, to God as the author of all Scripture, or to Scripture itself conceived as a living Word. This apparent confusion is due solely to Philo's fundamental conception of Scripture as an oracular book, which leads him to deal with its text as itself the Word of God: he has himself fully explained the matter,⁵⁷ and we should be able to steer clear of serious difficulties with his explanation in our hands.

Nevertheless, a somewhat mechanical mode of dealing with his citations has produced, on more than one occasion, certain odd results. Prof. Ryle says:⁵⁸

"The commonest forms of quotation employed by Philo are fhsi,(ei=pen(le,gei(le,getai(ge,graptai ga.r. Whether the subject of fhsi, be Moses or Scripture personified cannot in many cases be determined."

In no case is the subject strictly indeterminate, however, and the failure to determine it aright may introduce confusion. Thus, for example, in "De Confus. Ling.," § 26 (Mangey, i. 424), Philo mentions the Book of Judges, and cites it with the subjectless fhsi,. Prof. Ryle comments thus:[59](#)

"He does not mention any opinion as to authorship, and introduces his quotation with his usual formula fhsi,n. We are hardly justified in assuming that Philo intended Moses as the subject of fhsi,n, and regarded him as the author of Judges (so Dr. Pick, *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 1884). Moses is doubtless often spoken of by Philo as if he were the personification of the Inspired Word; but we cannot safely extend this idea beyond the range of the Pentateuch. All that we can say is that fhsi,n, used in this quotation from Judges, refers either to the unknown writer of this book or to the personification of Holy Scripture."

Or else, we may add, to God, the real author, in Philo's conception, of every word of Scripture. Prof. Ryle, however, has not caught precisely Dr. Pick's meaning: Dr. Pick does not commit himself to the extravagant view that wherever subjectless fhsi, occurs in Philo the *subauditum* "Moses" is implied: he only says, in direct words, that here - in this special passage - "Moses is introduced as speaking." It would seem obvious that he had a text before him which read "Moses says," and not simply "says," at this

place. This text was doubtless nothing other than Yonge's English translation, which reads Moses here, as often elsewhere with as little warrant: "'For,' says Moses, ' Gideon swore, etc.'"⁶⁰ The incident illustrates the evil of mechanically supplying a supplement to these subjectless verbs - which cannot indeed be understood except on the basis of Philo's primary principle, that it is all one to say "Moses says," "the Scripture says," or "God says." The simple fact here is that Philo quotes Judges, as he does the rest of Scripture, with the subjectless "says," and with the same implication, viz., that Judges is to him a part of the Word of God.

As has been already hinted, by all means the commonest verb used by Philo thus, - without expressed or obviously indicated subject, - to introduce a Scripture passage, is *fhsi*,. Perhaps, however, the one instance to which we have incidentally adverted will suffice to illustrate the usage - other instances of which may be seen on nearly every page of Philo's treatises. It is of more interest for us to note that *le,gei* seems also to be used in the same subjectless way - examples of which may be seen, for instance, in the following places, "Legg. Allegor.," i, 15; ii, 4; iii, 8; "Quod Det. Pot. Insid.," 48; "De Posterit. Caini," 9; 22; 52; "De Gigant.," 11; 12; "De Confus. Ling.," 32; "De Migrat. Abrah.," 11; "Fragment. ex Joh. Monast." (ii, 668). In "Legg. Allegor.," i, 15, for instance, we have a string of quotations without obvious subject, introduced, the first by the subjectless *fhsi*., the next by the equally subjectless *evpife,rei pa,lin*, and the third (from Exod. xx. 23) by *le,gei de. kai. evn e'te,roi*. In "Legg. Allegor.," ii, 4, we have Gen. ii. 19 introduced by *le,gei ga.r* without any obvious subject. Yonge translates this too by "For Moses says": but to obtain warrant for this we should have to go back two pages and a half (of Richter's text), quite to the beginning of the treatise, where we find an apostrophe to the "prophet." In "De Posterit. Caini," 22, *le,gei evpi. me.n*

vAbraa.m ou[twj (Gen. xi. 29), though Yonge supplies "Moses" again, that would seem to be demonstrably absurd, as the passage proceeds to place "Moses," in parallelism with Abraham, in the object. Similarly the passages adduced from "De Gigant.," 11 and 12 (Num. xiv. 44 and Deut. xxxiv. 6) are about Moses, and it would scarcely do to fill out the ellipsis of subject with his name. Examples need not, however, be multiplied.

It would seem quite clear that both the subjectless fhsi, frequently, and the subjectless le,gei less often, occur in Philo after a fashion quite similar to the instances adduced from the New Testament. And it would seem to be equally clear that the lack of a subject in their case is not indicative of indefiniteness, but rather of definiteness in their reference. Philo does not adduce passages of Scripture with the bare fhsi, or le,gei because he knows or cares very little whence they come or with what authority; but because he and his readers alike both know so well the source whence they are derived, and yield so unquestionably to its authority, that it is unnecessary to pause to indicate either. The use of the bare fhsi, or le,gei in citations from Scripture is in his case, obviously, the outgrowth and the culminating sign of his absolute confidence in Scripture as the living voice of God, fully recognized as such both by himself and his readers. In the same sense in which to the dying Sir Walter Scott there was but one "Book," to him and his readers there was but one authoritative divine Word, and all that was necessary in adducing it was to indicate the fact of adduction. The fhsi, or le,gei serves thus primarily the function of "quotation marks" in modern usage: but under such circumstances and with such implications that bare quotation marks carry with them the assurance that the words adduced are divine words.

It would seem to be very easy, in these circumstances, to give ourselves more uneasiness than is at all necessary as to the precise

subauditum which we are to assume with these verbs. It may serve very well to render them simply, "It says," with the implication that Philo is using the *codex* of Scripture as the living voice of God speaking to him and his readers. The case, in a word, would seem to be very similar to that of the common New Testament formula of quotation *ge,graptai* - meaning not that what is adduced is somewhere written, but that it is the authoritative law that is being adduced. Just so, "It says," in such a case would mean not that somebody or something says what is adduced, but that the Word of God says it. As the one usage is the natural outgrowth of the conception of the Scriptures as a written authoritative law, the other is the equally natural outgrowth of the conception of Scripture as the living voice of God. How very natural a development this usage is, may be illustrated by the fact that something very similar to it may be met with in colloquial English. In the same circles where we may hear God spoken of as simply "He," as if it were dangerous to name His name too freely, we may also occasionally hear the Bible quoted with a simple "It says," or even with an elision of the "it," as "'Tsays": and yet the "it," though treated thus cavalierly, is in reality a very emphatic "It" indeed - the phrase being the product of awe in the presence of "the Book," and importing that there is but one "It" that could be thought of in the case. Somewhat similarly, in the case of Philo, the Scriptures are cited with the bare *fhsi,*(*le,gei,* because, in his mind and in the circles which he addressed, there stood out so far above all other voices this one Voice of God embodied in His Scriptures, that none other would be thought of in the case. The phrase is the outgrowth of reverence for the Word and of unquestioning submission to it: and the fundamental fact is that no special subject is expressed simply because none was needed and it would be all one whether we understood as subject, Moses, the prophet and lawgiver - the holy or sacred Word or the oracle - or finally, God Himself. In any case, and with any *subauditum*, the real subject conceived as

speaking is GOD. [61](#)

If now, in the light of the facts we have thus brought to our recollection, we turn back to the New Testament passages in which the Old Testament is cited with a simple *fhsi*, or *le,gei*, it may not be impossible for us to perceive their real character and meaning. There would seem to be absolutely no warrant in Greek usage for taking *le,gei*, and but very little, if any, for taking *fhsi*, really indefinitely: and even if there were, it would be inconceivable that the New Testament writers, from their high conception of "Scripture," should have adduced Scripture with a simple "it is said" - somewhere, by some one - without implication of reverence toward the quoted words or recognition of the authority inherent in them. It is rather in the usage of Philo that we find the true analogue of these examples. Like Philo, the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews looks upon Scripture as an oracular book, and all that it says, God says to him: and accordingly, like Philo, he adduces its words with a simple "it says," with the full implication that this "it says" is a "God says" also. Whenever the same locution occurs elsewhere in the New Testament, it bears naturally the same implication. There is no reason why we should recognize the Philonic *fhsi*, in Heb. viii. 5, and deny it in I Cor. vi. 16: or why we should recognize the Philonic *le,gei* in Heb. viii. 8 and deny it in Acts xiii. 35, Rom. ix. 15, xv. 10, II Cor. vi. 2, Gal. iii. 16, or in Eph. iv. 8, v. 14. Only in case it were very clear that Paul did not share the high conception of Scripture as the living voice of God which underlies this usage in Philo and the Epistle to the Hebrews, could we hesitate to understand this phrase in him as we understand it in them. But we have seen that such is not the case: and his use in adducing Scripture of the subjectless *fhsi*, and *le,gei* quite in their manner is, rightly viewed, only another indication, among many, that his conception of Scripture was fundamentally the same with theirs, and it cannot be

explained away on the assumption that it was fundamentally different.

It does not indeed follow that on every occasion when a Scripture passage is introduced by a *h̄si*, or *le,gei* it is to be explained as an instance of this subjectless usage - even though a subject for it is given or plainly implied in the immediate context. That is not possible even in Philo, where the introductory formula often finds its appropriate subject expressed in the preceding context. But it does follow that we need not and ought not resort to unnatural expedients to find a subject for such a *h̄si*, or *le,gei* in the context, or that acquiescing, whenever that seems more natural, in its subjectlessness, we should seek to explain away its high implications.⁶² Men may differ as to the number of clear instances of such a usage, that may be counted in the New Testament. But most will doubtless agree that some may be counted: and will doubtless place among them Eph. iv. 8 and v. 14. Some will contend, no doubt, that in the latter of these texts, the passage adduced is not derived from the Old Testament at all. That, however, is "another story," on which we cannot enter now, but on which we must be content to differ. We pause only to say that we reckon among the reasons why we should think the citation here is derived from the Old Testament, just its adduction by *dio. le,gei* - which would seem to advise us that Paul intended to quote the oracular Word.

There may be room for difference of opinion again as to the precise *subauditum* which it will be most natural to assume with these subjectless verbs: whether *o` qeo,j* or *h` grafh,*. In our view it makes no real difference in their implication: for, in our view, the very essence of the case is, that, under the force of their conception of the Scriptures as an oracular book, it was all one to the New Testament writers whether they said "God says" or "Scripture says." This is made very clear, as their real

standpoint, by their double identification of Scripture with God and God with Scripture, to which we adverted at the beginning of this paper, and by which Paul, for example, could say alike "the *Scripture* saith to Pharaoh" (Rom. ix. 17) and "*God* . . . saith, Thou wilt not give thy Holy One to see corruption" (Acts xiii. 34). We may well be content in the New Testament as in Philo to translate the phrase wherever it occurs, "It says" - with the implication that *this* "It says" is the same as "Scripture says," and that this "Scripture says" is the same as "God says." It is this implication that is really the fundamental fact in the case.



Endnotes:

1. From *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, Vol. x, 1899, pp. 472-510.
2. "A Grammar of the New Testament Greek," Thayer's translation p. 134.
3. Sec. 373, 3.
4. Winer, Sec. 58, 9, g; p. 656 of Moulton's translation.
5. Blass' "Grammar of N. T. Greek"; English translation by H. St. J. Thackeray, M.A., p. 75.
6. So also Wandel: "James then cites the passage Prov. iii. 24, in which we must simply supply 'God' to *le,gei*."
7. As a single example, take, e. g., Oltramare, on Eph. iv. 8: "Dio. *le,gei*, scil. *h` grafh*,: In accord with the extreme frequency with which the New Testament is cited, Paul often cites by saying simply *le,gei* (v. 14, Rom. xv. 10, II Cor. vi. 2, Gal. iii. 16; cf. Rom. iv. 3, x. 17, I Tim. v. 18), or *fhsi*, (I Cor. vi. 16; cf. Heb. viii. 15), or *ei;pe* (I Cor. xv. 27). He understands the subject, which is understood of itself, *grafh*, or *qeo,j* (see Winer, Gr., p. 486)."
8. Earlier still De Wette explained the phrase in a somewhat similar way. His note on Eph. v. 8 runs: "Old Testament support. *dio. le,gei*] therefore (because Christ gives the gifts and according to the presupposition that all that concerns Christ is predicted in the Old Testament *it is said*, [*heisst es*] (cf. Gal. iii. 16, I Cor. vi. 16 - a

formula of citation (also v. 14) like Jas. iv. 6, Acts xiii. 35, Heb. x. 5, not elsewhere found in the apostle (cf., however, II Cor. vi. 17) . . . "And again on Eph. v. 14 we read: "dio. le,gei] *therefore it is said* [heisst es] (in the Scriptures). Cf. iv. 8." He supposes that, in the latter passage, Paul confuses a customary application of Scripture with the very words of Scripture.

9. Grimm's note on the passage runs: "Instead of the rec. reading, fhsi,n, Alex. Ephr., 157, 248, 296, Compl. have fasi,n. Nevertheless the author may here return to the singular, referring to the potter before depicted (see the following verses). Or fhsi, may stand impersonally, in the sense of 'heisst es,' 'sagt man,' Win., p. 462, 6th ed.; Müller, 'Philo's Buch von d. Weltschopfung,' p. 44." Cf. further, below, p. 316.
10. fhsi,n is placed by Tischendorf, Tregelles and Westcott and Hort in their texts: while fasi,n is read by Lachmann and placed in their margins by Tregelles and Westcott and Hort. The former is read by aDEFGKLP, etc., by the cursives, and by the Vulgate and Coptic versions, while the latter is the reading of B, Old Latin and Syriac. Heinrici pertinently remarks (in his own "Commentary," 1887): "The reading fasi,n, which Lachmann accepts, is just as strongly witnessed by B, the Itala and Peschitto as fhsi,n (aDFG Vulg. Copt.) and it almost looks as if fhsi,n were a correction occasioned by the succeeding o` toiou/toj (against Meyer)." Alford, who continues to read fhsi,n equally pertinently on that hypothesis, remarks: "fhsi,n, taken by Winer (Ed. 6, § 58, 96), De Wette and Meyer as impersonal, 'heisst es,' 'men say'; but why should not the tij of ver. 7, and o` toiou/toj of ver. 11, be the subject?" See further below, p. 316.
11. [See above, p. 287.]
12. ["He (viz., God, whose word the Scriptures are. See reff. [i. e., Rom. xii. 3, II Cor. x. 13, iv. 13, 16 = Paul only], and notes: not merely 'it,' *es heisst*, as, De Wette, *al.*: nor h` graph,: had it been the subject it must have been expressed, as in Rom. iv. 3, ix. 17, *al.*) says (viz., Ps. lxxviii. 18, see below: not in some Christian hymn, as Flatt and Storr - which would not agree with le,gei, nor with the treatment of the citation, which is plainly regarded as carrying the weight of Scripture.")]

13. ["*He saith*,' sc. o` qeo,j, not h` grafh,. This latter nominative is several times inserted by St. Paul (Rom. iv. 3, ix. 17, x. 11, Gal. iv. 30, I Tim. v. 18), but is not therefore to be regularly supplied whenever there is an ellipsis (Bos, *Ellips.*, p. 54) without reference to the nature of the passages. The surest and in fact only guide is the context; when that affords no certain hint, we fall back upon the natural subject, o` qeo,j, whose words the Scriptures are; see notes on Gal. iii. 16." See further above, p. 287. At Gal. iii. 16, Ellicott had said: "*He saith not*"; not h` grafh, (Bos, *Ellips.*, p. 54), as in Rom. xv. 10 - where the subst. is supplied from ge,graptai, ver. 9 - or to. pneu/ma (Ruck., Winer, Gr., §39, 1), which appears arbitrary, but the natural subject o` qeo,j, as in Eph. iv. 8, v. 14, and (fhsi,) I Cor. vi. 16, Heb. viii. 5. So apparently Syr., which here inserts *illi* after le,gei." The passage referred to in Bos (London ed. of 1825, pp. 57, 58) is as follows: "In the New Testament, where the Scripture of the Old Testament is cited, fhsi, or le,gei often occurs with h` grafh, understood - a word which actually stands in other passages: I Cor. vi. 16, Eph. v. 14, Gal. iii. 16. The same thing occurs in the Greek fathers. Marcus Eremita, in his earlier aphorisms, No. 106, ouvdei.j fhsi,, strateuo,menoj evmple,ketai tai/j tou~ bi,ou pragmatei,aij, 'No one, says (the Scripture, II Tim. ii. 4) going a-soldiering is entangled in the affairs of this life.' So, No. 134: fhsi, ga.r(o` u`yw/~n evauto.n tapeinwqh,setai, 'For, says (Scripture), he that exalteth himself shall be brought low.' There may be also understood *pro re nata* euvaggelisth,j, profhth,j(avpo,stoloj: but the other is more general and suits excellently. Schoettg."]
14. [The text actually has "ver. 14," but we venture to correct the obvious slip.]
15. ["With le,gei God is to be supplied as subject. From this way of adducing it, it is already clear that the cited words cannot be taken from a Christian hymn in use in the Church at Ephesus (Storr, Flatt), but must belong to the sacred, God-given Scripture." Accordingly at v. 14 he says: "In accordance with the formula (le,gei, chap. iv. 8) usual in adducing Scripture, it can scarcely be doubtful that the apostle intended to cite an Old Testament passage."]
16. The comment there is simply: "he *saith*] or possibly *it* (the Scripture) saith."
17. [The parenthetical marks should doubtless be removed.]

18. [This sentence seems formally incomplete; probably "is frequently employed" is to be supplied from the preceding clause.]
19. [This scarcely gives a complete view of Winer's remark: he says that "the subject ο` ρε,οj) is *usually* contained in the context, either directly or indirectly," and proceeds to adduce cases of ellipsis.]
20. [What Westcott apparently says is not that "the two passages in the Epistle to the Ephesians (iv. 8, v. 14, διο. λε,γει) appear to be different in kind" from the usage of Hebrews, but from the cases in the rest of the New Testament, where God is the subject of λε,γει indeed, but "the reference is to words directly spoken by God." He possibly means, "different in kind" from the usage both of Hebrews and of the rest of the New Testament: but he does not seem to say this directly. See post, p. 305.]
21. Vol. iv, p. 13.
22. *Op. cit.*, pp. 285, 286, 287.
23. Westcott, *in loc.*, "it seems more natural to refer it to the collected writings of the Old Testament."
24. What is meant may possibly be that these two passages in Ephesians are analogous neither to the usage of Hebrews nor to that of the rest of the New Testament, but stand out by themselves. In that case Dr. Westcott probably means to take them as instances of the indefinite use of λε,γει. Cf. above, p. 293.
25. Cf. Meyer's note: "λε,γει], the subject is necessarily that of ει;ρhken, ver. 34, and so, neither David (Bengel, Heinrichs and others), nor the Scriptures (Herrmann), but *God*, although Ps. xvi. 10 contains David's words addressed to God. But David is considered as the interpreter of God, who has put the prayer into his mouth. Comp. on Matt. xix. 5."
26. Cf. Meyer's note: "fhsi,n], who it is that says it, is self-evident, namely, God, the utterances of Scripture being His words, even when they may be spoken through another, as Gen. ii. 24 was through Adam. Comp. on Matt. xix. 5. Similarly Gal. iii. 16, Eph. iv. 8, Heb. viii. 5, I Cor. xv. 27. `H γραφh,, which is usually supplied here, would need to be suggested by the context, as in Rom. xv. 10. Ruckert arbitrarily prefers το. πνευ/μα." "To take it *impersonally*, 'it is said' as in II Cor. x. 10, according to the well-known usage in the classics, would be without warrant from any other instance of Paul's

- quotations from Scripture. Comp. Winer, *Gr.*, p. 486 [English translation, 656]; Buttmann, *Neut. Gr.*, p. 117 [English translation, 134]."
27. For he supposes the words quoted in i. 10 to be addressed not to Christ, but to God: "God through His Spirit so speaks in the Psalmist that words not directly addressed to Christ find their fulfillment in Him."
 28. So (according to Lünemann), Dindorf, Schulz, Böhme, Bleek, Ebrard Alford, Woerner: add Lowrie, Riggensbach.
 29. Cf. Deissmann, "Bibelstudien," 109; "Neue Bibelstudien," 77: and also for the implications, Kuyper, "Encyclopædia of Sacred Theology," pp. 433-435 and 444-445.
 30. § 373, 1. obs., 1.
 31. "Ausfuhr. Gram.," ii. 30 (§ 352).
 32. Jelf, § 373, 7: Kuhner, *l. c.*: Jannaris ("A Historical Greek Grammar," 1161 *seq.*), treats the omitted subject no otherwise than Kuhner.
 33. "Syntax.," 419.
 34. These references are added in a note: "Von fhsi, in späten manche nach Bentley, wie Dav. ad Cic. Tus. i. 39; Wytt. ad Plut., T. vi, p. 791. Von eivpe, moi, Heind. ad Euthyd., 29."
 35. Cf. Grimm's note, given above, p. 289.
 36. Meyer, *in loc.*, continues to read fhsi. He says, "*It is said*, impersonal, as often with the Greeks. See Bernhardt, p. 419. The reading fasi,n (Lachmann, following B. Vulg.), is a rash correction. Comp. Fritzsche, *ad Thesmoph.*, p. 189; Buttmann, *Neut. Gram.*, p. 119 [English translation, 136]." So in essence most commentators, including Flatt, Storr, Krause, De Wette, Kling, Waite. Rückert more warily comments: "fhsi,n is here properly recognized as a formula of adduction, without reference to the number of those speaking. See Winer (304)." Cf. above, p. 289.
 37. P. 1665a (Oxford, 1883).
 38. Whiston, Reiske, Weber.
 39. We are indebted to Prof. S. S. Orris, of Princeton University, for suggestions in preparing this paragraph. He permits us to add that, in his opinion, "fhsi, is never equivalent to the general, indefinite *they say* or *it is said*."
 40. Reiske, p. 477; Dindorf, ii. 23.

41. Reiske and Schaefer, vi. 162.
42. iii. §§ 41, 42 (p. 122); "Oratores Attici," v. 214.
43. Reiske-Schaefer, v. 579.
44. *Op. cit.*, p. 581.
45. P. 119 F (Wytttenbach, I. ii. 470).
46. P. 530 (20-30).
47. I, ii. 470.
48. VI, ii. 791.
49. Phaedo, 401 B. (115): "in these arrayed, [the soul] is ready to go on her journey to the world below, when her time comes. You, Simmias and Cebes, and all other men, will depart at some time or other. Me already, as the tragic poet would say, the voice of fate calls (evme. de. nu/n h;dh kalei/(fai,h a;n avnh.r tragiko.vj h` eivmarme,nh)." The other passages adduced witness only to the currency of the phrase h` evmarme,nh porei,a. But the language of both Plutarch and Plato would seem to imply that the "calling" is certainly a part of the quotation.
50. *Præcepta Sanit. Tuend.*, 135 B., ouv kata, ge th.n evmh.n(e;fh(gnw,mhn. Wytt.: "e;fh notat alterius dictum ut alibi fhsi,, de quo diximus, p. 119 F."
51. Cf. Heinrici as above, p. 481; and Blass, "Gram. of New Testament Greek," English translation, p. 2.
52. "Epicteti Dissertationes," etc. (Lipsiæ, 1894), Index, pp. 701, 702.
53. We purposely use Long's translation, which, in all these instances, proceeds on the theory that the fhsi, is Epictetus' own.
54. The matter of this interposition is investigated for Plato by Stallbaum, p. 472 D., 580 D. - where he seems to have collected all the instances of interposed fame,n in Plato. Cf. also Bornemann and Sauppe on Xenophon's *Memorab.*, iii. 5, 13, and the indices of Schenkl on Arrian-Epictetus and Thieme-Sturz on Xenophon (sub. voc. fa,nai).
55. On Acts xxv. 5, Blass has this note: "5 fit transitus ex or. obliqua in rectam, ut I. 4 al; hinc fhsi,n interpositum ut I. 4 β.," i. e., in the *Western* text of I, 4, which reads: "'Which ye heard,' says he, 'from my mouth.'" The interposition of a "he says," or some similar phrase, to keep the consciousness of the hearer or reader bright on the fact that the words before him are quoted words is, of course, a general

- linguistic and not a specifically Greek usage. It is found in all languages. A Hebrew instance, for example, may be found in I Kgs. ii. 4.
56. Schenkl catalogues in the "Discourses" of Epictetus two cases of interposed *le,gei*, quite in the style of *fhsi*, - iii. 19, 1 and "Fragment," xxi. 10 - but in both cases the subject is expressed.
 57. In "De Vita Mosis," iii. 23.
 58. "Philo and Holy Scripture," p. xlv.
 59. *Op. cit.*, p. xxv.
 60. Vol. ii. p. 27.
 61. The reverent use of an indefinite may be illustrated from the mode of citation adopted in Heb. ii. 6 - "one hath somewhere testified " - a mode of citation not uncommon in Philo [as, for example, *de Temul.* (ed. Mang., i. 365), *ei=pe ga,r pou, tij* (i. e., Abraham, Gen. xx. 12), and other examples in Bleek, II, i. 239]. Delitzsch correctly explains: "The citation is thus introduced with a special solemnity, the author naming neither the place whence he takes it nor the original speaker, but making use (as Philo frequently) of the vague term *pou, tij*, so that the important testimony itself becomes only the more conspicuous, like a grand pictured figure in the plainest, narrowest frame."
 62. The matter is approached in a sensible and helpful way by Viteau, in his "Étude sur le Grec du N. T.: sujet, complement et attribute" (1896), p. 61. He is treating of the subject to be mentally supplied, i. e., of the case where the reader may be fairly counted upon to supply the subject, and he remarks (*inter alia*): "76 (9). There is a kind of mental subject peculiar to the New Testament. When events of the Old Testament are spoken of, these events are supposed to be known to the reader or the hearer, who is invited to supply the subject of the verb mentally. . . . 77 (10). There is still another kind of mental subject peculiar to the New Testament and kindred to the preceding. In the citations made by the New Testament the subject is often lacking, as well for the verb which announces the citation as for the verb in the citation itself. The reader is supposed to recognize the passage and is invited to supply the subject. (a) For the verbs which announce the citation there occur as subjects: *o` qe,oj*, Acts ii. 17; *o` profh,thj*, Acts vii. 48; *Dauei,d*, Rom. iv. 6; *Mwu?sh/j*, Rom. x. 19;

`Hsai,aj, Rom. xv. 12; h` grafh,, Gal. iv. 30. When the verb has no subject, the reader is to supply it mentally: Acts xiii. 34, 35, ei=rhken and le,gei, the subject is o` qe,oj, according to the LXX., Es. lv. 3, and Ps. xv. 10; Rom. xv. 10, pa,lin le,gei (o` Mwu?sh/j), according to Deut. xxxii. 43; Eph. iv. 8, le,gei (o` qeo,j or Dauei.d), according to Ps. lxxvii. 19; Eph. v. 14, dio. le,gei, those who regard the passage as imitated or partially cited from the Old Testament give `Hsai,aj as the subject of le,gei, according to Isa. lx. 1, 2, but if we regard this passage as containing some kw/la of an early hymn (in imitation of Isaiah) we must supply as the subject tij, 'it is said,' 'it is sung' (96a); Heb. viii. 5, fhsi,n (o` qe,oj), according to Ex. xxv. 40." We do not accord, of course, with the remark on Eph. v. 14; and we miss in Viteau's remarks the expected reference to the deeper fact in the case.

VIII. "The Oracles of God"¹

The purpose of this paper is to bring together somewhat more fully than can be easily found in one place elsewhere, the material for forming a judgment as to the sense borne by the term [ta.] lo,gia, as it appears in the pages of the New Testament. This term occurs only four times in the New Testament. The passages, as translated by the English revisers of 1881, are as follows: "Moses . . . who received living *oracles* to give unto us" (Acts vii. 38); "They [the Jews] were intrusted with *the oracles of God*" (Rom. iii. 2); "When by reason of the time ye ought to be teachers, ye have need again that some one teach you the rudiments of the first principles of *the oracles of God*" (Heb. v. 12); "If any man speaketh let him speak as it were *oracles of God*" (I Peter iv. 11). The general sense of the term is obvious on the face of things: and the commentators certainly do not go wholly wrong in explaining it. But the minor differences that emerge in their explanations are numerous, and seem frequently to evince an insufficient examination of the usage of the word: and the references by which they support their several views are not always accessible to readers who would fain test them, so that the varying explanations stand, in the eyes of many, as only so many *obiter dicta* between which choice must be made, if choice is made at all, purely arbitrarily. It has seemed, therefore, as if it would not be without its value if the usage of the word were exhibited in sufficient fullness to serve as some sort of a touchstone of the explanations that have been offered of it. We are sure, at any rate, that students of the New Testament remote from libraries will not be sorry to have at hand a tolerably full account of the usage of the word: and we are not without hope that a comprehensive view of it may help to correct some longstanding errors concerning its exact meaning, and may, indeed, point not obscurely to its true

connotation - which is not without interesting implications. Upheld by this hope we shall essay to pass in rapid review the usage of the term in Classic, Hellenistic and Patristic Greek, and then to ask what, in the light of this usage, the word is likely to have meant to the writers of the New Testament.

I. It may be just as well at the outset to disabuse our minds of any presumption that a diminutive sense is inherent in the term *logion*, as a result of its very form.² Whether we explain it with Meyer-Weiss³ as the neuter of *logios* and point to *logidion*⁴ as the proper diminutive of this stem; or look upon it with Sanday-Headlam⁵ as originally the diminutive of *logos*, whose place as such was subsequently, viz., when it acquired the special sense of "oracle," taken by the strengthened diminutive *logidion* - it remains true that no trace of a diminutive sense attaches to it as we meet it on the pages of Greek literature.⁶

We are pointed, to be sure, to a scholium on the "Frogs" of Aristophanes (line 942) as indicating the contrary. The passage is the well-known one in which Euripides is made to respond to Æschylus' inquiry as to what things he manufactured. "Not winged horses," is the reply (as Wheelwright translates it), "By Jupiter, nor goat-stags, such as thou, Like paintings on the Median tapestry, But as from thee I first received the art, Swelling with boastful pomp and heavy words, I pared it straight and took away its substance, With little words, and walking dialogues,⁷ And white beet mingled, straining from the books A juice of pleasant sayings, - then I fed him With monodies, mixing Ctesiphon." It is upon the word here translated "with little words," but really meaning "verselets" (Blaydes: *versiculis*) - *evpullion* - that the scholium occurs. It runs: *vAnti. tou/ logion mikroi/j w`j de. brefoj brefullion, kai. ei=doj eivdullion\ ou;tw kai. e;poj evpullion.*⁸ That is to say, *evpullion* is a

diminutive of the same class as *brefu,llion* and *evpu,llion*,⁹ and means *lo,gion mikro,n*. Since the idea of smallness is explicit in the adjective attached to *lo,gion* here, surely it is not necessary to discover it also in the noun,¹⁰ especially when what the scholiast is obviously striving to say is not that *evpullioij* means "little wordlets," but "little verses." The presence of *mikroi/j* here, rather is conclusive evidence that *logi,oi/j* by itself did not convey a diminutive meaning to the scholiast. If we are to give *lo,gion* an unexampled sense here, we might be tempted to take it, therefore, as intended to express the idea "verses" rather than the tautological one of "little words" or even "little maxims" or "little sayings." And it might fairly be pleaded in favor of so doing that *lo,gion* in its current sense of "oracle" not only lies close to one of the ordinary meanings of *e;poj* ("Od.," 12, 266; Herod., 1, 13, and often in the Tragedians), but also, because oracles were commonly couched in verse, might easily come to suggest in popular speech the idea of "verse," so that a *lo,gion mikro,n* would easily obtrude itself as the exact synonym of *evpu,llion*, in Euripides' sense, i. e., in the sense of short broken verses. There is no reason apparent on the other hand why we should find a diminutive implication in the word as here used, and in any case, if this is intended, it is a sense unillustrated by a single instance of usage.

And the unquestionable learning of Eustathius seems to assure us that to Greek ears *lo,gion* did not suggest a diminutive sense at all. He is commenting on line 339 of the Second Book of the "Iliad," which runs,

phv dh. sunqesi.ai te kai. o[rkia bh,setai h`mi/n,

and he tells us that *o[rkion* in Homer is not a diminutive, but is a formation similar to *lo,gion*, which means "an oracle": *Ouvc u`pokoristiko.n de. par v `Omh,rw| ouvde.))) to. i'cnion) [Wspere. ta. o[rkia parwno,mastai evk tou/ o[rkou(ou[tw kai. evk tou/ lo,gou ta. lo,gia h;koun oi` crhsmoi,*¹¹

There is no direct statement here, to be sure, that *logion* is not a diminutive; that statement is made - with entire accuracy - only of *orkion* and *icnion*:¹² nor is the derivation suggested for *logion*, as if it came directly from *logoj*, perhaps scientifically accurate. But there is every indication of clearness of perception in the statement: and it could scarcely be given the form it has, had *logion* stood in Eustathius' mind as the diminutive of *logoj*. It obviously represented to him not a diminutive synonym of *logoj*, but an equal synonym of *crhsmoj*. What *logion* stood for, in his mind, is very clearly exhibited, further, in a comment which he makes on the 416th line of the First Book of the "Odyssey," where Telemachus declares that he does not "care for divinations such as my mother seeks, summoning a diviner to the hall":

ou;te qeopropi,hj evmpa,zomai(h[n tina mh,thr
evj me,garon kale,sasa qeopro,pon evxere,htai)

Eustathius wishes us to note that *qeopro,poj* means the *mantij*, *qeopropi,a* his art, and *qeopro,pion* the message he delivers, which Eustathius calls the *crhsmw|dhma*, and informs us is denominated by the Attics also *logion*. He says: *vIste,on de. o[ti qeopro,poj me.n a;llwj(o` ma,ntij) qeopropi,a de.(h` te,cnh avvtou/) qeopro,pion de.(to. crhsmw|dhma(o] kai. lo,gion e;legon oi` vAttikoi,*¹³ To Eustathius, thus *logion* was simply the exact synonym of the highest words in use to express a divine communication to men - *qeopro,pion*,¹⁴ *crhsmw|dhma(crhsmoj*. Similarly Hesychius' definition runs: *Lo,gia: qe,sfata(mauteu,mata, (pro)fhteu,mata(fh/mai(crhsmoi,*. In a word, *logion* differs from *logoj* not as expressing something smaller than it, but as expressing something more sacred.

The Greek synonymy of the notion "oracle" is at once extraordinarily full and very obscure. It is easy to draw up a long list of terms - *mantei/a(mauteu,mata(pro,ganta(qeopro,pia(evpiqespismoi,(qe,sfata(qespi,smata(*

logia, and the like; but exceedingly difficult, we do not say to lay down hard and fast lines between them, but even to establish any shades of difference among them which are consistently reflected in usage. M. Bouché-Leclercq, after commenting on the poverty of the Latin nomenclature, continues as to the Greek:¹⁵

"The Greek terminology is richer and allows analysis of the different senses, but it is even more confused than abundant. The Greeks, possessors of a flexible tongue, capable of rendering all the shades of thought, often squandered their treasures, broadening the meaning of words at pleasure, multiplying synonyms without distinguishing between them, and thus disdaining the precision to which they could attain without effort. We shall seek in vain for terms especially appropriated to divination by oracles. From the verb *crh/sqai*, which signifies in Homer 'to reveal' in a general way, come the derivatives *crhsmo,j* and *crhsth,rion*. The latter, which dates from Hesiod and the Homerides, designates the place where prophecies are dispensed and, later, the responses themselves, or the instrument by which they are obtained. *Crhsmo,j*, which comes into current usage from the time of Solon, is applied without ambiguity to inspired and versified prophecies, but belongs equally to the responses of the oracles and those of free prophets. The word *mantei/on* in the singular designates ordinarily the place of consultation; but in the plural it is applied to the prophecies themselves of whatever origin. In the last sense it has a crowd of synonyms of indeterminate and changeable shades of meaning. The

grammarians themselves have been obliged to renounce imposing rules on the capricious usage and seeking recognition for their artificial distinctions. We learn once more the impossibility of erecting precise definitions for terms which lack precision."

Among the distinctions which have been proposed but which usage will not sustain is the discrimination erected by the scholiast on Euripides, "Phœniss.," 907,¹⁶ which would reserve *qe,sfata(qespi,smata(crhsmoi*, for oracles directly from the gods, and assign *manteu/ai* and *manteu,mata* to the responses of the diviners. The grain of truth in this is that in *ma,ntij(manteu,esqai(mantei,a*, etymologically, what is most prominent is the idea of a special unwonted capacity, attention being directed by these words to the strong spiritual elevation which begets new powers in us. While, on the other hand, in *qespi,zein* the reference is directly to the divine inspiration, which, because it is normally delivered in song, is referred to by such forms as *qespiw|do,v, qespiw|,dein) Crhsmo,j*, on the other hand, seems an expression which in itself has little direct reference either to the source whence or the form in which the oracle comes, but describes the oracle from the point of view of what it is in itself - viz., a "communication" - going back, as it does, to *crh/n*, the original sense of which seems to be "to bestow," "to communicate."¹⁷ *lo,gion* doubtless may be classed with *crhsmo,j* in this respect - it is *par excellence* the "utterance," the "saying." It would seem to be distinguished from *crhsmo,j* by having even less reference than it to the source whence - something as "a declaration" is distinguished from "a message." If we suppose a herald coming with the cry, "A communication from the Lord," and then, after delivering the message, adding: "This is His utterance," it might fairly be contended that in strict precision the former should be *crhsmo,j* and the latter *lo,gion*, in so far as the former term may keep

faintly before the mind the *source* of the message as a thing given, while the latter may direct the attention to its *content as the very thing* received, doubtless with a further connotation of its fitness to its high origin. Such subtlety of distinction, however, is not sure to stamp itself on current use, so that by such etymological considerations we are not much advanced in determining the ordinary connotation of the words in usage.

A much more famous discrimination, and one which much more nearly concerns us at present, has been erected on what seems to be a misapprehension of a construction in Thucydides. In a passage which has received the compliment of imitation by a number of his successors,¹⁸ the historian is describing the agitation caused by the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, one symptom of which was the passion for oracles which was developed. "All Hellas," he says,¹⁹ "was excited by the coming conflict between the two cities. Many were the prophecies circulated, and many the oracles chanted by diviners (kai. polla. me.n lo,gia evle,gonto(polla. de. crhsmolo,goi h|=don), not only in the cities about to engage in the struggle, but throughout Hellas." And again, as the Lacedæmonians approached the city, one of the marks he, at a later point, notes of the increasing excitement is that "soothsayers (crhsmologoi) were repeating oracles (h|=don crhsmou,j) of the most different kinds, which all found in some one or other enthusiastic listeners."²⁰ On a casual glance the distinction appears to lie on the surface of the former passage that lo,gia are oracles in prose and crhsmoi, oracles in verse: and so the scholiast²¹ on the passage, followed by Suidas²² defines. But it is immediately obvious on the most cursory glance into Greek literature that the distinction thus suggested will not hold. The crhsmoi, are, to be sure, commonly spoken of as sung; and the group of words crhsmw|do,j(crhsmw|de,w(crhsmw|di,a(crhsmw|,dhma(crhsmw|,dhj(crhsmw|diko,j, witnesses to the intimate connection of the two ideas. But this arises out of the nature of the case,

rather than out of any special sense attached to the word *crhsmo,j*: and accordingly, by the side of this group of words, we have others which, on the one hand, compound *crhsmo,j* with terms not implicative of singing (*crhsmhgore,w(crhsmago,rhj - crhsmodote,w(crhsmodo,thj(crhsmodo,thma - crhsmologe,w(crhsmolo,goj(crhsmologi,a(crhsmolo,gion(crhsmologikh,(crhsmole,schj - crhsmopoio,j*), and, on the other hand, compound other words for oracles with words denoting singing (*qespiw|de,w(qespiw|,dhma(qespiw|do,j*). The fact is that, as J.H. Heinr. Schmidt²³ points out in an interesting discussion, the natural expression of elevated feeling was originally in song: so that the singer comes before the poet and the poet before the speaker. It was thus as natural for the ancients to say *vaticinium* as it is for moderns to say *Weis-sagung* or *sooth-saying*; but as the custom of written literature gradually transformed the consciousness of men, their thought became more logical and less pictorial until even the Pythia ceased at last to speak in verse. Meanwhile, old custom dominated the oracles. They were chanted: they were couched in verse: and the terms which had been framed to describe them continued to bear this implication. Even when called *lo,gia*, they prove to be ordinarily²⁴ in verse; and these also are said to be sung, as we read, for example, in Dio Cassius (431, 66 and 273, 64): *lo,gia pantoi/a h|;deto*. What appears to be a somewhat constant equivalence in usage of the two terms *crhsmo,j* and *lo,gion*, spread broadly over the face of Greek literature, seems in any event to negative the proposed distinction. Nor does the passage in Thucydides when more closely examined afford any real ground for it. After all, *lo,gia* and *crhsmoi*, are not contrasted in this passage: the word *crhsmoi*, does not even occur in it. The stress of the distinction falls, indeed, not on the nouns, but on the verbs, the point of the remark being that oracles were scattered among the people by every possible method.²⁵ If we add that the second *polla*, is probably not to be resolved into *pollou,j crhsmou,j*,²⁶ the *crhsmou,j* being derived from the *crhsmw|lo,goi*, but is to

have lo,gia supplied with it from the preceding clause, the assumed distinction between lo,gia and crhsmoi, goes up at once in smoke. Lo,gia alone are spoken of: and these lo,gia are said to be both spoken and sung.²⁷

So easy and frequent is the interchange between the two terms that it seems difficult to allow even the more wary attempts of modern commentators to discriminate between them. These ordinarily turn on the idea that lo,gia is the more general and crhsmo,j the more specific word, and go back to the careful study of the Baron de Locella,²⁸ in his comment on a passage in (the later) Xenophon's "Ephesiaca." Locella's note does indeed practically cover the ground. He begins by noting the interchange of the two words in the text before him. Then he offers the definition that *oraculorum responsa* are generically lo,gia, whether in prose or verse, adducing the lo,gia palaia, of Eurip., "Heracl.," 406, and the lo,gion puqo,crhston of Plutarch, "Thes.," i. 55, as instances of lo,gia undoubtedly couched in verse; while versified oracles, originally in hexameters and later in iambic trimeters are, specifically, crhsmoi, - whence crhsmw|de,w is *vaticinor*, crhsmw|di,a, *vaticinium*, and crhsmw|do,j, *vates*. As thus the difference between the two words is that of genus and species, they may be used promiscuously for the same oracle. It is worth the trouble, he then remarks, to inspect how often lo,gion and crhsmo,j are interchanged in the "Knights" of Aristophanes between verses 109 and 1224, from which the error of the scholiast on Thucydides, ii. 8, is clear and of Suidas following him, in making lo,gion specifically an oracle in prose, and crhsmo,j one in verse. He then quotes Eustathius on the "Iliad," ii. ver. 233, and on the "Odyssey," i. ver. 1426; adduces the gloss, lo,gion(o` crhsmo,j; and asks his readers to note what Stephens adduces from Camerarius against this distinction.²⁹ The continued designation by Greek writers of the prose Pythian oracles as crhsmoi, is adverted to,

Plutarch's testimony being dwelt on: and relevant scholia on Aristophanes' "Av"., 960, and "Nub.," 144, are referred to. It is not strange that Locella's finding, based on so exhaustive a survey of the relevant facts, should have dominated later commentators, who differ from it ordinarily more by way of slight modification than of any real revision - suggesting that *logia*, being the more general word, is somewhat less sacred;³⁰ or somewhat less precise;³¹ or somewhat less ancient.³² The common difficulty with all these efforts to distinguish the two words is that there is no usage to sustain them. When the two words occur together it is not in contrast but in apparently complete equivalence, and when *logion* appears apart from *chrsmoj* it is in a sense which seems in no way to be distinguishable from it. The only qualification to which this statement seems liable, arises from a faintly-felt suspicion that, in accordance with their etymological implications already suggested, *chrsmoj* has a tendency to appear when the mind of the speaker is more upon the source of the "oracle" and *logion* when his mind is more upon its substance.

Even in such a rare passage as Eurip., "Heracl.," 406, where the two words occur in quasi-contrast, we find no further ground for an intelligible distinction between them:

"Yet all my preparations well are laid:
Athens is all in arms, the victims ready
Stand for the gods for whom they must be slain.
By seers the city is filled with sacrifice
For the foes' rout and saving of the state.
All prophecy-chanters have I caused to meet,
Into old public oracles have searched,
And secret, for salvation of this land."³³

And mid their manifest diversities,
 In one thing glares the sense of all the same -
 They bid me to Demeter's daughter slay,
 A maiden of a high-born father sprung."³⁴

And ordinarily they display an interchangeability which seems almost studied, it is so complete and, as it were, iterant. Certainly, at all events, it is good advice to follow, to go to Aristophanes' "Knights" to learn their usage. In that biting play Demos - the Athenian people - is pictured as "a Sibyllianizing old man" with whom Cleon curries favor by plying him with oracles,

a|;dei de. crhsmou,j\ o` de. ge,rwn sibullia|/.³⁵

Nicias steals tou,j crhsmou,j from Cleon, and brings to.n i`ero.n crhsmo,n to Demosthenes, who immediately on reading it exclaims, w= lo,gia!³⁶ "DEM.: +W lo,gia. Give me quick the cup! NIC.: Behold, what says the crhsmo,j? DEM.: Pour on! NIC.: Is it so stated in the logi,oij? DEM.: O Bacis!" To cap the climax, the scholiast remarks on w= lo,gia: " (manteu,mata): he wonders when he reads to.n crhsmo,n." Only a little later,³⁷ Demosthenes is counseling the Sausage Vender not to "slight what the gods by toi/j logi,oisi have given" him and receives the answer: "What then says o` crhsmo,j?" and after the contents of it are explained the declaration, "I am flattered by ta. lo,gia." As the dénouement approaches, Cleon and the Sausage Vender plead that their oracles may at least be heard (lines 960-961: oi` crhsmoi,). They are brought, and this absurd scene is the result: "CLEON: Behold, look here - and yet I've not got all. S. V.: Ah, me! I burst - 'and yet I've not got all!' DEM.: What are these? CLEON: Oracles (lo,gia). DEM.: All! CLEON: Do you wonder? By Jupiter, I've still a chestful left. S. V.: And I an upper with two dwelling rooms. DEM.: Come, let us see whose oracles (oi` crhsmoi,) are these?

CLEON: Mine are of Bacis. DEM.: Whose are thine ? S. V.: Of Glamis, his elder brother." And when they are read they are all alike in heroic measure.

It is not in Aristophanes alone, however, that this equivalence meets us: the easy interchange of the two words is, we may say, constant throughout Greek literature. Thus, for example, in the "Corinthiaca" of Pausanias (ii. 20, 10) an oracle is introduced as *to. lo, gion*, and commented on as *o` crhsmo, j*.³⁸ In Diodorus Siculus, ii. 14,³⁹ Semiramis is said to have gone to Ammon *crhsome, nh tw|/ qew|/ peri. th/ j ivdi, aj teleuth/ j*, and, the narrative continues, *le, getai aujth|/ gene, sqai lo, gion*. Similarly in Plutarch's "De Defectu Orac.," v.⁴⁰ we have the three terms *to. crhsthri, on(to. lo, gion* and *ta. mantei/ a tau/ ta* equated: in "De Mul. Virt.," viii.⁴¹ the *lo, gia* are explained by what was *evcrh, sqh*: in "Quaestiones Romanae," xxi.⁴² *lo, gia* came by way of a *crhsmw| dei/ n*. In the "Ephesiaca" of the later Xenophon metrical *manteu, mata* are received, the recipients of which are in doubt what *ta. tou/ qeou/ lo, gia* can mean, until, on consideration, they discover a likely interpretation for the *crhsmo, n* that seems to meet the wish of the God who *evmanteu, sato*.⁴³

How little anything can be derived from the separate use of *lo, gion* to throw doubt on its equivalence with *crhsmo, j* as thus exhibited, may be observed from the following instances of its usage, gathered together somewhat at random: ⁴⁴

Herodotus, i. 64: "He purified the island of Delos, according to the injunctions of an oracle (*evk tw/ n logi, wn*)"; i. 120: "We have found even oracles sometimes fulfilled in unimportant ways (*tw/ n logi, wn e; nia*)"; iv. 178: "Here in this lake is an island called Phla, which it is said the Lacedæmonians were to have

colonized according to an oracle (th.n nh/son Lakedaimoni,ois, fasi lo,gion ei;nai kti,sai)"; viii. 60: "Where an oracle has said that we are to overcome our enemies (kai. lo,gio,n evsti tw/n evcqro/n katu,perqe)"; viii. 62: "which the prophecies declare we are to colonize (ta. lo,gia le,gei)." Aristophanes, "Vesp.," 799: o[ra to. crh/ma ta. lo,gi v w`j perai,netai; "Knights," 1050, tauti. telei/sqai ta. lo,gi v h;dh moi dokei/. Polybius, viii. 30, 6: "For the eastern quarter of Tarentum is full of monuments, because those who die there are to this day all buried within the walls, in obedience to an ancient oracle (kata, ti lo,gion avrcai/on)." Diodorus Siculus ap. Geog. Sync., p. 194 D ("Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae," i. 366), "Fabius says an oracle came to Æneas (Aivnei,a| gene,sqai lo,gion), that a quadruped should direct him to the founding of a city." Ælian, "Var. Hist.," ii. 41: "Moreover Mycerinus the Egyptian, when there was brought to him the prophecy from Budo (to. evk bou,thj mantei/on), predicting a short life, and he wished to escape the oracle (to. lo,gion) . . . " Arrian, "Exped. Alex.," ii. 3, 14 (Ellendt., 1. 151): w`j tou/ logi,ou tou/ evpi. th|/ lu,sei tou/ desmou/ xumbekhko,toj; vii. 16, 7 (Ellendt., ii. 419), "But when Alexander had crossed the river Tigris with his army, pushing on to Babylon, the wise men of the Chaldeans (Caldai,wn oi` lo,gioi) met him and separating him from his companions asked him to check the march to Babylon. For they had an oracle from their God Belus (lo,gion evk tou/ qeou/ tou/ bh,lou) that entrance into Babylon at that time would not be for his good. But he

answered them with a verse (ε;poj) of the poet Euripides, which runs thus: 'The best man is he whose conclusion is good.'" Plutarch, "Non posse suaviter vivi," etc., 24 (1103 F.): "What of that? (quoth Zeuxippus). Shall the present discourse be left imperfect and unfinished because of it? and feare we to alledge the oracle of the gods (το. λογιον προ. j vEpi,kouron λε,γοντεj) when we dispute against the Epicureans? No (quoth I againe) in any wise, for according to the sentence of Empedocles, 'A good tale twice a man may tell, and heare it told as oft full well';" "Life of Theseus," §26 (p. 12 C, Didot, p. 14), "He applied to himself a certain oracle of Apollo's (λογιον τι puqo,crhston)" §27 (p. 12 E, Didot, p. 14): "At length Theseus, having sacrificed to Fear, according to the oracle (kata, τι λογιον)"; "Life of Fabius," §4 (Didot, p. 210), vEkinh,qhsan de. to,te pollai. kai. tw/n avporvr`h,twn kai. crhsi,mwn avtoi/j bi,blwn(a]j Sibullei,ouj kalou/si\ kai. λε,getai sundramei/n ε;nia tw/n avpokeime,nwn evn avtai/j logi,wn προ. j ta. j tu,caj kai. ta. j pra,xeij evkei,naj. Pausanias, "Attica" [I. 44, 9] (taken unverified from Wetstein): qu,santoj Aivakou/ kata. dh, τι λογιον tw| Panellhni,w| Dii`,. Polyaeus, p. 37 (Wetstein) [I, 18]: ο` qeo. j ε;crhse - oi` pole,mioi το. λογιον ει]δο,τεj - tou/ logi,ou peplhrwme,nou; p. 347 [IV, 3, 27], h-n de. λογιον vApo,llwnoj. Aristeas, p. 119 (Wetsteln): ευcaristw/ me.n(a;ndrej(u`mi/n(tw| de. avpostei,lanti ma/llo\n me,giston de. tw| qew|/(ou[tino,j evsti ta. logia tau/ta.

A survey of this somewhat miscellaneous collection of passages will

certainly only strengthen the impression we derived from those in which *logion* and *chrismoj* occur together - that in *logion* we have a term expressive, in common usage at least, of the simple notion of a divine revelation, an oracle, and that independently of any accompanying implication of length or brevity, poetical or prose form, directness or indirectness of delivery. This is the meaning of *logion* in the mass of profane Greek literature. As we have already suggested, the matter of the derivation of the word is of no great importance to our inquiry:⁴⁵ but we may be permitted to add that the usage seems distinctly favorable to the view that it is to be regarded rather as, in origin, the neuter of *logioj* used substantively, than the diminutive of *logoj*. No implication of brevity seems to attach to the word in usage; and its exclusive application to "oracles" may perhaps be most easily explained on the supposition that it connotes fundamentally "a wise saying," and implies at all times something above the ordinary run of "words."⁴⁶

II. It was with this fixed significance, therefore, that the word presented itself to the Jews of the later centuries before Christ, when the changed conditions were forcing them to give a clothing in Greek speech to their conceptions, derived from the revelation of the old covenant; and thus to prepare the way for the language of the new covenant. The oldest monument of Hellenistic Greek - the Septuagint Version of the Sacred Books, made probably in the century that stretched between 250 and 150 B.C. - is, however, peculiarly ill-adapted to witness to the Hellenistic usage of this word. As lay in the nature of the case, and, as we shall see later, was the actual fact, to these Jewish writers there were no "oracles" except what stood written in these sacred books themselves, and all that stood written in them were "oracles of God." In a translation of the books themselves, naturally this, the most significant Hellenistic application of the word "oracles," could find little place. And though the term might be

employed within the sacred books to translate such a phrase as, say, "the word of God," in one form or another not infrequently met with in their pages, the way even here was clogged by the fact that the Hebrew words used in these phrases only imperfectly corresponded to the Greek word *logion*, and were not very naturally represented by it. Though the ordinary Hebrew verb for "saying" - *rm;a'* ⁴⁷ - to which etymologically certain high implications might be thought to be natural, had substantival derivatives, yet these were fairly effectually set aside by a term of lower origin - *rb'D'* ⁴⁸ - which absorbed very much the whole field of the conception "word."⁴⁹ The derivatives of *rm;a'* - *rm,ao*, *hr'm.ai*, *hr'm.a.*, *rm'a}m;* - in accordance with their etymological impress of loftiness or authority, are relegated to poetic speech (except *rm'a}m;*, which occurs only in Esther i. 15, ii. 20, ix. 32, and has the sense of *commandment*) and are used comparatively seldom.⁵⁰ Nevertheless, it was to one of these that the Septuagint translators fitted the word *logion*. To *rb'D'* they naturally consecrated the general terms *lo,goj(r`h/ma(pra/gma*: while they adjusted *logion* as well as might be to *hr'm.ai*, and left to one side meanwhile its classical synonyms⁵¹ - except *mantei,a* and its cognates, which they assigned, chiefly, of course, in a bad sense, to the Hebrew *mmq* in the sense of "divination."

hr'm.ai is, to be sure, in no sense an exact synonym of *logion*. It is simply a poetical word of high implications, prevailing, though not exclusively, used of the "utterances" of God, and apparently felt by the Septuagint translators to bear in its bosom a special hint of the authoritativeness or awesomeness of the "word" it designates. It is used only some thirty-six times in the entire Old Testament (of which no less than nineteen are in Ps. cxix.), and designates the solemn words of men (Gen. iv. 23, cf. Isa. xxix. 4 *bis.*, xxviii. 23, xxxii. 9; Ps. xvii. 6; Deut. xxxii.

2) as well as, more prevailing, those of God. In adjusting lo,gion to it the instances of its application to human words are, of course, passed by and translated either by lo,goj (Gen. iv. 23; Isa. xxix. 4 *bis.*; Isa. xxviii. 23, xxxii. 9), or r`h/ma (Deut. xxxii. 2; Ps. xvii. 6). In a few other instances, although the term is applied to "words of God," it is translated by Greek words other than lo,gion (II Sam. xxii. 31, LXX. r`h/ma, and its close parallel, Prov. xxx. 5, LXX. lo,goi, though in the other parallels, Ps. xii. 7, xviii. 31, the LXX. has lo,gia; Ps. cxix. [41]⁵², 154, where the LXX. has lo,goj; in Ps. cxxxviii. 2, the LXX. reads to. a[gio,n sou, on which Bæthgen remarks, *in loc.*, that "a[gio,n seems to be a corruption for lo,gion," which is read here by Aquila and the Quinta). In the remaining instances of its occurrences, however - and that is in the large majority of its occurrences - the word is uniformly rendered by lo,gion (Deut. xxxiii. 9; Ps. xii. 7 *bis.*, xviii. 31, cv. 19, cxix. 11, 38 [41],⁵² 50, 58, 67, 76, 82, 103, 116, 123, 133, 140, 148, 158, 162, 170, 172, cxlvii. 15; Isa. v. 24). If there is a fringe of usage of hr'm.ai thus standing outside of the use made of lo,gion, there is, on the other side, a corresponding stretching of the use made of lo,gion beyond the range of hr'm.ai - to cover a few passages judged by the translators of similar import. Thus it translates Im,aO in Num. xxiv. 4, 16; Ps. xviii. 15 [xix. 15], cvi. [cvii.] 11, and 7=rb'D' in Ps. cxviii. [cxix.] 25, 65, 107, 169, [cxlvii. 8]; Isa. xxviii. 13; and it represents in a few passages Xoyov, a variation from the Hebrew, viz., Ps. cxviii. [cxix.]; Isa. xxx. 11, 27 *bis.* In twenty-five instances of its thirty-nine occurrences, however, it is the rendering of hr'm.ai.⁵³ It is also used twice in the Greek apocrypha (Wis. xvi. 11; Sir. xxxvi. 19 [16]), in quite the same sense. In all the forty-one instances of its usage, it is needless to say, it is employed in its native and only current sense, of "oracle," a sacred utterance of the Divine Being, the only apparent exception to this uniformity of usage (Ps. xviii. 15 [xix. 15]) being really no exception, but,

in truth, significant of the attitude of the translators to the text they were translating - as we shall see presently.

What led the LXX. translators to fix upon *hr'm.ai* as the nearest Hebrew equivalent to *lo,gion*,⁵⁴ we have scanty material for judging. Certainly, in Psalm cxix, where the word most frequently occurs, it is difficult to erect a distinction between its implications and those of *rb'D'* with which it seems to be freely interchanged, but which the LXX. translators keep reasonably distinct from it by rendering it prevailingly by *lo,goj*,⁵⁵ while equally prevailingly reserving *lo,gion* for *hr'm.ai*.⁵⁶ Perhaps the reader may faintly feel even in this Psalm, that *hr'm.ai* was to the writer the more sacred and solemn word, and was used, in his rhetorical variation of his terms, especially whenever the sense of the awesomeness of God's words or the unity of the whole revelation of God⁵⁷ more prominently occupied his mind; and this impression is slightly increased, perhaps, in the case of the interchange of *lo,gion* and *lo,goj* in the Greek translation. When we look beyond this Psalm we certainly feel that something more requires to be said of *hr'm.ai* than merely that it is poetic.⁵⁸ It is very seldom applied to human words and then only to the most solemn forms of human speech - Gen. xxiv. 23 (LXX., *lo,goi*); Deut. xxxii. 2 (LXX., *r`h/ma*); Ps. xxvii. (LXX., *r`h/ma*) ; cf. Isa. xxix. 4 *bis* (LXX., *lo,goi*) where the speaker is Jerusalem whose speech is compared to the murmuring of familiar spirits or of the dead,⁵⁹ and Isa. xxviii. 23, xxxii. 9, where the prophet's word is in question. It appears to suggest itself naturally when God's word is to receive its highest praises (II Sam. xxii. 31; Ps. xii. 7, xviii. 31; Prov. xxx. 5; Ps. cxxxviii. 2), or when the word of Jehovah is conceived as power or adduced in a peculiarly solemn way (Ps. cxlvii. 18⁶⁰; Isa. v. 24). Perhaps the most significant passage is that in Psalm cv. 19, where the writer would appear to contrast man's word with

God's word, using for the former **rb'D'** (LXX., lo,goj) and for the latter **hr'm.ai** (LXX., lo,gion): Joseph was tried by the word of the Lord until his own words came to pass.⁶¹ Whatever implications of superior solemnity attached to the Hebrew word **hr'm.ai**, however, were not only preserved, but emphasized by the employment of the Greek term lo,gion to translate it - a term which was inapplicable, in the nature of the case, to human words, and designated whatever it was applied to as the utterance of God. We may see its lofty implications in the application given to it outside the usage of **hr'm.ai** - in Num. xxiv. 4, for example, where the very solemn description of Balaam's deliverances - "oracle of the hearer of the words of God" (**la-yrem.ai**) - is rendered most naturally **fhsi.n avkou,wn lo,gia ivscrou/**. Here, one would say, we have the very essence of the word, as developed in its classical usage, applied to Biblical conceptions: and it is essentially this conception of the "unspeakable oracles of God" (Sir., xxxvi. 19, [16]) that is conveyed by the word in every instance of its occurrence.

An exception has been sometimes found, to be sure, in Ps. xviii. 15 (xix. 14), inasmuch as in this passage we have the words of the Psalmist designated as **ta. lo,gia**: "And the words (**ta. lo,gia**) of my mouth and the meditation of my heart shall be continually before thee for approval, O Lord, my help and my redeemer." In this passage, however - and in Isa. xxxii. 9 as rendered by Aquila, which is similar - we would seem to have not so much an exception to the usage of **ta. lo,gia** as otherwise known, as an extension of it. The translators have by no means used it here of the words of a human speaker, but of words deemed by them to be the words of God, and called **ta. lo,gia** just because considered the "tried words of God." This has always been perceived by the more careful expositors. Thus Philippi⁶² writes:

"Psalm xix. 14 supplies only an apparent exception, since ta. lo,gia tou/ sto,matoj mou there, as spoken through the Holy Spirit, may be regarded as at the same time, lo,gia qeou/."

And Morrison:[63](#)

"In Psalm xix. 15 (14) the term thus occurs: 'let the words of my mouth (ta. lo,gia tou/ sto,mato,j mou = $\text{y}\pi\iota\text{-yrem.ai}$, from $\text{r}\mu,\text{ae}$), and the meditation of my heart, be acceptable in thy sight, O Lord, my strength and my Redeemer.' But even here the term may be fitly regarded as having its otherwise invariable reference. The Septuagint translator looked upon the sacred writer as giving utterance in his Psalm - the words of his mouth - to diviner thoughts than his own, to the thoughts of God Himself. He regarded him as 'moved' in what he said, 'by the Holy Ghost.'" [64](#)

In a word, we have here an early instance of what proves to be the standing application of ta. lo,gia on Hellenistic lips - its application to the Scripture word as such, as the special word of God that had come to them. The only ground of surprise that can emerge with reference to its use here, therefore, is that in this instance it occurs within the limits of the Scriptures themselves: and this is only significant of the customary employment of the term in this application - for, we may well argue, it was only in sequence to such a customary employment of it that this usage could intrude itself thus, unobserved as it were, into the Biblical text itself.

It is scarcely necessary to do more than incidentally advert to the

occasional occurrence of lo,gion = logei/on in the Septuagint narrative, as the rendering of the Hebrew !V,X, that is, to designate the breastplate of the high priest, which he wore when he consulted Jehovah.⁶⁵ Bleek writes, to be sure, as follows:⁶⁶

"How fully the notion of an utterance of God attended the word according to the usage of the Alexandrians too is shown by the circumstance that the LXX. employed it for the oracular breastplate of the High Priest (!V,X), Ex. xxviii. 15, 22 *seq.*, xxix. 5, xxxix. 8 *seq.*; Lev. viii. 8; Sir. xlv. 12, for which logei/on, although found in Codd. Vat. and Alex., is apparently a later reading; lo,gion, to which the Latin translation *rationale* goes back, has also Josephus, "Ant.," iii. 7, 5, for it: evssh,nhj (!VX) me.n kalei/tai(shmai,nei de. tou/to kata. th.n `Ellh,nwn glw/ttan lo,gion; c. 8, 9: o[qen [Ellhnej . . . to.n ejssh,nhn lo,gion kalou/sin; viii. 3, 8. And similarly apparently Philo, as may be inferred from his expositions, in that he brings it into connection with lo,goj, *reason*, although with him too the reading varies between the two forms: see "Legg. Allegor.," iii. 40, p. 83, A. B.; §43, p. 84, C. "Vit. Mos.," iii. 11, p. 670 C.; §12, p. 672 B.; §13, p. 673 A. "De Monarch.," ii. 5, p. 824 A."

It is much more probable, however, that we have here an itacistic confusion by the copyists, than an application by the Septuagint translators of lo,gion to a new meaning. This confusion may have had its influence on the readers of the LXX., and may have affected in some degree their usage of the word: but it can have no significance for the study of the use of the word by the LXX. itself.

III. Among the readers of the Septuagint it is naturally to Philo that we will turn with the highest expectations of light on the Hellenistic usage of the word: and we have already seen Bleek pointing out the influence upon him of the LXX. use of *logion* = *logoi/on*. Whatever minor influence of this kind the usage of the Septuagint may have had on him, however, Philo's own general employment of the word carries on distinctly that of the profane authors. In him, too, the two words *crhsmoj* and *logion* appear as exact synonyms, interchanging repeatedly with each other, to express what is in the highest sense the word of God, an oracle from heaven. The only real distinction between his usage of these words and that of profane authors arises from the fact that to Philo nothing is an oracle from heaven, a direct word of God, except what he found within the sacred books of Israel.⁶⁷ And the only confusing element in his usage springs from the fact that the whole contents of the Jewish sacred books are to him "oracles," the word of God; so that he has no nomenclature by which the oracles recorded in the Scriptures may be distinguished from the oracles which the Scriptures as such are. He has no higher words than *logion* and *crhsmoj* by which to designate the words of God which are recorded in the course of the Biblical narrative: he can use no lower words than these to designate the several passages of Scripture he adduces, each one of which is to him a direct word of God. Both of these uses of the words may be illustrated from his writings almost without limit. A few instances will suffice.

In the following, the "oracle" is a "word of God" recorded in the Scriptures:⁶⁸

"For he inquires whether the man is still coming hither, and the sacred oracle answers (*avpokri,netai to. logion*), 'He is hidden among the stuff' (I Sam. x. 22)" ("De

Migrat. Abrah.," §36, pp. 418 E). "For after the wise man heard the oracle which being divinely given said (qespisque,ntoj logi,ou toiou,tou) 'Thy reward is exceeding great' (Gen. xv. 1), he inquired, saying. . . . And yet who would not have been amazed at the dignity and greatness of him who delivered this oracle (tou/crhwsmw|/ dou,ntoj)?" ("Quis rer. div. her.," §1, pp. 481 D). "And he (God) mentions the ministrations and services by which Abraham displayed his love to his master in the last sentence of the divine oracle given to his son (avkroteleu,tion logi,ou tou/ crhsqe,ntoj autou/ tw|/ ui`ei/) ("Quis rer. div. her.," §2, pp. 482 E). "To him (Abraham), then, being conscious of such a disposition, an oracular command suddenly comes (qespi,zetai lo,gion), which was never expected (Gen. xxii. 1) . . . and without mentioning the oracular command (to. lo,gion) to anyone . . ." ("De Abrah.," §32, P., p. 373 E). "[Moses] had appointed his brother high-priest in accordance with the will of God that had been declared unto him (kata. ta. crhsqe,nta lo,gia") ("De Vita Moysis," iii. 21, P., p. 569 D). "Moses . . . being perplexed . . . besought God to decide the question and to announce his decision to him by an oracular command (crhwsmw|/). And God listened to his entreaty and gave him an oracle (lo,gion qespi,zei). . . . We must proceed to relate the oracular commands (lo,gia crhsqe,nta). He says . . . (Num. ix. 10)" ("De Vita Moysis," iii. 30, P., p. 687 D). "And Balaam replied, All that I have hitherto uttered have been oracles and words of God (lo,gia kai. crhsmoi,), but what I am going to say are merely the

suggestions of my own mind. . . . Why do you give counsel suggesting things contrary to the oracles of God (toi/j crhsmoi/j) unless indeed that your counsels are more powerful than his decrees (logi,wn)?" ("De Vita Moysis," i. 53, P., p. 647 D). "Was it not on this account that when Cain fancied he had offered up a blameless sacrifice an oracle (lo,gion) came to him? . . . And the oracle is as follows (to. de. lo,gio,n evsti toio,nde) (Gen. iv. 7)" ("De Agricult.," §29, M. i. 319). "And a proof of this may be found in the oracular answer given by God (to. qespisqe.n lo,gion) to the person who asked what name he had: 'I am that I am'" ("De Somniis," i. §40, M. 1, 655). "But when he became improved and was about to have his name changed, he then became a man born of God (a;nqrwpoj qeou/) according to the oracle that was delivered to him (kata. to. crhsqe.n auvtw/ lo,gion), 'I am thy God'" ("De Gigant.," §14, M. 1, 271). "For which reason, a sacred injunction to the following purport (dio. kai. lo,gion evcrh,sqh tw/ sofww/ toio,nde) 'Go thou up to the Lord, thou and Aaron,' etc. (Gen. xxiv. i.). And the meaning of this injunction is as follows: 'Go thou up, O soul'" ("De Migrat. Abrah.," §31, M. 1, 462). "For which account an oracle of the all-merciful God has been given (lo,gion tou/ i[llew qeou/ mesto.n h`mero,tthoj) full of gentleness, which shadows forth good hopes to those who love instruction in these times, 'I will never leave thee nor forsake thee' (Jos. i. 5)" ("De Confus. Ling.," §32, M. i. 430). "Do you not recollect the case of the soothsayer Balaam? He is represented as hearing the oracles of God (lo,gia qeou/)

and as having received knowledge from the Most High, but what advantage did he reap from such hearing, and what good accrued to him from such knowledge?" ("De Mutat. Nominum," §37). "There are then a countless number of things well worthy of being displayed and demonstrated; and among them one which was mentioned a little while ago; for the oracle (to. lo,gion) calls the person who was really his grandfather, the father of the practiser of virtue, and to him who was really his father it has not given any such title; for it says, 'I am the Lord God of Abraham, thy Father' (Gen. xxviii. 13), and in reality he was his grandfather, and, again, 'the God of Isaac,' not adding this time, 'thy Father' ('De Somniis,' i. §27)." "And there is something closely resembling this in the passage of Scripture (*lit.* the oracle: to. crhsqe.n lo,gion) concerning the High Priest (Lev. xvi. 17)" ("De Somniis," ii. §34).

On the other hand, in the following instances, the reference is distinctly to Scripture as such:

"And the following oracle given with respect to Enoch (to. crhsqe.n evpi. vEnw.c lo,gion) proves this: 'Enoch pleased God and he was not found' (Gen. v. 24)" ("De Mutat. Nom.," §4).

It is a portion of the narrative Scriptures which is thus adduced.

"But let us stick to the subject before us and follow the Scripture (avkolouqh,santej tw| logi,w|) and say that there is such a thing as wisdom existing, and that he

who loves wisdom is wise" (*do*).

Here *to. lo,gion* is either Scripture in general, or, perhaps more probably, the passage previously under discussion and still in mind (Gen. v. 24).

"*Marturei/ de, mou lo,gion to. crhsqe.n evpi. tou/ vAbraa,m to,de*, 'He came into the place of which the Lord God had told him; and having looked up with his eyes, he saw the place afar off (Gen. xxii. 9)'" ("De Somniis," i. 11).

This narrative passage of Scripture is here cited as *lo,gion to. crhsqe,n*.

"This is a boast of a great and magnanimous soul, to rise above all creation, and to overleap its boundaries and to cling to the great uncreated God above, according to his sacred commands (*kata. ta.j i[eraj u`yhgh,seij*) in which we are expressly enjoined 'to cleave unto him' (Deut. xxx. 20). Therefore he in requital bestows himself as their inheritance upon those who do cleave unto him and who serve him without intermission; and the sacred Scripture (*lo,gion*) bears its testimony in behalf of these, when it says, 'The Lord himself is his inheritance' (Deut. x. 9)" ("De Congressu erud. grat.," §24, p. 443).

Here the anarthrous *lo,gion* is probably to be understood of "a passage of Scripture" - viz., that about to be cited.

"Moreover she (Consideration) confirmed this opinion of hers by the sacred scriptures (*crhsmoi/j*), one of which ran in this form (*evni. me.n toiw|/de* - without

verb) (Deut. iv. 4). . . . She also confirmed her statement by another passage in Scripture of the following purport (e`te,rw| toiw/|de crhsmw|/) (Deut. xxx. 15) . . . and in another passage we read (kai. evn e`te,roj) (Deut. xxx. 20). And again this is what the Lord himself hath said . . . (Lev. x. 3) . . . as it is also said in the Psalms (Ps. cxiii. 25) . . . but Cain, that shameless man, that parricide, is nowhere spoken of in the Law (ouvdamou/ th/j nomoqesi,aj) as dying: but there is an oracle delivered respecting him in such words as these (avlla. kai. lo,gion e;stin evp v auvtw|/ crhsqe.n toiou/ton): 'The Lord God put a mark upon Cain' (Gen. iv. 15)" ("De Profug.," §11, M. i. 555).

Here it is questionable whether "the Law" (h` nomoqesi,a) is not broad enough to include all the passages mentioned - from Genesis, Leviticus and the Psalms - as it is elsewhere made to include Joshua ("De Migrat. Abrah.," §32, M. i, 464. See Ryle: p. xix). At all events, whatever is in this nomoqesi,a is a crhsqe.n lo,gion: the passage more particularly adduced being a narrative one.

"After the person who loves virtue seeks a goat by reason of his sins, but does not find one; for already as the sacred Scripture tells us (w`j dhloi/ to. lo,gion), 'It hath been burnt' (Lev. x. 16) . . . Accordingly the Scripture says (fhsi.n ou=n o` crhsmo,j) that Moses 'sought and sought again,' a reason for repentance for his sins in mortal life . . . on which account it is said in the Scripture (dio. le,getai) (Lev. xvi. 20) De Profug.," §28, M. i. 569).

Here *to. lo,gion* seems to mean not so much a passage in Scripture as "Scripture" in the abstract: Lev. x. 16 not being previously quoted in this context. The same may be said of the reference of *o` crhsmo,j* in the next clause and of the simple *le,getai* lower down - the interest of the passage turning on the entire equivalence of the three modes of adducing Scripture.

"This then is the beginning and preface of the prophecies of Moses under the influence of inspiration (*th/j kat v evnqousiasmo.n profhtei,aj Mwus?se,wj*). After this he prophesied (*qespi,zei*) . . . about food . . . being full of inspiration (*ejpiqeia,saj*). . . . Some thinking, perhaps, that what was said to them was not an oracle (*ouv crhsmou,j*). . . . But the father established the oracle by his prophet (*to. lo,gion tou/ profh,tou*). . . . He gave a second instance of his prophetic inspiration in the oracle (*lo,gion, anarthrou*) which he delivered about the seventh day" ("De Vit. Moysis," iii. 35 and 36).

"And the holy oracle that has been given (*to. crhsqe.n lo,gion* = 'the delivered oracle'; Ryle, 'the utterance of the oracle') will bear witness, which expressly says that he cried out loudly and betrayed clearly by his cries what he had suffered from the concrete evil, that is from the body" ("Quod det. pot. insid.," § 14, M. L., 200).

Here the narrative in Gen. iv, somewhat broadly taken, including vers. 8 and 10, is called *to. crhsqe.n lo,gion*.

"There is also something like this in the sacred

scriptures where the account of the creation of the universe is given and it is expressed more distinctly (to. paraph, sion kai. evn toi/j peri. th/j tou/ panto.j gene,sewj crhsqei/si logi, oij perie, cetai shmeiwde, steron). For it is said to the wicked man, 'O thou man, that hast sinned; cease to sin' (Gen. iv. 7)" ("De Sobriet.," §10, D7. 1, 400).

Here there is a formal citation of a portion of Scripture, viz., the portion "concerning the creation of the universe," which means, probably, the Book of Genesis (see Ryle's "Philo and Holy Scripture," p. xx) ; and this is cited as made up of "declared oracles," evn toi/j crhsqei/si logi, oij. The Book of Genesis is thus to Philo a body of crhsqe, nta lo, gia.

"And this is the meaning of the oracle recorded in Deuteronomy (par v o] kai. lo, gion e; sti toiou/ ton avnagegramme, non evn Deuteronomi, w|), 'Behold I have put before thy face life and death, good and evil'" ("Quod Deus Immut.," §10, M. i. 280).

Here the "oracle" is a "written" thing; and it is written in a well-known book of oracles, viz., in "Deuteronomy," the second book of the Law. This book, and of course the others like it, consists of written oracles.

"And the words of scripture show this, in which (dhloi/ de. to. lo, gion evn w-|) it is distinctly stated that 'they both of them went together, and came to the plain which God had mentioned to them (Gen. xxii. 3)" ("De Migrat. Abrah." §30, M. i. 462).

"And for this reason the following scripture has been

given to men (dio. lo,gion evcrh,sqh toio,nde), 'Return to the land of thy father and to thy family, and I will be with thee' (Gen. xxxi. 3)" "(De Migrat. Abrah.," §6, M. i. 440).

Here, though the words are spoken in the person of God, the generalized use of them seems to point to their Scriptural expression as the main point.

"Moses chose to deliver each of the ten commandments (e;kaston qespi,zein tw/n de,ka logi,wn) in such a form as if they were addressed not to many persons but to one" ("De Decem Oracul.," peri. tw/n De,ka Logi,wn, §10).

"And the sacred scripture (lo,gion, anarthrous) bears its testimony in behalf of this assertion, when it says: 'The Lord himself is his inheritance' (Deut. x. 9)" ("De Congr. Erud. Grat.," §24, M. i. 538).

"For there is a passage in the word of God (lo,gion ga.r e;stin) that . . . (Lev. xxvi. 3)" ("De praem. et poen.," §17, M. ii. 424).

Both classes of passages thus exist in Philo's text in the greatest abundance - no more those which speak of words of God recorded in Scripture as lo,gia than those which speak of the words of Scripture as such as equally lo,gia. Nor are we left to accord the two classes of passages for ourselves. Philo himself, in what we may call an even overstrained attempt at systematization, elaborately explains how he distinguishes the several kinds of matter which confront him in Scripture. The fullest statement is probably that in the "De Vita Moysis," iii, 23 (Mangey, ii,

163). Here he somewhat artificially separates three classes of "oracles," all having equal right to the name. It is worth while to transcribe enough of the passage to set its essential contents clearly before us. He is naturally in this place speaking directly of Moses - as indeed commonly in his tracts, which are confined, generally speaking, to an exposition of the Pentateuch: but his words will apply also to the rest of the "sacred books," which he uniformly treats as the oracles of God alike with the Pentateuch.⁶⁹ He writes:

"Having shown that Moses was a most excellent king and lawgiver and high priest, I come in the last place to show that he was also the most illustrious of the prophets (profhtw/n). I am not unaware, then, that all the things that are written in the sacred books are oracles delivered by him (w`j pa,nta eivsi. crhsmoi. o;sa evn tai/j i`erai/j bi,bloij avnage,graptai crhsqe,ntej di v auvtou/): and I will set forth what more particularly concerns him, when I have first mentioned this one point, namely, that of the sacred oracles (tw/n logi,wn) some are represented as delivered in the person of God by His interpreter, the divine prophet (evk prosw,pou tou/ qeou/ di v e`rmhne,wj tou/ qei,ou profh,tou), while others are put in the form of question and answer (evk peu,sewj kai. avpokri,sewj evqespi,sqh), and others are delivered by Moses in his own character, as a divinely prompted lawgiver possessed by divine inspiration (evk prosw,pou Mwus,ewj evpiqeia,santoj kai. evx auvtou/ katasceqe,ntoj).

"Therefore all the earliest [Gr. prw/ta = the first of the

three classes enumerated] oracles are manifestations of the whole of the divine virtues and especially of that merciful and boundless character by means of which He trains all men to virtue, and especially the race which is devoted to His service, to which He lays open the road leading to happiness. The second class have a sort of mixture and communication (mi,xin kai. koinwni,an) in them, the prophet asking information on the subjects as to which he is in difficulty and God answering him and instructing him. The third sort are attributed to the lawgiver, God having given him a share in His prescient power by means of which he is enabled to foretell the future.

"Therefore we must for the present pass by the first; for they are too great to be adequately praised by any man, as indeed they could scarcely be panegyricized worthily by the heaven itself and the nature of the universe; and they are also uttered by the mouth, as it were, of an interpreter (kai. a;llwj le,getai w`sanei. di v evrmhse,wj). But (de.) interpretation and prophecy differ from one another. And concerning the second kind I will at once endeavor to explain the truth, connecting with them the third species also, in which the inspired character (evnqousiw/dej) of the speaker is shown, according to which he is most especially and appropriately looked upon as a prophet."[70](#)

A somewhat different distribution of material - now from the point of view, not of mode of oracular delivery, but of nature of contents - is given

at the opening of the tract "De praem. et poen." (§1, init.):

"We find then that in the sacred oracles delivered by the prophet Moses (tw/n dia. tou/ profh,tou Mwu?se,wj logi,wn) there are three separate characters: for a portion of them relates to the creation of the world, a portion is historical, and the third portion is legislative."

Accordingly in the tract "DeLegat. ad Caium," §31 (Mangey, ii. 577), we are told of the high esteem the Jews put on their laws:

"For looking upon their laws as oracles directly given to them by God Himself (qeo,crhsta ga.r lo,gia tou.j no,mouj ei;nai u1polamba,nontej) and having been instructed in this doctrine from their earliest infancy, they bear in their souls the images of the commandments contained in these laws as sacred."

By the side of this passage should be placed doubtless another from the "De Vita Contemplativa," §3, since it appears that we may still look on this tract as Philo's:

"And in every house there is a sacred shrine . . . Studying in that place the laws and sacred oracles of God enunciated by the holy prophets (no,mouj kai. lo,gia despisqe,nta dia. profhtw/n) and hymns and psalms and all kinds of other things by reason of which knowledge and piety are increased and brought to perfection."

It is not strange that out of such a view of Scripture Philo should adduce every part of it alike as a lo,gion. Sometimes, to be sure, his

discrimination of its contents into classes shows itself in the formulæ of citation; and we should guard ourselves from being misled by this. Thus, for example, he occasionally quotes a *logion* "from the mouth (or 'person') of God" - which does not mean that Scriptures other than these portions thus directly ascribed to God as speaking, are less oracular than these, but only that these are oracles of his first class - those that "are represented as delivered from the person of God (*evk prosw,pou tou/ qeou/*) by his interpreter, the divine prophet." A single instance or two will suffice for examples:

"And the sacred oracle which is delivered as" [~~dele "as"~~]
"from the mouth" [or "person"] "of the ruler of the
universe (*logion evk prosw,pou qespisqe.n tou/ tw/n o[lwn
h`gemo,noj*) speaks of the proper name of God as never
having been revealed to anyone⁷¹ when God is
represented as saying, 'For I have not shown them my
name' (Gen. vi. 3)" ("De Mutat. Nom.," §2). "And the
oracles" (*oi` crhsmoi*, which is a standing term for 'the
Scriptures' in Philo) "bear testimony, in which it is said
to Abraham *evk prosw,pou tou/ qeou/* (Gen. xvii. 1)"
(*ditto*, §5). "And he (Jeremiah the prophet) like a man
very much under the influence of inspiration (*a;te ta.
polla. evnqonsiw/n*) uttered an oracle in the character of
God (*crhsmo,n tina evxei/pen evk prosw,pou tou/ qeou/*)
speaking in this manner to most peaceful virtue: 'Hast
thou not called me as thy house' etc. (Jer. iii. 4)" ("De
Cherub.," §14, AT. i. 148).

The other oracles, delivered not *evk prosw,pou tou/ qeou/* but in dialogue or in the person of the prophet, are, however, no less oracular or

authoritative. To Philo all that is in Scripture is oracular, every passage is a *logion*, of whatever character or length; and the whole, as constituted of these oracles, is *ta. logia*, or perhaps even *to. logion* - the mass of *logia* or one continuous *logion*.

It is not said, be it observed, that Philo's sole mode of designating Scripture, or even his most customary mode, is as *ta. logia*. As has already been stated, he used *crhsmoj* equally freely with *logion* for passages of Scripture, and *oi` crhsmoi*, apparently even more frequently than *ta. logia* for the body of Scripture. Instances of the use of the two terms interchangeably in the same passage have already been incidentally given.⁷² A very few passages will suffice to illustrate his constant use of *crhsmoj* and *oi` crhsmoi*, separately.

In the following instances he adduces passages of Scripture, each as a *crhsmoj*:

On this account also the oracle (*o` crhsmoj*) which bears testimony against the pretended simplicity of Cain says, 'You do not think as you say' (Gen. iv. 15)" ("Quod det. potiori insid.," §45, M. i. 223). "And of the supreme authority of the living God, the sacred scripture is a true witness (*o` crhsmoj avlhqh.j ma,rtuj*) which speaks thus (Lev. xxv. 23)" ("De Cherub.," §31, A7. i. 158). "For a man will come forth, says the word of God (*fhsi.n o` crhsmoj*) leading a host and warring furiously, etc. (Num. xxiv. 7)" ("De Praem. et Poem," §16, M. ii. 423). "And the sacred scripture bears witness to this fact (*marturei/ de. o` peri. tou,twn crhsmoj*): for it says (Num. Xxlil. 19)" ("De Migrat. Abrah.," §20, M. i. 454). "For though there was a sacred scripture (*crhsmou/ ga.r o[ntoj*) that 'There should be no harlot among the daughters of the seer, Israel' (Deut. xxiii. 17)" ("De Migrat. Abrah.," §39, M. i. 472). "And witness is borne to this assertion by the scripture (*ma,rtuj de. kai. crhsmoj*) in which it is said: 'I will cause to

live,' etc. (Deut. xxxii. 39)" ("De Somniis," ii. 44, M. i. 698). "The oracle (o` crhsmo,j) given to the all-wise Moses, in which these words are contained" ("Quod det. pot. insid.," §34, M. i. 215). "Which also the oracle (o` crhsmo,j) said to Cain" (*do.*, §21). "And I know that this illustrious oracle was formerly delivered from the mouth of the prophet (sto,mati d v oi=da, pote profhtikw|/ qespisqe,nta dia,puron toio,nde crhsmo,n), 'Thy fruit,' etc., (Hos. xiv. 9)" ("De Mutat. Nom.," §24, M. ii. 599). In this last case it is to be noticed that the "oracle" is taken from Hosea: the corresponding passage in "De Plant. Noe.," §33, NI. 1, 350, should be compared: "And with this assertion, this oracle delivered by one of the prophets is consistent, etc. (Hos. xiv. 9) (tou,tw| kai. para, tini tw/n profhtw/n crhsqe.n funa|,dei to,de)."

Two other passages may be adduced for their inherent interest. The first from "De Profug.," §32 (M. i. 573), where we read:

"There are passages written in the sacred scriptures (oi` avnagrafe,ntej crhsmoi,) which give proof of these things. What they are we must now consider. Now in the very beginning of the history of the law there is a passage to the following effect (Gen. ii. 6) (ai;detai, tij evn avrch|/ nomoqesi,aj meta. th.n kosmopoi<an euvqu.j toio,sde)."

Here there is a precise designation where, among "*the written crhsmoi,*" a certain one (tij) of them may be found, viz., in the beginning of "The Legislation" immediately after "The Creation" (cf. Ryle, p. xxi, note 1). The other is from the first book of the "De Somniis," § 27 (M. i. 646):

"These things are not my myth, but an oracle (crhsmo,j) written on the sacred tables (evn tai/j i`erai/j avnagegramme,noj sth,laij), For it says (Gen. xlvi. 1)."

This passage in Genesis is thus an oracle "*written in the sacred tablets*" - and thus this phrase emerges as one of Philo's names for the Scriptures. Elsewhere we read somewhat more precisely:

"Now these are those men who have lived irreproachably and admirably, whose virtues are durably and permanently recorded as on pillars in the sacred scriptures (w-n ta.j avreta.j evn tai/j i`erwta,taij evsthliteu/sqai grafai/j sumbe,bhken)" ("De Abrah.," §1, M. ii. 2). "There is also in another place the following sentence (gra,mma) deeply engraven (evsthliteume,non), (Deut. xxxii. 8)" "(De Congr. Erud. Grat.," §12, M. i. 527).

The "Scriptures" thus bear to Philo a monumental character: they are a body of oracles written, and more - a body of oracles permanently engraved to be a lasting testimony forever.

The designations for Scripture in Philo are, indeed, somewhat various - such as i`erai. grafai, ("Quis rerum div. heres," §32 M. i. 495); i`erai. bi,bloi ("Quod det. pot. insid.," §44, M. i. 222); toi/j i`eroi/j gra,mmasin ("Legat. ad Caium.," §29, M. ii. 574). But probably none are used so frequently as, on the one hand, lo,goj, with various adjectival enhancements - such as o` profhtiko.j lo,goj ("De Plantat. Noe," §28, M. i. 437), o` qei/oj lo,goj ("Legg. Alleg.," iii, §3, M. i. 89; "De Mutat. Nom.," §20; "De Somniis," i. 33, ii. 37), and o] i`eroj lo,goj ("De Ebriet.," §36, M. i. 379; "De Mut. Nominum," §38; "De Somniis," i. 14, 22, 33, 35, 37, 39, 42; ii. 4, 9, 37, etc.); and especially, on the other hand, oi` crhsmoi., occurring at times with extraordinary frequency.⁷³ Some passages illustrative of this last usage are the following:

"For the sacred Scriptures (oi` crhsmoi,) say that he entered into the darkness" ("De Mutat. Nom.," §2). "But the sacred oracles (oi` crhsmoi,) are witnesses of that in which Abraham is addressed (the words being put in the mouth of God), (evn oi-j le,getai tw|/ vAbraa.m evk prosw,pou tou/ qeou/) (Gen. xvii. 1)" (*do.* §5). "And these are not my words only but those of the most holy scriptures (crhsmw/n tw/n i`erwta,twn, - anarthrous to bring out the quality in contrast to evmo.j mu/qoj), in which certain persons are introduced as saying . . ." (*do.* §28). Of Isaiah xlviii. 22 it is said in *do.* §31: lo,goj ga.r o;ntwj kai. crhsmo,j evsti qei/oj. "Accordingly the holy scriptures (oi` crhsmoi,) tell us that . . ." (*do.* § 36). "Therefore the sacred scriptures (oi` crhsmoi,) represent Leah as hated" (*do.* §44) "For she is represented by the sacred oracles (dia. tw/n crhsmw/n) as having left off all womanly ways (Gen. xviii. 12)" ("De Ebrietat.," §14, M. i. 365). "On which account the holy scripture (oi` crhsmoi,) very beautifully represent it as 'a little city and yet not a little one'" ("De Abrah.," §31, M. ii. 25). "Therefore the sacred scriptures (oi` crhsmoi,) say (Gen. xxiv. 1)" ("De Sobriet.," §4, M. i. 395). "According as the sacred scriptures (oi` crhsmoi,) testify, in which it is said (Ex. viii. 1)" ("De Confus. Ling.," §20, M. i. 419). "On which account it is said in the sacred scriptures (evn crhsmoi/j) (Deut. vii. 7)" ("De Migrat. Abrah.," §11, 1VI. i. 445). "God having drawn up and confirmed the proposition, as the Scriptures (oi` crhsmoi) show, in which it is expressly stated that (Deut. xxx. 4)" ("De Confus. Ling.," § 38, M, i. 435).

When we combine these passages with those in which *logion* occurs it will probably not seem too much to say that the dominant method of conceiving the Bible in Philo's mind was as a book of oracles. Whether he uses the word *logion* or *crhsmoj*, it is, of course, all one to him. Indeed, that nothing should be lacking he occasionally uses also other synonyms. For example, here is an instance of the Homeric word *qeoipro,pion* cropping out: "For there is extant an oracle delivered to the wise man in which it is said (Lev. xxvi. 12), (kai. ga,r evsti crhsqe.n tw|/ sofw|/ qeoipro,pion evn w-| le,getai)" ("De Somniis," i, §23). And this oracular conception of Scripture is doubtless the reason why it is so frequently quoted in Philo by the subjectless *fhsi,(le,gei(le,getai* (instead of, say, *ge,graptai*). There are in general, speaking broadly, three ways in which one fully accepting the divine origin and direct divine authority of Scripture may habitually look upon it. He may think of it as a library of volumes and then each volume is likely to be spoken of by him as a *grafh*, and the whole, because the collection of volumes, as *ai` grafai,,* or, when the idea of its unity is prominently in mind, as itself *h` grafh,.* On the other hand, the sense of its composite character may be somewhat lost out of habitual thought, swallowed up in the idea of its divine unity, and then its several sentences or passages are apt to be thought and spoken of as each a *gra,mma*, and the whole, because made up of these sentences or passages, as *ta. gra,mmata.* Or, finally, the sense of the direct divine utterance of the whole to the soul, and of its immediate divine authority, may overshadow all else and the several sentences or passages of the book be each conceived as an unmediated divine word coming directly to the soul - and then each passage is likely to be called a *logion* or *crhsmoj*, and the whole volume, because the sum of these passages, *ta. logia* or *oi` crhsmoi,* - or occasionally, when its unity is prominently in mind, one great *to. logion* or *o` crhsmoj.* Each of these three ways of looking at the Scriptures of the

Old Testament finds expression in Philo,⁷⁴ in Josephus and in the New Testament. But it is the last that is most characteristic of the thought of Philo, and the first possibly of the writers of the New Testament:⁷⁵ while perhaps we may suspect that the intermediate one was most congenial to the thought of Josephus, who, as a man of affairs and letters rather than of religion, would naturally envisage the writings of the Old Testament rather as documents than as oracles.

From this survey we may be able to apprehend with some accuracy Philo's place in the development of the usage of the word *logion*. He has received it directly from profane Greek as one of a series of synonyms - *logion* (*crhsmoj*) (*qepropion*, etc. - denoting a direct word from God, an "oracle." He has in no way modified its meaning except in so far as a heightening of its connotation was inseparable from the transference of it from the frivolous and ambiguous oracles of heathendom to the revelations of the God of Israel, a heightening which was, no doubt, aided by the constant use of the word in the Septuagint - Philo's Bible - to translate the Hebrew *hr'm.ai* with all its high suggestions. But in this transference he has nevertheless given it a wholly new significance, in so far as he has applied it to a fixed written revelation and thus impressed on it entirely new implications. In his hands, *logion* becomes, by this means, a synonym of *gramma*, and imports "a passage of Scripture" - conceived, of course, as a direct oracle from God. And the plural becomes a synonym of *ta. grammata* (*ai` grafai*) (*oi` biblioi*) (*o` logoi*) - or whatever other terms are used to express the idea of "the Holy Scriptures" - and imports what we call "the Bible," of course with the implication that this Bible is but a congeries of "oracles," or direct utterances of God, or even in its whole extent one great "oracle" or utterance of God - that it is, in a word, the pure and absolute "Word of God." But when we say that *logion* is in Philo's hands the equivalent of "a passage of Scripture," we must guard

against supposing that there is any implication of brevity attaching to it: its implication is that of direct divine utterance, not of brevity; and "the passage" in mind and designated by *logion* may be of any length, conceived for the time and the purpose in hand as a unitary deliverance from God, up to the whole body of Scripture itself." Similarly *ta. logia* in Philo has not yet hardened into a simple synonym of "Scripture," but designates any body of the "oracles" of which the whole Scripture is composed - now the "ten commandments," now the Book of Genesis, now the Pentateuch, now the Jewish Law in general."

There is little trace in Philo of the application made in the LXX. of *logion* to the high priestly breastplate, by which it came to mean, not only the oracular deliverance, but the place or instrument of divination - though, quoting the LXX. as freely as he does, Philo could not help occasionally incorporating such a passage in his writings. We read, for example, in the "Legg. Allegor.," iii, §40 (M. i. 111) :

"At all events the Holy Scripture (*o` i`ero.j lo,goj*), being well aware how great is the power of the impetuosity of each passion, anger and appetite, puts a bridle in the mouth of each, having appointed reason (*to.n lo,gon*) as their charioteer and pilot. And first of all it speaks thus of anger, in the hope of pacifying and curing it, 'And you shall put manifestation and truth' [the Urim and Thummim] 'in the oracle of judgment (*evpi. to. logion tw/n kri,sewn*) and it shall be on the breast of Aaron, when he comes into the Holy Place before the Lord' (Ex. xxviii. 30). Nor by the oracle (*logion*) is here meant the organs of speech which exist in us. . . . For Moses here speaks not of a random, spurious oracle

(lo,gion) but of the oracle of judgment, which is equivalent to saying a well-judged and carefully examined oracle."

Thus Philo gradually transmutes the lo,gion = logei/on of his text into the lo,gion = crhsmo,j of his exposition: and it is a little remarkable how little influence this LXX. usage has on his own use of the word. With him lo,gion is distinctively a passage of Scripture, and the congeries of these passages make ta. lo,gia.

That this usage is not, however, a *peculium* of Philo's merely, is evidenced by a striking passage from Josephus, in which it appears in full development. For example, we read:

"The Jews, by demolishing the tower of Antonia, had made their temple square, though they had it written in their sacred oracles (avnagegramme,non evn toi/j logi,oij) that their city and sanctuary should be taken when their temple should become square. But what most stirred them up was an ambiguous oracle (crhsmo,j) that was found also in their sacred writings (evn toi/j i`eroi/j eu`rhme,noj gra,mmasin) that about that time one from their country should become ruler of the world. The Jews took this prediction to belong to themselves, and many wise men were thereby deceived in their judgment. Now this oracle (to. lo,gion) certainly denoted the rule of Vespasian" ("De Bello Jud.," vi. 5, 4).

In this short passage we have most of the characteristics of the Philonean usage repeated: here is the interchangeable usage of lo,gion and crhsmo,j,

on the one hand, and of ta. lo,gia and ta. gra,mmata, on the other: the sacred writings of the Jews are made up of "oracles," so that each portion of them is a lo,gion and the whole ta. lo,gia.⁷⁸

IV. That this employment of ta. lo,gia as a synonym of ai` grafai, was carried over from the Jewish writers to the early Fathers, Dr. Lightfoot has sufficiently shown in a brief but effective passage in his brilliant papers in reply to the author of "Supernatural Religion."⁷⁹ It is not necessary to go over the ground afresh which Dr. Lightfoot has covered. But, for the sake of a general completeness in the presentation of the history of the word, it may be proper to set down here some of the instances of its usage in this sense among the earlier Fathers. Clement of Rome, after having quoted examples from the Scriptures at length, sums up the lesson thus: "The humility, therefore, and the submissiveness of so many great men, who have thus obtained a good report, hath through obedience made better not only us, but also the generations which were before us, even them that received his oracles in fear and truth" (c. 19); again (c. 53), "For ye know, and know well the sacred Scriptures (ta.j i`eraj grafa,j), dearly beloved, and ye have searched into the oracles of God (ta. lo,gia tou/ qeou/)" ; and still again (c. 62), "And we have put you in mind of these things the more gladly, since we knew well that we were writing to men who are faithful and highly accounted and have diligently searched into the oracles of the teaching of God (ta. lo,gia th/j paidei,aj tou/ qeou/)." The same phenomenon obviously meets us here as in Philo: and Harnack⁸⁰ and Lightfoot⁸¹ both naturally comment to this effect on the middle instance - the former calling especially attention to the equation drawn between the two phrases for Scripture, and the latter to the fact, as shown by the Scriptures immediately adduced, that the mind of the writer in so designating Scripture was not on "any divine precept or prediction, but *the example of Moses.*" Equally strikingly, we read in II

Clem., xiii, "For the Gentiles when they hear from our mouth the oracles of God, marvel at them for their beauty and greatness. . . . For when they hear from us that God saith, 'It is no thank unto you, if ye love them that love you, but this is thank unto you, if you love your enemies and them that hate you [Luke vi. 32]' - when they hear these things, I say, they marvel at their exceeding goodness." "The point to be observed," says Lightfoot,⁸² "is that the expression here refers to an *evangelical* record." Similarly Polycarp, c. vii, writes: "For every one 'who will not confess that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is antichrist' (I John iv. 2, 3) ; and whosoever shall not confess the testimony of the cross is of the devil; and whosoever shall pervert the oracles of the Lord (ta. lo,gia tou/ kuri,ou) to his own lusts and say there is neither resurrection nor judgment, that man is the firstborn of Satan." On this passage Zahn, followed by Lightfoot, very appropriately adduces the parallel in the Preface to Irenaeus' great work, "Against Heresies," where he complains of the Gnostics "falsifying the oracles of the Lord (ta. lo,gia Kuri,ou), becoming bad exegetes of what is well said": while later ("Haer.," i. 8, 1) the same writer speaks of the Gnostics' art in adapting the dominical oracles (ta. kuriaka. lo,gia) to their opinions, a phrase he equates with "the oracles of God," and uses in a context which shows that he has the whole complex of Scripture in mind. In precisely similar wise, Clement of Alexandria is found calling the Scriptures the "oracles of truth" ("Coh. ad Gent.," p. 84 ed. Potter), the "oracles of God" ("Quis Div. Sal.," 3) and the "inspired oracles" ("Strom.," i. 392); and Origen, "the oracles," "the oracles of God" ("De Prin.," iv. 11; in Matt., x. § 6): and Basil, the "sacred oracles," "the oracles of the Spirit" ("Hom.," xi. 5; xii. 1). The Pseudo-Ignatius ("ad Smyr.," iii) writes: "For the oracles (ta. lo,gia) say: 'This Jesus who was taken up from you into heaven,' etc. [Acts i. 11]" - where the term certainly is just the equivalent of h` graph.⁸³ And Photius tells us ("Bibl.," 228) that the Scriptures recognized by Ephraem, Patriarch of Antioch

(circa 525-545 A.D.), consisted of the Old Testament, the Dominical Oracles (ta. kuriaka. lo,gia) and the Preaching of the Apostles" - where the adjective kuriaka, is obviously intended to limit the broad ta. lo,gia, so that the phrase means just "the Gospels."

Dr. Lightfoot's object in bringing together such passages, it will be remembered, was to fix the sense of lo,gia in the description which Eusebius gives of the work of Papias and in his quotations from Papias' remarks about the Gospels of Matthew and Mark. Papias' book, we are told by Eusebius ("H. E.," iii, 39), was entitled Logi,wn kuriakw/n evxhgh,seij - that is, obviously, from the usage of the words, it was a commentary on the Gospels, or less likely, on the New Testament: and he is quoted as explaining that Matthew wrote ta. lo,gia in the Hebrew language and that Mark made no attempt to frame a su,ntaxin tw/n kuriakw/n logi,wn,⁸⁴ or, as is explained in the previous clause, of ta. u`po. tou/ Cristou/ h' lecqe,nta h' pracqe,nta - that is, as would seem again to be obvious, each wrote his section of the "Scriptures" in the manner described. The temptation to adjust these Papian phrases to current theories of the origin of the Gospels has proved too strong, however, to be withstood even by the demonstration of the more natural meaning of the words provided by Dr. Lightfoot's trenchant treatment: and we still hear of Papias' treatise on the "Discourses of the Lord," and of the "Book of Discourses" which Papias ascribes to Matthew and which may well be identified (we are told) with the "Collection of Sayings of Jesus," which criticism has unearthed as lying behind our present Gospels.⁸⁵ Indeed, as time has run on, there seems in some quarters even a growing disposition to neglect altogether the hard facts of usage marshaled by Dr. Lightfoot, and to give such rein to speculation as to the meaning of the term lo,gia as employed by Papias, that the last end of the matter would appear to threaten to be worse than the first. We are led to use this language by a

recent construction of Alfred Resch's, published in the "Theologische Studien" dedicated to Bernhard Weiss on his seventieth birthday. Let us, however, permit Resch to speak for himself. He is remarking on the identification of the assumed fundamental gospel (*Urevangelium*) with the work of Matthew mentioned by Papias. He says:

"Thus the name - lo,gia - and the author - Matthew - seemed to be found for this *Quellenschrift*. In the way of this assumption there stood only the circumstance that the name 'lo,gia' did not seem to fit the *Quellenschrift* as it had been drawn out by study of the Gospels, made wholly independently of the notice of Papias - since it yielded a treatise of mixed narrative and discourses. This circumstance led some to characterize the *Quellenschrift*, in correspondence with the name lo,gia, as a mere collection of discourses; while others found in it a reason for sharply opposing the identification of the Logia of Matthew and the fundamental gospel (*Urevangelium*), or even for discrediting the whole notice of Papias as worthless and of no use to scholars. No one, however, thought of looking behind the lo,gia for the hidden Hebrew name, although it was certainly obvious that a treatise written in Hebrew could not fail to have a Hebrew title. And I must myself confess that only in 1895, while the third volume of my 'Aussercanonischen Paralleltex-te' was passing through the press, did it occur to me to ask after the Hebrew name of the lo,gia. But with the question the answer was self-evidently at once given: ~yrib'D.,⁸⁶ therefore [;Wvye yreb.Di. To this

answer attached itself at once, however, the reminiscence of titles ascribed in the Old Testament to a whole series of *Quellenschriften*: laWmv. yrbD, %lMh `dywd yrbD, aybNh !tn yrbD, (harh) hzth dG yrbD (cf. I Chron. xxix. 29); hmlv yrbD rps (I Kings xi. 41); hVnm yrbD, larcy yklm yrbD (II Chron. xxxiii. 18). As, then, there in the Old Testament, it is just historical *Quellenschriften* of biographical contents that bear the name of myirb'D; so this New Testament *Quellenschrift*, the title [;Wvey yreb.Di. It contained therefore the history of Him of whom the prophets had prophesied, Who was greater than Solomon, David's Son and David's Lord and the King of Israel. And as the LXX. had translated the title certainly unskillfully enough by lo,goi, so Papias or his sponsor (*Gewährsmann*) by lo,gia. The sense, however, of the Hebrew ~yrib'D. is, as Luther very correctly renders it - 'Histories.' Cf. Heft iii. 812. By this discovery of the original title, the New Testament *Quellenschrift* which from an unknown had already become a known thing, has now become from an unnamed a named thing. The desiderated x has been completely found."⁸⁷

Criticism like this certainly scorns all facts. The Hebrew word rbd, meaning a "word," passed by a very readily understood process into the sense of "thing." In defining the term as used in the titles which Resch adduces, Dr. Driver says:⁸⁸ "*words*: hence *affairs, things* - in so far as they are done, 'acts'; in so far as they are narrated, 'history.'" The

word **rbd** thus readily lent itself, in combinations like those adduced by Resch, to a double meaning: and it is apparently found in both these senses. In instances like **tl,h,qo yreb.Di** (Eccl. i. 1, cf. Prov. xxx. 1, xxxi. 5; Jer. i. 1; Am. i. 1; Neh. i. 1) it doubtless means "words of Koheleth," and the like. In the instances adduced by Resch, it is doubtless used in the secondary sense of "history." The Greek word **lo,goj**, by which **rbd** was ordinarily translated in the LXX., while naturally not running through a development of meaning exactly parallel to that of **rbd**, yet oddly enough presented a fair Greek equivalent for both of these senses of **-yreb.Di**, used in titles: and why Resch should speak of **lo,goi** as unskillfully used in the titles he adduces, does not appear on the surface of things. Certainly, from Herodotus down, **oi` lo,goi** bore the specific meaning of just "Histories," as afterwards it bore the sense of "prose writings": and the early Greek historians were called accordingly **oi` logogra,foi**.⁸⁹ The LXX. translators, in a word, could scarcely have found a happier Greek rendering for the titles of the *Quellenschriften* enumerated in I Chron. xxix. 29, 30, etc. Who, however, could estimate the unskillfulness of translating **yrbd** in such titles by **lo,gia** - a word which had no such usage and indeed did not readily lend itself to an application to human "words?" Papias (or his sponsor) must have been (as Eusebius calls him) a man of mean capacity indeed, so to have garbled Matthew's Hebrew. It should be noted, further, that Papias does not declare, as Resch seems to think, that Matthew wrote **ta. lo,gia tou/ qeou/**, or even **ta. kuriaka. lo,gia** - it is Papias' own book whose title contains this phrase; and it will be hard to suppose that Papias (or his sponsor) was a man of such mean capacity as to fancy the simple **ta. lo,gia** a fair equivalent for the Hebrew **[wvy yrbd** in the sense of "The History of Jesus." If he did so, one does not wonder that he has had to wait two thousand years for a reader to catch his meaning. Such speculations, in truth, serve no other good purpose than

to exhibit how far a-sea one must drift who, leaving the moorings of actual usage, seeks an unnatural meaning for these phrases. Their obvious meaning is that Papias wrote an "Exposition of the Gospels," and that he speaks of Matthew's and Mark's books as themselves sections of those "Scriptures" which he was expounding. Under the guidance of the usage of the word, this would seem the only tenable opinion.⁹⁰

It is not intended, of course, to imply that there is no trace among the Fathers of any other sense attaching to the words *to. lo, gion* (*ta. lo, gia*, than "the Scriptures" as a whole. Other applications of the words were found standing side by side with this in Philo, and they are found also among the Fathers. *To. lo, gion*, used of a specific text of Scripture, for example, is not uncommon in the Fathers. It is found, for instance, in Justin Martyr, "Apol.," i. 32: "And Jesse was his forefather *kata. to. lo, gion*" - to wit, Isa. xi. 1, just quoted. It is found in Clement of Alexandria ("Strom.," ii. Migne, i. 949a), where Isa. vii. 9 is quoted and it is added: "It was this *lo, gion* that Heraclitus of Ephesus paraphrased when he said" It is found repeatedly in Eusebius' "Ecclesiastical History," in which the Papias passages are preserved, as, e. g., ix. 7, *ad fin.*, "So that, according to that divine (*qei/on*) *lo, gion*," *Viz.*, Matt. xxiv. 24; x. 1, 4, "the *lo, gion* thus enjoining us," *viz.*, Ps. xcvi. (xcviii.) 1; x. 4, 7, "concerning which a certain other divine *lo, gion* thus proclaims," *viz.*, Ps. lxxxvi. (lxxxvii.) 3. *Ta. lo, gia* is also used in the Fathers, as in Philo, for any body of these Scriptural *lo, gia*, however small or large (i. e., for any given section of Scripture) - as, e.g., for the Ten Commandments. It is so used, for instance, in the "Apostolical Constitutions," ii. 26: "Keep the fear of God before your eyes, always remembering *tw/n de, ka tou/ qeou/ logi, wn*"; and also in Eusebius (H. E., ii. 18, 5). So, again, we have seen it, modified by qualifying adjectives, used for the Gospels - and indeed it seems to be employed without qualifications in this sense in Pseudo-Justin's "Epistola

ad Zeram et Serenum" (Otto, i. 70b). It is further sometimes used apparently not of the Scripture text as such, but of certain oracular utterances recorded in it - as, for example, when Justin says to Trypho (c. 18): "For since you have read, O Trypho, as you yourself admitted, the doctrines taught by our Saviour, I do not think that I have done foolishly in adding some short utterances of his (brace,a tou/ evkei,nou lo,gia) to the prophetic statements" - to wit, words of Jesus recorded in Matt. xxi, xxiii and Luke xi, here put on a level with the oracles of the prophets, but apparently envisaged as spoken. All these are usages that have met us before.

But there are lower usages also discoverable in the later Patristic writers at least. There is an appearance now and then indeed as if the word was, in popular speech, losing something of its high implication of "solemn oracular utterances of God," and coming to be applied as well to the words of mere men⁹¹ - possibly in sequence to its application to the words of prophets and apostles as such and the gradual wearing down, in the careless popular consciousness, of the distinction between their words as prophets and apostles and their words as men; possibly, on the other hand, in sequence to the freer use of the word in profane speech and the wearing away of its high import with the loss of reverence for the thing designated. Thus we read as early as in the "Acts of Xanthippe and Polyxena," edited by Prof. James for the "Cambridge Texts and Studies," and assigned by him to the middle of the third century (c. 28, p. 78), the following dialogue, in the course of a conversation between Polyxena and Andrew, "the apostle of the Lord": "Andrew saith: 'Draw not near me, child, but tell me who thou art and whence.' Then saith Polyxena: 'I am a great friend -of these here (xe,nh tw/n evntau/qa), but I see thy gracious countenance and thy logia are as the logia of Paul and I presume thee, too, to belong to his God.'" If we may assume this to mark a transition

stage in the usage, we may look upon a curious passage in John of Damascus as marking almost the completion of the sinking of the word to an equivalence to *r`h,mata*. It occurs in his "Disput. Christiani et Saraceni" (Migne, i. 1588, iii. 1344). The Saracenic disputant is represented as eager to obtain an acknowledgment that the Word of God, that is Christ, is a mere creature, and as plying the Christian with a juggle on the word *lo,gia*. He asks whether the *lo,gia* of God are create or increate. If the reply is "create," the rejoinder is to be: "Then they are not gods, and you have confessed that Christ, who is the Word (*lo,goj*) of God is not God." If, on the other hand, the reply is "increate," the rejoinder apparently is to be that the *lo,gia* of God nevertheless are not properly gods, and so again Christ the *lo,goj* is not God. Accordingly John instructs the Christian disputant to refuse to say either that they are create or that they are increate, but declining the dilemma, to reply merely: "I confess one only *lo,goj* of God that is increate, but my whole Scripture (*graph,*) I do not call *lo,gia*, but *r`h,mata qeou/*." On the Saracen retorting that David certainly says *ta. lo,gia* (not *r`h,mata*) of the Lord are pure *lo,gia*, the Christian is to reply that the prophet speaks here *tropologikw/j*, and not *kuriologikw/j*, that is to say, not by way of a direct declaration, but by way of an indirect characterization. It is a remarkable logomachy that we are thus treated to: and it seems to imply that in John's day *lo,gia* had sunk to a mere synonym of *r`h,mata*. That men had then ceased to speak of the whole *graph*, as *ta. qei/a lo,gia* we know not to have been the case: but apparently this language was now made use of with no more pregnancy of meaning than if they had said *ta. qei/a r`h,mata*.⁹² This process seems to have continued, and in the following passage from a work of the opening of the eleventh century - the "Life of Nilus the Younger," published in the 120th volume of Migne's "Pat. Graec." (p. 97 D), - we have an instance of the extreme extension of the application of the word: "Then saith the Father to him: 'It is not fitting that thou, a man of wisdom and high-learning,

should think or speak ta. tw/n koinw/n avnqrw,pwn lo,gia."⁹³ And accordingly we cannot be surprised to find that in modern Greek the word is employed quite freely of human speech. Jannaris tells us that it is used in the sense of "maxim," and that in colloquial usage ta. lo,gia may mean "promise" - in both of which employments there may remain a trace of its original higher import.⁹⁴ While Kontopoulos gives as the English equivalents of lo,gion, the following list: "A saying, a word; a maxim; a motto, an oracle; ta. qei/a lo,gia, the divine oracles, the sacred Scriptures."⁹⁵

Thus not only all the usages of the word found, say, in Philo, are continued in the Fathers, but there is an obvious development to be traced. But this development itself is founded on and is a witness to the characteristic usage of the word among the Fathers - that, to wit, in which it is applied to the inspired words of prophets and apostles. And by far the most frequent use of the word in the Patristic writings seems to be that in which it designates just the Holy Scriptures. Their prevailing usage is very well illustrated by that of Eusebius. We have already quoted a number of passages from his "Ecclesiastical History" in which he seems to adduce special passages of Scripture, each as a lo,gion. More common is it for him to refer to the whole Scriptures as ta. lo,gia, or rather (for this is his favorite formula) ta. qei/a lo,gia - and that whether he means the Old Testament (which in the "Praep. Evang.," ii. 6 [Migne, iii. 140 A], he calls ta. vEbrai,wn lo,gia), or the New Testament, or refers to the prophetic or the narrative portions. Instances may be found in "H. E.," v., 17, 5, where we are told that Miltiades left monuments of his study of the qei/a lo,gia; vi. 23, 2, where the zeal of Origen's friend Ambrose for the study of the qei/a lo,gia is mentioned as enabling Origen to write his commentaries on the qei/ai grafai; ix. 9, 8, where a sentence from Ex. xv. 1 is quoted as from the qei/a lo,gia; x. 4, 28, where Ps. lvii. (lviii.), 7 is quoted from the qei/a

lo,gia; "Palestinian Martyrs," xi. 2, where the devotion of the Palestinian martyrs to the qei/a lo,gia is adverted to. Even the singular - to. lo,gion - seems occasionally used by Eusebius (as by Philo) as a designation of the whole Scripture fabric. We may suspect this to be the case in "H. E.," x. 4, 43, when we read of "the costly cedar of Lebanon of which to. qei/on lo,gion has not been unmindful, saying, 'The forests of the Lord shall rejoice and the cedars of Lebanon which he planted' (Ps. cv. [civ.] 16)." And we cannot doubt it at "H. E.," ii. 10, 1, where we read concerning Herod Agrippa, that "as h` tw/n pra,xewn grafh, relates, he proceeded to Cæsarea and to. lo,gion relates 'that the angel of the Lord smote him'" - in which account it is worth while to observe the coincidence of Josephus' narrative with th.n qei/an grafh,n. Here, of course, to. lo,gion is primarily the Book of Acts - but as the subsequent context shows, it represents that book only as part of the sacred Scriptures, so that to. lo,gion emerges as a complete synonym of h` qei/a grafh,. Whatever other usage may from time to time emerge in the pages of the Fathers, the Patristic usage of the term, kat v evxoch,n, is as a designation of the "Scriptures" conceived as the Word of God.⁹⁶

In the light of these broad facts of usage, certain lines may very reasonably be laid down within which our interpretation of [ta.] lo,gia in the New Testament instances of its occurrence should move. It would seem quite certain, for example, that no lower sense can be attached to it in these instances, than that which it bears uniformly in its classical and Hellenistic usage: it means, not "words" barely, simple "utterances," but distinctively "oracular utterances," divinely authoritative communications, before which men stand in awe and to which they bow in humility: and this high meaning is not merely implicit, but is explicit in the term. It would seem clear again that there are no implications of brevity in the term: it means not short, pithy, pregnant sayings, but high,

authoritative, sacred utterances; and it may be applied equally well to long as to short utterances - even though they extend to pages and books and treatises. It would seem to be clear once more that there are no implications in the term of what may be called the literary nature of the utterances to which it is applied: it characterizes the utterances to which it is applied as emanations from God, but whether they be prophetic or narrative or legal, parenetic or promissory in character, is entirely indifferent: its whole function is exhausted in declaring them to be God's own utterances.⁹⁷ And still further, it would seem to be clear that it is equally indifferent to the term whether the utterances so designated be oral or written communications: whether oral or written it declares them to be God's own Word, and it had become customary to designate the written Word of God by this term as one that was felt fitly to describe the Scriptures as an oracular book - either a body of oracles, or one continuous oracular deliverance from God's own lips.

This last usage is so strikingly characteristic of the Hellenistic adaptation of the term that a certain presumption lies in favor of so understanding it in Hellenistic writings, when the Scriptural revelation is in question: though this presumption is, of course, liable to correction by the obvious implications of the passages as wholes. In such a passage as Rom. iii. 2 this presumption rises very high indeed, and it would seem as if the word here must be read as a designation of the "Scriptures" as such, unless very compelling reasons to the contrary may be adduced from the context. That the mind of the writer may seem to some to be particularly dwelling upon this or that element in the contents of the Scriptures cannot be taken as such a compelling reason to the contrary: for nothing is more common than for a writer to be thinking more particularly of one portion of what he is formally adducing as a whole. The paraphrase of Wetstein appears in this aspect, therefore, very judicious: "They have the

Sacred Books, in which are contained the oracles and especially the prophecies of the advent of the Messiah and the calling of the Gentiles; and by these their minds should be prepared": though, so far as this paraphrase may seem to separate between the Sacred Books and the Oracles they contain, it is unfortunate. The very point of this use of the word is that it *identifies* the Sacred Books with the Oracles; and in this aspect of it Dr. David Brown's comment is more satisfactory: "That remarkable expression, denoting 'Divine Communications' in general, is transferred to the sacred Scriptures to express their oracular, divinely authoritative character." The case is not quite so simple in Heb. v. 12: but here, too, the well-balanced comment of Dr. Westcott appears to us to carry conviction with it: "The phrase might refer to the new revelation given by Christ to His apostles (comp. c. i. 2) ; but it seems more natural to refer it to the collective writings of the Old Testament which the Hebrew Christians failed to understand." In Acts vii. 38 the absence of the article introduces no real complication: it merely emphasizes the qualitative aspect of the matter; what Moses received was emphatically *oracles* - which is further enhanced by calling them "lively," i. e., they were not merely dead, but living, effective, operative oracles. The speaker's eye is obviously on Moses as the recipient of these oracles, and on the oracles as given by God to Moses, as is recorded in the Pentateuch: but the oracles his eye is on are those recorded in the Pentateuch, and that came to Moses, not for himself, but for the Church of all ages - "to give to us." Here we may hesitate to say, indeed, that *logia* means just the "Scriptures"; but what it means stands in a very express relation to the Scriptures, and possibly was not very sharply distinguished from the Scriptures by the speaker. With the analogies in Philo clearly in our mind, we should scarcely go far wrong if we conceived of *logia* here as meaning to the speaker those portions of Scripture in which Moses recorded the revelations vouchsafed to him by God - conceived as themselves these

revelations recorded. In I Peter iv. 11 the interpretation is complicated by the question that arises concerning the charisma that is intended, as well as by the casting of the phrase into the form of a comparison: "let him speak *as it were* oracles of God." It is not clear that the Divine Scriptures as such are meant here; but the term, in any case, retains all its force as a designation of sacred, solemn divine utterances: the speaker is to speak as becomes one whose words are not his own, but the very words of God - oracles proclaimed through his mouth. Whether it is the exercise of the prophetic gift in the strict sense that is adverted to, so that Peter's exhortation is that the prophet should comport himself in his prophesying as becomes one made the vehicle of the awful words of revelation; or only the gift of teaching that is in question, so that Peter's exhortation is that he who proclaims the word of God, even in this lower sense, shall bear himself as befits one to whom are committed the Divine oracles for explanation and enforcement - must be left here without investigation. In either case the term is obviously used in its highest sense and implies that the *logia* of God are His own words, His awesome utterances.

What has thus been said in reference to these New Testament passages is intended to go no further in their explanation than to throw the light of the usage of the word upon their interpretation. Into their detailed exegesis we cannot now enter. We cannot pass by the general subject, however, without emphasizing the bearing these passages have on the New Testament doctrine of Holy Scripture. It will probably seem reasonable to most to interpret Rom. iii. 2 as certainly, Heb. v. 12 as probably, and Acts vii. 38 as very likely making reference to the written Scriptures; and as bearing witness to the conception of them on the part of the New Testament writers as "the oracles of God." That is to say, we have unobtrusive and convincing evidence here that the Old Testament

Scriptures, as such, were esteemed by the writers of the New Testament as an oracular book, which in itself not merely contains, but is the "utterance," the very Word of God; and is to be appealed to as such and as such deferred to, because nothing other than the crystallized speech of God. We merely advert to this fact here without stopping to develop its implications or to show how consonant this designation of the Scriptures as the "Oracles of God" is with the conception of the Holy Scriptures entertained by the New Testament writers as otherwise made known to us. We have lately had occasion to point out in this Review some of the other ways in which this conception expresses itself in the New Testament writings.⁹⁸ He who cares to look for it will find it in many ways written largely and clearly and indelibly on the pages of the New Testament. We content ourselves at this time, however, with merely pointing out that the designation of the Scriptures as *ta. lo,gia tou/ qeou/* fairly shouts to us out of the pages of the New Testament, that to its writers the Scriptures of the Old Testament were the very Word of God in the highest and strictest sense that term can bear - the express utterance, in all their parts and each and every of their words, of the Most High - the "oracles of God." Let him that thinks them something other and less than this, reckon, then, with the apostles and prophets of the New Covenant - to whose trustworthiness as witnesses to doctrinal truth he owes all he knows about the New Covenant itself, and therefore all he hopes for through this New Covenant.

Endnotes:

1. From *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, Vol. XI. 1900, pp. 217-260.
2. So very commonly: as, e. g., by Grimm ("Lexicon in N. T.," s. v.), Bleek ("Der Brief an die Hebräer," ii. 2, 114, on Heb. v. 12), Philippi

- ("Com. on Romans," E. T., i. 105, on Rom. iii. 2), Morrison ("Expos. of 3d Chap. of Rom.," p. 14).
3. "Com. on Romans," on Rom. iii. 2 (E. T., i. 140, note 1).
 4. Plato, "Eryx.," 401, E.: evta, ratte, ge auvto.n)) to. logi, dion; Isocrates, "Contra Sophistas," 295 B. (Didot, 191): tosou, tw| de. cei, rouj tw/n peri. ta.j e;ridaj kalindoume, nwn(o[son ou-toi me.n toiau/ta logi, dia diexio, ntev))); Aristophanes, "Vesp.," 64: avll v e;stin h`mi/n logi, dion gnw, mhn e;con | u`mw/n me.n auvtw/n ouvci. dexiw, teron. Cf. Blaydes on the passage in Aristophanes.
 5. "Com. on Rom.," on Rom. iii. 2: "The old account of lo, gion as a diminutive of lo, goj is probably correct, though Mey.-W. make it neuter of lo, gioj on the ground that logi, dion is the proper diminutive. The form logi, dion is rather a strengthened diminutive which, by a process common in language, took the place of lo, gion when it acquired the sense of 'oracle.'" When they add that it was as "a brief condensed saying" that the oracle was called lo, gion, they have no support in the literature.
 6. Jelf, who looks upon it as a diminutive, cites it as an extreme example of the fact that many simple diminutives in -ion have lost their diminutive force such as qhri, on(bibli, on: lo, gion, he says, "has assumed a peculiar meaning." In any event, thus, no diminutive meaning clings to lo, gion.
 7. evpulli, oij kai. peripa, toij kai. teutli, oisi leukoi/j.
 8. Dindorf, iv. ii. p. 113, on line 973.
 9. Blaydes adds some other instances: "Ejusdem formæ diminutiva sunt eivdu, llion(brefu, llion(meiraku, llion(zwu<llion(kreu<llion(xenu, llion."
 10. With this lo, gion mikro, n compare the brace, a lo, gia of Justin Martyr, "Contra Tryph.," c. 18. When the idea of brevity needed to be conveyed, it would seem that an adjective expressive of this idea was required to be added.
 11. Ed. Bas., i. 177; Rom. i. 233: Weigel's Leipzig ed. (here used), i. 189.
 12. Liddell and Scott say, s. v.: "o[rkion is not with Buttm., "Lexil.," s. v., to be regarded as a dim. of o[rkoj, but rather as neuter of o[rkioj, with which i`ero, n or i`era, may be supplied"; "Dim. of i; cnoj only in form (v. Chandler, "Accent.," §340)." Cf. in general Jelf, "Grammar," §§56, 2, and 335, c (Vol. i, pp. 53, 337).

13. Ed. Bas., pp. 1426,1427; ed. Rom., p. 69; ed. Leipzig, i. p. 72.
14. A scholium on the passage in the "Odyssey" brings out the meaning of *qeopro,pion*, to wit: *to. evk qeou/ legome,non(evx ou- kai. qeopro,poj o` ta. tou/ qeou/ le,gwn*. Cf. also the Homeric Lexicons on the word: e. g., Ebeling, s. v. *qeopropi,h et qeopro,pion*: "Sententia deorum, iudicium quod dii (Juppiter potissimum et Appollo) cum vate (vel cum deo) communicant, vates cum aliis hominibus, oraculum. Cf. Nægelsb., H[omerische] Th[eologie], 187. Ap. 87, 4 *ma,nteuma to. evk qeou/ prolego,menon*. Cf. Suid, i. 2, 1144 Hes."; and Capelle under same heading: "Alles was von den Göttern (bes[onders] Apollon und Zeus) angezeigt und durch den *qeopro,poj* gedeutet wird, 'die von den Göttern eingegebenen Offenbarungen' (Nægelsb. zu A. 385. Cf. 'Hom. Th.,' S. 187), also *Weissagung, Göttergebot, Götterbeschetid, Orakel*."
15. "Histoire de la Divination dans l'Antiquité" (Paris, Leroux, 1879), Vol. ii, pp. 229, 230.
16. The Scholium runs: *qe,sfata(qespi,smata(crhsmoi. to. auvto.(evle,gonto de. evpi. qew/n manteu/ai de. kai. manteu,mata evpi. ma,ntewn ajnqro,pwn*.
17. The above is abstracted from J. H. Heinr. Schmidt in his "Handbuch der Lateinischen und Griechischen Synonymik" (1889), §21, pp. 77-82. The original meaning assigned to *crh/n* (*darreichen, ertheilen*) is supported by a reference to Vaniček, p. 250. Surely it is a much more reasonable determination than that of Bouché-Leclercq ("Hist. de la Divination," i. 192), who would derive it from a cleromantic idea, as if *cra,w* signified first of all "entailler." So he conceives *avnairei/n* to refer to the lot, as we say to "draw lots," as if the Pythoness "drew her revelations as we draw lots." Schmidt refers the use of this word to the early idea that the words came up out of the depths of the earth.
18. E. g., Polybius, 3, 112, 8: "All the oracles preserved in Rome were in everybody's mouth (*pa,nta d v h=n ta. par v auvtoi/j lo,gia pa/si to,te dia. sto,matoj*) and every temple and house was full of prodigies and miracles: in consequence of which the city was one scene of vows, sacrifices, supplicatory processions and prayers" (Schuchburgh's translation). Appian, 2, 115, *dei,mata ta. ga.r a;loga polloi/j evne,pipte peri. o[lhn vItali,an) Kai(manteuma,twn palaiw/n evpifobwte,rwn evmnhmo,neuon*. Dionys. Hal., "Ant.," vii. 68: *crhsmoi, t v h;ldonto evn polloi/j cwri,oi,j ktl*) Dio Cassius, 431, 66 and 273, 64, where we read of

lo,gia pantoi/a h;|deto.

19. ii. 8, Jowett's translation (i. p. 99).
20. ii. 21, Jowett's translation (i. 109).
21. In Didot's appendix, p. 416: Lo,gia evsti ta. para. tou/ qeou/ lego,mena katloga,dhn\ crhsmoi. de. oi[tinej evmme,trwj le,gontai(qeoforoume,nwn tw/n lego,ntwn.
22. Ed. Bekker, p. 666: lo,gia ta. para. qeou/ lego,mena kataloga,dhn(crhsmoi. de. oi;tinej evmme,trwj le,gonta qeoforoume,nwn tw/n lego,ntwn.
23. In his "Handbuch der Lateinischen und Griechischen Synonymik" (Leipzig, 1889), §21 (pp. 77-82).
24. So for example in Aristophanes' "Knights" *passim* (see below) and in Porphyry's collection of Oracles.
25. This is the explanation of Croiset in the very sensible brief note he gives on the passage in his attractive edition of Thucydides (Paris, Hachette & Cie., 1886): He says: "lo,gia, oracles: according to the scholiast, oracles in prose in contrast with crhsmoi or oracles in verse; but it may be seen in Aristophanes ("Knights," 999-1002), that the two expressions were synonyms: the distinction bears here only on the manner in which these oracles were spread among the people; evle,gonto signifies: they were hawked about from mouth to mouth, without the intervention of the diviners (evle,gonto in the plural, despite the neuter subject, because it is the idea of *diversity* that dominates, rather than an idea of *collectivity*; cf. Curtius "Gr. gr.," §363, Fiem. 1); h=don is the appropriate word in speaking of crhsmolo,goi or oracle-deliverers whose business was to recite the prophecies in verse."
26. So still Franz Müller in his handy edition of this second book (Paderborn, 1886).
27. So Steup-Classen in the fourth edition of Classen's "Second Book of Thucydides," brought out by Steup (Berlin, 1889). They say: "evle,gonto: the unusual plural doubtless on account of the variety and diffusion of the lo,gia: cf. 5, 26, 2; 6, 62, 4. Lo,gia, according to the usage of the anaphora, is to be understood with polla, in both instances (B. supposes the anaphora would require the prepositing of the noun, as I. 3; but there neo,thj is emphasized by kai., which is not the case here with lo,gia). vEle,gonto: circulated by the mouth of the people, without fixed or metrical form, which would be given them or

- preserved for them by the *crhsmolo,goi* who were occupied professionally in the collection (hence - *lo,goi*) and interpretation of transmitted prophecies (cf. Herod. 7, 6, 142; Schomann, Gr. Alt., 23, 304). The distinction is between *evle,gonto* and *h|;don*, not the object of the *lo,gia*."
28. Pp. 152, 153 of his edition of the piece (Vienna, 1796). It is reprinted entire in Peerlkamp's edition (Haarlem, 1818) with this addition by the later editor: "*lo,gia* Latinis interdum *dictiones, dicta, sermones, et logia*; cf. Heins. *ad Ovid.*, Her. v. 33 et Observ. Misc. V. I. T. L, p. 276. *Apollodorus* in Biblioth. saepe permutat *lo,gia* et *crhsmou,j*, qui quum scribit I, vi. §1, *toi/j de. qeoi/j lo,gion h-n mireris interpretem reddentem rumor erat inter deos. De discrimine lo,gia inter et crhsmou,j eadem jam ex Aristophane ejusque Schol. notarat Tresling. Adv. pag. 46, 47, addens L. Bos ad Rom. iii. 2 et Alberti Obs. Phil. pag. 298 seq.*"
 29. Stephens (ed. Dindorf-Hase) merely adduces Camerarius' testimony: "So Cam., adding that the discrimination of the grammarians is a false one, although the passage in Thucydides, i (*sic.*) [8] seems to agree with it."
 30. This seems to be what Haack (on Thucyd., ii. 8) means when he defines *lo,gia* as *auguria, prcesagia vatium*, and *crhsmoi*, as *oracula deorum*.
 31. This seems the gist of Bredow's view (on Thucyd., ii. 8) : "*crhsmo,j cum verbis cra/n et crei/sqai oraculorum propriis cohaerens definite oraculum divinum vocatur; lo,gion autem aperte generalius vocabulorum est, sermo ominosus, verbum fatididum quod non interrogatus vel deus, vel vates elocutus est.*" Poppo and Goeller *ad loc.* quote these views but add nothing of value to them.
 32. Bouché-Leclercq seems almost inclined to revert to Eustathius' statement and look upon *lo,gion* as "an expression peculiar to the Attic dialect, as *pro,fanta* (Herod., v. 63; ix. 93) is an Ionic expression" (*op. cit.*, ii. 130, note 4).
 33. *crhsmw/n d v avoidou,j pa,ntaj eivj e;n avli,saj | h'legxa kai. be,bhla kai. kekrumme,na | lo,gia palaia. th|/ de. gh|/ swth,ria.*
 34. ways translation, 398 *seq.*
 35. Line 61. Blaydes says: "*sensus est, senes enim oracula amat.*"
 36. Line 120. Wheelwright's translation is used throughout.

37. Line 194.
38. pro,teron de. e;ti to.n avgw/na tou/ton proesh,mhnen h` Puqi,a(kai. to. lo,gion ei;te a;llwj ei;te kai. w]j sunei.j evdh,lwsen `Hro,dotoj\
 vAll v o[tan h` qh,leia to.n a;rrena nikh,sasa
 evxela,sh| kai. ku/doj evn vArgei,oisin a;rhtai
 polla.j vArgei,wn avmfidrufe,aj to,te qh,sei)
 Ta. me.n evj to. e;rgon tw/n gunaikw/n e;conta tou/ crhsmou/ tau/ta h=n. In. v. 3, 1; iv. 9, 4 ; ix. 37, 4 in like manner crhsmo,j is identified with ma,nteuma.
39. Bekker, i. 150.
40. ii. 412 D.
41. ii. 247 D. avpopeirw,menoi tw/n logi,wn. vExrh,sqh ga.r auvtoi/j\ . . .
42. ii. 268 E. avpofqe,ggesqai lo,gia(kai. crhsmw|dei/n toi/j evrwtw/sin\ . . .
43. i. 6.
44. The word, as will be seen, is as old as Herodotus: on the other hand - if we may trust the indices - it does not seem to occur in Homer (Dunbar's "Concordance" [to Odyssey], Gehring's "Index"), Hesiod (Paulsen's "Index"), Plato (Ast's "Lexicon") or Aristotle, Xenophon or Sophocles.
45. See above, p. 336.
46. Dr. Addison Alexander, with his usual clearness, posits the alternative admirably (on Acts vii. 38): "The Greek word (lo,gia) has been variously explained as a diminutive of (lo,goj) *word*, meaning a brief, condensed and frequent utterance; or as the neuter of an adjective (lo,gioj) meaning rational, profound, wise, and as a substantive, a wise saying." It would seem difficult to rise from a survey of the classical usage without an impression that it justifies the latter derivation. This usage is stated with perfect accuracy by DeMoor ("Com. in Marckii Compend.," i. 13): to. lo,gion "when used substantively may be considered as more emphatic than to. r`h/ma or even o` lo,goj: for this term means with the Greeks not any kind of word, but specifically an oracle, a divine response."
47. It occurs, according to the Brown-Gesenius "Lexicon," no less than 5287 times; according to Girdlestone ("Synonyms of the O. T.," ed. 2, p. 205), it "is generally rendered in the LXX. e;pw and le,gw." There seems to be inherent in the word an undertone of loftiness or authoritativeness due possibly to its etymological implication of

- "prominence." Its derivations are accordingly mostly poetical words designating a lofty speech or authoritative speech.
48. The verb, of doubtful origin, occurs according to Brown-Gesenius, 1142 times, and is generally rendered in the LXX. (Girdlestone, loc. cit.) *lale,w*. The noun occurs 1439 times and is rendered "generally *lo,goj*, sometimes *r`h/ma*, and in 35 passages, *pra/gma*."
 49. There is also the poetic word *ll;m'* and its derivative noun *hL'mi* - a word "used in 30 passages, 19 of which are in Job and 7 in Daniel," and rendered in the LXX. *lo,goj* and *r`h/ma* (Girdlestone).
 50. *rm,aO*, "except in Josh. xxiv. 27 (E) used exclusively in poetry, 48 times, of which 22 are in Proverbs and 11 in Job" (Driver on Deut. xxxii. 1). *hr'm.ai* "only found in poetry (36 times, of which 19 are in Ps. cxix.)" (Driver on Dent. xxxii. 2). *hr'm.a,*, Lam. ii. 17 only. *rm'a]m;*, Esth. i. 15, ii. 20, ix. 32 only. On the general subject of their poetic usage see Green, "General Introduction to the O. T.: The Text," p. 19; Bleek, "Introduction to the O. T.," E. T., i. 98; Havernick, "Einleitung," i. 172; Gesenius, "Geschichte der hebraischen Sprache," p. 22, and "Lehrgebäude," Register, p. 892; Vogel, "De Dialecto Poetica."
 51. *crhsmo,j*, for example, which we have found the constant accompaniment of *lo,gion* in the classics and shall find always by its side in Philo, does not occur in the LXX. at all. The cognates *crhmati,zw* (Jer. xxxii. (25) 30, xxxiii. (26) 2, xxxvi. (29) 23, xxxvii. (30) 2, *crhmatismo,j* (Prov. xxiv. 69 (xxxii. 1), II Macc. ii. 4), *crhmatisthri*, (I Kgs. viii. 6), are, however, found, and in their high sense. It is somewhat overstrained for Delitzsch (on Heb. viii. 5, E. T., Vol. ii. 32) to say: "The Septuagint word for the deliverance of a divine oracle or injunction is *crhmati,zein* (*tou.j lo,gouj*) *tini*, or *pro,j tina*:" *crhmati,zein* is found in this sense only in the LXX. Jeremiah. A very rich body of illustrations for the New Testament usages (Luke ii. 26, Acts x. 22, Heb. viii. 5) might, however, be culled from Philo.
 52. In some codd. but in the edd. we read, *kata. to. e;leo,j sou*.
 53. The passages are already enumerated just above.
 54. The other versions add nothing of importance. At Ps. cxix. 41 the *hr'm.ai* rendered *e;leo,j* by LXX. is rendered *lo,gion* by Aq. and Th.

In Ps. cxxxvii. (cxxxviii). 2 the hr'm.ai rendered by LXX. a[*gion* (though Baethgen remarks that this seems merely a corruption of lo,*gion*) is rendered lo,*gion* by Aq. and Quinta. In Isa. xxxii. 9, the hr'm.ai rendered in LXX. by lo,*goi* is given as lo,*gion* by Aq., a case quite parallel with Ps. xviii. 15 (xix. 15) in LXX. In Jer. viii. 9 the phrase hw'hy-rb;d.Bi is rendered in Aq. by lo,*gion*.

55. The statistics of this Psalm are: hr'm.ai is used 19 times: being translated by lo,*gion* 17 times, viz., at verses 11, 38, 50, 58, 67, 76, 82, 103, 115, 123, 133, 140, 148, 158, 162, 170, 172; at v. 41 it is translated to. e;*leoj*, though some codices read to.n lo,*gon* and some to. lo,*gion*; at v. 154 it is translated by lo,*gon*. rb'D' is used 23 times: being translated by lo,*goj* 15 times, viz., at verses 9, 16, 17, 28, 42, 43, 49, 74, 81, 89, 101, 130, 147, 160, 161; by lo,*gion* 4 times, viz., at verses 25, 65, 107, 109; by evntolh, twice, viz., at verses 57,139; by no,*moj* at v. 105, and by lao,j v. 114 (though some cod. read lo,*goi* or lo,*goj*). Lo,*gion* is used 23 times: being the translation of hr'm.ai 17 times, viz., at verses 11, 38, 50, 58, 67, 76, 82, 103, 115, 123, 133, 140, 148, 158, 162, 170, 172; of rb'D' 4 times (25, 65, 107, 169); of ds,h, once (124) and of fpvm once (149). lo,*goj* is used 17 times: being the translation of rb'D' 15 times, viz., at verses 9, 16, 17, 28, 42, 43, 49, 74, 81, 89, 101, 130, 147, 160, 161 and of hr'm.ai once (154, cf. 41), while once (42a) it is inserted without warrant from the Hebrew.
56. Delitzsch on v. 9 seq.: "The old classic (e. g., xviii. 31), ^t,r'm.ai alternates throughout with both are intended collectively." Perowne on v. 11: "WORD, or rather 'saying,' 'speech,' distinct from the word employed, for instance, in v. 9. Both words are constantly interchanged throughout the Psalm."
57. Delitzsch on v. 145-152: "hr'm.ai is here as in verses 140, 158, the whole Word of God, whether in its requirements or its promises."
58. Driver on Deut. xxxii. 2: "Only found in poetry (36 times, of which 19 are in Ps. 119); cf. Isa. xxviii. 23, xxxii. 9."
59. On this passage cf. Konig, " Offenbarungsbegriff," ii. 149, 150.
60. "The God of Israel is the Almighty Governor of nature. It is He who

sends His fiat (!tr'm.ai after the manner of the rmeaOYw: of the history of creation, cf. xxxiii. 9), earthward. . . . The word is His messenger (cf. in cvii. 20), etc." Delitzsch, *in loc.*

61. It seems certainly inadequate to render hr'm.ai by "saying," as is very frequently done, e. g., by Dr. John DeWitt in his "Praise Songs of Israel" (we have only the first edition at hand), by Dr. Maclaren in the cxix. Psalm ("Expositor's Bible") and by Dr. Driver at Ps. cv. 19; cf. cxlvii. 15 *seq.* This English word suggests nothing of the lofty implications which seem to have attached to the Hebrew term.
62. On Rom. iii. 2.
63. On Rom. iii. 2 (pp. 14,15).
64. Possibly Bleek *in loc.* Heb. v. 12 means the same thing when he says the word stands here of "the inspired religious song of the poet."
65. Ex. xxviii. 15, 22, 23, 24, 24, 26, xxix. 5, 5 A. R., xxxv. 27, xxxvi. 15, 16, 22, 24, 25, 27, 29, 29; Lev. viii. 8, 8; Sir. xlv. 10. Also in Aq.: Ex. xxv. 6 (7), xxviii. 4, xxxv. 9. In Sm.: Ex. xxviii. 4, 28. In Th.: Ex. xxv. 6 (7), xxviii. 4, 23, 23, xxviii. 24, 26, 28, xxxv. 9.
66. Hebrews, pp. 115, 116, note.
67. It is not intended to deny that Philo recognized a certain divine influence working beyond the limits of Scripture: but he does this without prejudice to his supreme regard for the Scriptures as the only proper oracles of God. At the opening of the tractate "Quod Omn. Prob. Lib." (§1, M. 444, 445), he gives expression in the most exalted terms to his appreciation of the value of Greek thought: the Pythagoreans are a most sacred brotherhood (i`erw,tatoj qi,asoj) whose teachings are ka,la, and all men who have genuinely embraced philosophy (filosofi,an gnhsi,wj hvspa,santo) have found one of their lo,goi a qesmo.n ivsou,menon crhsmw/|. Elsewhere he speaks of Parmenides, Empedocles, Zeno and Cleanthes and their like as "divi homines" constituting a "sacer coetus" ("De Prov.," § 48), who did not cast their teachings in verse only because it was fitting that they should not be quite gods ("De Prov.," § 42). But even here the crhsmo,j is the standard to which their teaching is only likened: with all their wisdom they fall short of deity; and it is the utterance of deity alone which is "oracular" - and this utterance is discernible only in the Scriptures of the Jews. We venture to quote here the

statements of Prof. James Drummond ("Philo`udæus," i. pp.13 *seq.*): The Scriptures "were the 'oracles,' the 'sacred' or 'divine word,' whose inspiration extended to the most minute particulars. Philo distinguishes indeed different kinds of inspiration, but the distinction did not affect its divine authority. . . . Communion between God and man is among the permanent possibilities of our race; and Philo goes so far as to say that every good and wise man has the gift of prophecy, while it is impossible for the wicked man to become an interpreter of God ("Quis rer. div. heres." 52 [i. 510]). It is true that he is referring here primarily to the good men in the Scriptures, but he seems to regard them as representatives of a general law. He did not look upon himself as a stranger to this blessed influence, but sometimes 'a more solemn word' spoke from his own soul, and he ventured to write down what it said to him ("Cherubim," 9 [i. 143]). In one passage he fully records his experience ("Migrat. Abrah.," 7 [i. 441]). . . . Elsewhere he refers to the suggestions of the Spirit which was accustomed to commune with him unseen ("De Somniis," ii. 38 [i. 692]).... But he ascribed to the Biblical writers a fullness of this divine enthusiasm, and consequent infallibility of utterance, which he claimed for no others."

68. Yonge's translation (in Bohn's Ecclesiastical Library) is made use of in these citations. The paging of Mangey is often given and sometimes that of the Paris edition: but the edition of Richter is the one that has been actually used. The shortcomings of Yonge's translation (cf. Edersheim's article, "Philo," in Smith and Wace's "Dictionary of Christian Biography," iv. 367 A, note o), will be evident to the reader; but when important for our purpose will be correctable from the Greek clauses inserted.
69. Cf. on this matter Edersheim in Smith and Wace's "Dictionary of Christian Biography," art. "Philo" (Vol. iv. pp. 386, 387): The only books "of which it may with certainty be said that they are not referred to by Philo, are Esther and the Song of Solomon. The reference to Ecclesiastes is very doubtful, much more so than that to Daniel (p. 387 a)." Cf. also Ryle, "Philo and Holy Scripture," pp. 16-35: "It is abundantly clear that to Philo the Pentateuch was a Bible within a Bible, and that he only occasionally referred to other books, whose sanctity he acknowledged, as opportunity chanced to present

itself" (p. 27). Cf. also Ewald, "History of Israel," E. T., vii. 204, 205: "Although he uses, and generally in the order in which they are now found in the Hebrew Canon, the other books much less *gradatim* than the Pentateuch, their authors are, nevertheless, considered by him as of equal holiness and divinity with Moses, and inasmuch as from his whole view and treatment of the Scriptures, he can attribute but little importance to their authors as authors, or to their names and temporal circumstances, he likes to call them all simply friends, or associates, or disciples of Moses, or prefers still more to quote the passage to which he refers simply as a sacred song, sacred word, etc." "It is only the books which we now find collected in the Hebrew Canon which he regarded as holy, and he was both sufficiently learned and careful not to rank all the others which were at that time gradually appended to the Greek Bible upon an equality with them." Cf. also Lee, "The Inspiration of Holy Scripture," pp. 69, 70.

70. Compare Ewald, "The History of Israel," E. T., vii. 203, 204: "The sacred Scriptures are to Philo so immediately divine and holy, that he consistently finds in them simply the divine word rather than Scripture, and therefore really everywhere speaks less of the *Sacred Scriptures* than of divine oracles [crhsmoi,(lo,gia] of which they were wholly composed, or, when he desires to designate them briefly as a whole, of *the sacred and divine Word*, as if the same Logos, of whom he speaks so much elsewhere, were symbolized and incorporated in them for all time, as far as that is possible in a book [o` i`ero.j, more rarely o` qei/oj lo,goj, likewise o` ovrqo.j lo,goj (e. g., i. 308, 27; 681, 17; cf. esp., ii. 163, 44) is the expression which he constantly uses in this case; cf. esp. i. 676, 37 seq.; 677, 12]. It is true that in the case of the general subject matter, of the Pentateuch for instance, he makes a certain distinction, inasmuch as some of the oracles come to the prophet, as a mere interpreter directly as from the presence and voice of God alone, while others are revealed to him by God in answer to his interrogations, and again others have their origin in himself when in an inspired state of mind. But he makes this threefold distinction simply because he found it in reading particular passages of the Bible, and not with a view of further reflecting upon it and drawing references from it. On the contrary, he regards and treats all the sentences and words of the Scripture as on a perfect

equality and teaches expressly that sacred Scripture must be interpreted and applied, as forming even to its smallest particles, one inseparable whole [cf. esp. "Auch.," ii. 170, 212 *seq.*; in other respects, cf. i. 554, 14, and many other passages of a similar character]."

71. The translation here is unusually expanded: the Greek runs Dhloi/ de. kai. l) e) p(q) t) t) o[) h`) peri. tou/ medeni. tou/ dedhlw/sqai o;noma, ti auvtou/ ku,rion(ktl)
72. "De Profug.," §§11 and 28; "De Vita Moysis," i. 53; iii. 23, 30, 35, 36.
73. Philo's designations of Scripture have been collected by Cl. Frees Hornemann, in his "Observationes ad illustr. doctr. de Can. V. T. ex. Philone" (1775); more briefly by Eichhorn in his "Einl. in d. A. Test.;" and in a not altogether complete or exact list by Ryle, "Philo and Holy Scripture."
74. As to grafai, see "Quis rerum div. heres," §32 (Mangey, i. 495), par v o] kai. evn i`erai/j grafai/j le,getai; "De Abrah.," §1 (M. ii. 2), "Now these are those men who have lived irreproachably . . . whose virtues are durably and permanently recorded as on pillars, evn tai/j i`erwta,taij grafai/j." As to gra,mma(gra,mmata, see "De Congr. Erud. Grat.," §12 (M.1. 527), ;Esti de. kai. evte,rwqi to. gra,mma tou/to evsthliteume,non (Deut. xxxii. 8) "; "Quod Deus Immut.," §2 (M. i. 273), "For in the first book of Kings (= I Sam. i. 20), she (Hannah) speaks in this manner: 'I give him (Samuel) unto thee freely,' the expression here used being equivalent to 'I give him unto thee whom thou hast given unto me,' kata. to. i`erw,taton Mwu?se,wj gra,mma tou/to, 'My gifts and my offerings, and my firstfruits, ye shall observe to offer unto me'; "Legat. ad Caium," §29 (M. ii. 574), "You have never been trained in the knowledge of the sacred Scriptures (toi/j i`eroi/j gra,mmasin"; "De Vita M.," iii. 39; etc.
75. In the New Testament gra,mma does not occur in the sense of a passage of Scripture - as indeed ta. gra,mmata occurs of Scripture only in II Tim. iii. 15, cf. John v. 47. The place of gra,mma in this sense is taken in the New Testament by grafh,, though it is extreme to say with Lightfoot on Gal. iii. 22 (cf. Westcott on John ii. 22) that grafh,, always in the New Testament refers to a particular passage. On the other hand this use of grafh, is far from peculiar to the New Testament as seems to be implied by Stephens ("Thes." *sub. voc.*).

Not only does it occur familiarly in the Fathers, as e. g. (from Sophocles): Clems. Rom., ii. 2; Justin Mart., "Advs. Tryph.," cc. 56, 65 (a very instructive case), 69, 71 (cf. Otto's note here) and elsewhere; Clems. Alex., "Cohort ad Gentes.," ix. *ad init.*: but also in Philo, as e. g., "De Praem. et Poem.," §11 near the end (M. ii. 418): "Being continually devoted to the study of the Holy Scriptures both in their literal sense and also in the allegories figuratively contained in them (evn tai/j r`htai/j grafai/j kai. evn tai/j u`po,noian avllhgori,aij)," and "Quis rerum div. her.," §53 (M. i. 511): "And the historian connects with his preceding account what follows in consistency with it, saying . . . (to. de. avko,louqon prosufai,nei th/ grafh/ fa,skwn)." Of course Philo sometimes uses h` grafh, in the non-technical sense also, of a human treatise: thus at the opening of "De Somniis" he refers to what was contained in the preceding treatise h` me.n ou=n pro. tau,thj grafh. periei/ce). What is said in the text is not intended to traverse such facts as these, indicating other usages; but is meant only to suggest in a broad way what seems to be the primary distinction between the three usages; the subsequent development undergone by them is another story.

76. Thus of the passage cited above: in "Quod det pot. insid.," §14, the reference is to the narrative of Gen. iv; in "De Vita Moysis," iii. 35, to the whole legislation concerning food; in "De Profug.," § 28, and "De Mutat. Nom.," §4, apparently to the whole Bible.
77. "De Decem Oraculis," title and §10; "De Sobrietate," §10; "De Praem. et Poen.," §1; "De Vita Moysis," iii. §23; "De Legat. ad Caium," §31; "De Vita Contemplativa," §3.
78. Cf. the echo of Josephus' language in Tacitus, "Hist.," v. 13: "Pluribus persuasio inerat, *antiquis sacerdotum litteris* (= evn toi/j i`eroi/j gra,mmasi) contineri, eo ipso tempore fore ut valesceret Oriens profectique Judæa rerum potirentur. Quae *ambages* (= crhsmo.j avmfi,boloj = to. lo,gion) Vespasianum et Titum praedixerant."
79. *The Contemporary Review*, August, 1875, p. 400; "Essays on the work entitled Supernatural Religion" (1889), p. 173.
80. *In loc.*
81. *Loc. cit.*
82. *In loc.*
83. Cf. what Prof. Ropes says of this passage in *The American Journal of*

Theology, October, 1899 (iii. 698) and his strictures on Resch's use of it.

84. Or lo,gwn, as is read by both Schwegler and Heinichen: contra Routh, Lightfoot and Gebhardt-Harnack.
85. If there ever was such a "Collection of Sayings of Jesus," the natural title of it would certainly not be ta. kuriaka. lo,gia, but something like the h` su,ntaxij tw/n kuriakw/n lo,gwn which Papias says (if we adopt the reading lo,gwn) Mark did not write. We observe with astonishment, the venerable Prof. Godet saying, in his recent volume on the Gospels, that the existence of such collections of lo,gia is now put beyond doubt by the discovery of the Oxyrhynchus fragment. The last word has doubtless not been said as to the nature and origin of this fragment: but that it was a collection of LOGIA rests solely on the ascription of that title to it by its editors - a proceeding which in turn rests solely on their traditional misunderstanding of the Papias phrase. And that Matthew's "Logia" were "Logia" like these is scarcely a supposable case to a critic of Prof. Godet's views. Meanwhile we cannot but account it unfortunate that Messrs. Grenfell and Hunt should have attached so misleading a title to their valuable discovery: to which it is suitable only in one aspect, viz., as describing these "sayings" of Jesus as (in the conception of the compiler, as the constant le,gei shows) "oracular utterances" of present and continuous authority.
86. Why should Resch, we may ask, think of rbd instead of hrma as the Hebrew original of lo,gion? Cf. above p. 353.
87. *Op. cit.*, p. 121 seq.
88. "Introduction," last ed., 527, note 1.
89. See Liddell and Scott, *sub. voc.*, iv. and v.
90. We must account it, then, as only another instance of that excess of caution which characterizes his application of the "apologetical" results of investigation, when Dr. Sanday still holds back from this conclusion and writes thus: "The word lo,gia, indeed, means 'oracles' and not 'discourses.' But while the term 'the oracles' might well from the first have been applied to our Lord's words it is hardly likely that it should so early have been applied to a writing of the New Testament as such. Moreover, even when the inspiration of the New Testament had come to be as clearly recognized as that of the Old

Testament, the term 'the oracles' would not have been a fitting one for a single work, simply on the ground that it formed part of the collection" (Hastings' "Bible Dictionary," ii. p. 235 a). Apart altogether from the fact that these caveats are founded on a demonstrably mistaken conception of the origin of the New Testament Canon, they are in themselves invalid. The term *logia* was contemporaneously applied to writings of the New Testament as such - as a glance at II Clem. xiii. and Polycarp vii. will show - and as Lightfoot's note on the former passage, correcting his less careful earlier note on the latter passage, points out. And that *ta. logia* could easily refer to any definite portion of the congeries of "oracles" known also as "Scripture," Philo's usage as indicated above (p. 374) sufficiently exhibits. For the rest, it cannot be doubted that Papias was understood by all his early readers to mean by his *ta. logia* of Matthew, just Matthew's Gospel. This has been sufficiently shown ("Einleitung," ii. 265) by Zahn, who in his rich and fundamentally right remarks on the subject both here and elsewhere (e. g., pp. 254 *seq.* and "Geschichte d. Kanons," i. 857 *seq.*, ii. 790 *seq.*) supplies another instance of how near a great scholar can come to the truth of a matter without precisely adopting it.

91. In the thirty-fifth chapter of the fourth book of Origen's "Against Celsus," there is a passage which is given this appearance in Dr. Crombie's excellent English translation, printed in the "Ante-Nicene Library" (Am. Ed., iv. 512): "And yet if Celsus had wished honestly to overturn the genealogy which he deemed the Jews to have so shamelessly arrogated, in boasting of Abraham and his descendants (as their progenitors), he ought to have quoted all the passages bearing on the subject; and, in the first place, to have advocated his cause with such arguments as he thought likely to be convincing, and in the next to have bravely refuted, by means of what appeared to him to be the true meaning, and by arguments in its favor, the errors existing on the subject (*kai. toi/j u`pe.r auvth/j logi,oi,j ta. kata. to.n to,pon*)." The rendering of *logi,oi,j* here by "arguments," however, is certainly wrong. The whole context is speaking of Celsus' misrepresentation of the teaching of the Hebrew Scriptures; and what Origen would have him do is to point out the passages in them which will bear out his allegations. According to Koetschau's index

the word occurs but twice elsewhere in the treatise "Against Celsus," viz., V. xxix. *ad fin.*, and VI. lxxvii. near the end (inserted by Koetschau from Philoc. 85, 16): and in both of these cases the high meaning of the word is unmistakable.

92. Dr. F. W. Farrar, with his fatal facility for quoting phrases in senses far other than those attached to them by their authors (other instances meet us in his dealing with the formula "*Scriptura complectitur Verbum Dei*" and with the word "Inspiration" in the same context, - see pp. 369, 370 of work cited) makes a thoroughly wrong use of this passage ("Hist. of Interpretation," p. 374, note 2). He says: "But as far back as the eighth century the eminently orthodox Father, St. John of Damascus, had said, 'We apply not to the written word of Scripture the title due to the Incarnate Word of God.' He says that when the Scriptures are called *logia qeou*/ the phrase is only figurative, 'Disput. Christiani et Saraceni' (see Lupton, St. John of Damascus, p. 95)." But John says the Scriptures *are* called without figure *r`h,mata tou/ qeou/*: he only means to say they are not God's Word *in the same sense* that the Logos is: in comparison with Him who is the only incarnate Word of God, they are only figuratively words of God, but they are real words of God, nevertheless, His *r`h,mata*, by which designation, rather than *logia*, John would have them called, not to avoid confessing them to be God's utterances, but to escape a Moslem jibe.
93. An instance of the secular use of the word in this lowered meaning, is found doubtless in the Scholium on the "Frogs" of Aristophanes adduced above, p. 336. The date of this Scholium is uncertain, but it seems to belong to the later strata of the Scholia. It is not found in the "Ravenna MS.," which Rutherford is publishing; nor in the "Venetus" (Marc. 474), cf. Blaydes, "Ranae," p. 391; nor indeed in four out of the six MSS. used by Dindorf (iv. 2, p. 113).
94. In his "Concise Dictionary of English and Modern Greek," *sub. vocc.* "word" and "saying."
95. In his "New Lexicon of Modern Greek and English," *sub voc.*
96. Sophocles, in his "Lexicon," gives also the following references for this sense: Titus of Bostra (Migne, xviii. 1253 B); Serapion of Egypt (Migne, xl. 908 C, 909 B). References might be added, apparently, indefinitely.

97. It is therefore a perfectly blind comment that we meet with in Gerhard Heine's recent "Synonymik des N. T. Griechisch" (1898), p. 157 - when in contrast to *lo,goj* as the "reasonable expression" of the *nou/j to. lo,gion* is said to be "more the separate utterance, with the (occasional?) accessory notion of promise (Rom. iii. 2)."
98. See article entitled, "It Says; Scripture Says; God Says," in the number of this *Review* for July, 1899, and also article entitled, "God-Inspired Scripture," in the number for January, 1900.